5-1992

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Churches, Church Development Agencies and American Foreign Policy in Nicaragua: A Case Study

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For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in Political Science

University of Richmond

May, 1992

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Churches and church agencies have always been involved in American public and political life. These involvements exhibited cooperation and common interest. An example of this includes the combined efforts to help European refugees following World War II.

Since then, churches have challenged their partnership with government. Sensitivity to Third World issues, theologies of liberation, ideologies of oppression, and the values malaise brought on by the Vietnam War separated some interests of American churches and their government. What would churches do when confronted with an American foreign policy they considered immoral and oppressive?

The hypotheses of Robert Sullivan and Jørgen Lissner and the history of Sandinista Nicaragua intersect and form a case study. Rather than disband the Church/State partnership in light of increasing value incongruities (Sullivan), I contend that the pluralistic influences affecting the modern church agency encourage the partnership to remain and evolve in spite of the incongruities (Lissner).

I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



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A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the University of Richmond

in Candidacy

for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Political Science

May, 1992

Richmond, Virginia

Chapter 1

Introduction

Up until the Vietnam War, American church relief agencies had often and freely cooperated with their government and its foreign policy objectives. Since the end of World War II, the partnership between church agencies and the federal government has expanded and the agencies have complemented or supplemented the government's efforts in overseas relief, refugee assistance and development. In his book, The Uneasy Alliance, an historical survey of church/state/cooperation in refugee programming, Bruce Nichols described this twenty-year period of time as a "remarkable partnership" unmatched in America's history before or since (Nichols,p.83).

The Vietnam War marked a transitional chapter in the relationship between the church relief agencies and the foreign policies of the American government. Prior to the war, isolated groups such as the Mennonites and their well known position of conscientious objection opposed some American foreign policies. The history of church agency activities during the Vietnam War provides evidence of a shift from agency cooperation with the American government and its foreign policy objectives to varying degrees of confrontation. The following paragraphs outline the passage from church agency cooperation to confrontation.

As has been always the case, cooperation with American foreign policy objectives meant accepting and using federal government grants

targeted towards the world's regions where American interests were strong. The State Department's figures for 1969 indicate that ten out of the twenty-two agencies represented in the umbrella agency, the Council of Voluntary Agencies in Vietnam (CVAV), received program assistance, and many of the others received shipping cost reimbursements (Nichols, p.103). In that same year, 50% of all the money used to administer voluntary agency programs in Vietnam came from the federal government ($6.6 million) with an additional $17.4 million in material and food assistance (Nichols, p.103). In 1972, the largest church agency operating in Vietnam, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was still receiving 94% of its $3.9 million budget for relief and refugee resettlement from federal funds (Sommer, p.94). Even though the precentage of the CRS budget derived from federal funds is higher than any other American church agency, the source of the funds and the total amount are not unusual for an agency which worked in Vietnam.

In addition to accepting federal dollars, cooperation with the government's interests obviously included programs which benefited those interests. In Vietnam, all agencies provided forms of medical and food relief assistance and refugee resettlement activities. More controversial were the programs and camps run by the Vietnam Christian Service (VCS), an ecumenical organization including Lutheran World Relief (LWR), the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), and Church World Service of the National Council of Churches (CWS). The camps housed defectors from the National Liberation Front and were used in Saigon's war prisoner reeducation efforts (Sommer, p.98). It was even alleged

(though always denied) that CRS cooperated with government interests to such an extent that up to half of its money intended for refugee food assistance had been given to the South Vietnamese Militia (Nichols, p.102). Clearly and at least indirectly, church agencies were involved in the war efforts and were rewarded for these by receiving the U.S. government privileges of free transportation and commissary and postal services for agency personnel (Nichols, p.103).

According to John Sommer, former director of the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C., cooperative activities like the above demonstrated a shared understanding between church agencies and American policymakers that American foreign policy was just and benevolent. Church organizations which operated relief efforts during World War II (CWS, CRS, LWR, CARE, etc.) maintained institutional ideologies in common with American foreign policy. The United States government, the majority of its citizens, and American church institutions appeared to share common interests (Sommer, p.105). Thus, the cooperation which church agencies gave during the first years of the Vietnam War was not unusual. Only after the charge was made that the U.S. government had no humanitarian interests, or in the words of Robert Miller, director of VCS from 1968-71, that "the goals of the agencies were primarily humanitarian and were basically different from the government's" did the church agency/U.S. government consensus deteriorate (Nichols, p.105). Teh decisions by individual church groups and later whole denominations to challenge and confront American foreign policy during the middle and

later years of the war were very unusual, given the long history of church agency relations with official foreign policy.

The shift from cooperation to confrontation with the U.S. government began as early as 1965 from a group with pacifist leanings similar to the Mennonites. In that year, a Quaker Action Group attempted to send a boat of medical relief supplies to the North Vietnamese. The State Department retaliated by confiscating the group's bank assets and forcing it to open accounts in Canadian banks. The State Department later relented and the money was returned (Sommer, p.104).

This attempt at establishing contact with teh enemy of the United States would later be followed up by similar actions by the Action Group's denomination. In 1969, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the overseas development and relief agency of the Quaker church, began unilaterally to ship non-lethal supplies to the North Vietnamese. They, like the action group before them, experienced government harrassment through selective enforcement of wartime shipping regulations (Sommer, p.104).

Confrontation with American policy also included written statements by denominations as a means of instruction to its members. In 1967 the Presbyterian Church in the USA published its study, Vietnam - the Christian - the Gospel - the Church. In it the policy body of the PCUSA, the Office of the General Assembly, advocated five changes in American war policy. These were:

(1) that America should halt the bombing of North Vietnam;
(2) that America should fight an all-out defensive war;
(3) that America should seek medication through the United Nations;
(4) that public dissent is moral; and
(5) that the expressions or personal conscience are moral (PCUSA/OGA, p.5).

Given the context of the time which included various forms of draft resistance, the stance by the Presbyterian Church was controversial.

Other American churches joined in the clamor against the American government's war policy, basing their criticisms in the Just War Doctrine. The American Lutheran Church, the American Baptist Convention, the United Church of Christ, the African Methodist-Episcopal Church, and the Catholic Committee of Vietnam, a seperate populist organization in opposition to CRS activities, all advocated some form of dissent against the war in Vietnam (Smylie, p.395).

Lastly, the coalition of agencies brought together for common service to the war's victims began to break down even as the toll of human suffering rose. In 1969, the MCC withdrew its participation from the VCS, citing the need to serve other interests. Letters from MCC leaders to the boards of MCC organizations stated that they had become "disillusioned by the palliative efforts [of relief work] which caused more harm than good (Dyck, p.116)." In 1971, the International Voluntary Services (IVS), an ecumenical organization which had served in Vietnam since 1954 with grants from AID, was refused any additional funds due to their critique of the war through letters to United Nations and Nixon Administration Leaders and those published in the New York Times (Nichols, p.104). The Mennonites would ultimately join the Quakers in

1972 in sending assistance to the North Vietnamese as a "desire to assist in the reconstruction of war-torn areas of Indo-China (Dyck, p.116)."

As a symbol of final abandoment of their acceptance of official U.S. policies in Vietnam, the former members of VCS formed another coalition which they named Friendshipment. Instead of aiding Saigon, the three church agencies now sent relief and reconstruction supplies to the reunited Vietnamese (Sommer, p.104).

While the examples above may not necessarily show denominations working against their government, they do demonstrate clearly that many churches were no longer supporting it, either. This conclusion is supported in Nichols' analysis of refugee policy.

> For many with religious motives, the golden cord binding the moral purpose of the government and the church in international humanitatian assistance was severed in Vietnam. On this analysis church groups were gradually realizing the width of the gulf that seperated their purposes in aiding refugees from those of the state. In further eroding what remained of post-war church/state cooperation in foreign policy, the Vietnam War highlighted the critical role of religion in formulating (or destroying) that consensus (Nichols, p.107).

If Vietnam is seen as the period of transition for church agencies moving from cooperation to confrontation, one might ask whether the confrontation has continued since the war. In some ways, the answer is yes.

Most of America's Protestant and Orthodox Churches participate in the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC's Program to Combat Racism (PCR) has a particular interest in America's foreign policy in

southern Africa. Aided by an ideology which included the belief that racism (a heresy in the Christian Church) was supported by international economic and military power, PCR asked churches to stand with and transfer power to the world's oppressed. This would be accomplished through international educational conferences, South African investment and divestment strategies, and grants to liberation groups (Adler, pgs.15-19).

The most controversial aspect of PCR was the distribution of the grants (see appendix for PCR grants, for 1970-1974). The criteria established to identify "worthy" groups to receive the grants and to determine the amounts to be given were as follows:

(1) money should be used for humanitarian purposes;
(2) money should be used to strengthen the organizational capacity of oppressed people;
(3) no external constraints on the use of the money should be adopted; and
(4) South Africa should be given priority status (Lissner, p.257).

The above list of the first recipients of WCC grants include numerous liberation groups not supporting American foreign policy. The loose terms adopted by the WCC were meant to limit any interference into a liberation organization's internal affairs.

WCC critics labeled the program hypocritical, political, and anti-Western. They accused the WCC of supporting terrorist organizations and, of proof, pointed to a $45,000 grant awarded to the Patriotic Front of Rhodesia after it was reported that the Front had massacred eight missionaries (Smith, Bernard, p.15).

What has happened to American churches and their developmental assistance agencies in the past twenty years? Do the above examples show American churches becoming more militant or, as in the case of the AFSC in Vietnam, even subversive of American foreign policies? Why are churches involved in programs and activities which embarrass the United States and question the government's interpretation of its geopolitical interests? Do the events such as the above signal an end to the longterm and cordial partnership between Church and State in providing relief and developmental assistance abroad? And if so, why? Two American sociologists of religion have tried to form theoretical answers to these questions.

One, Peter Berger, suggests that an interest towards survival motivates the churches to seperate themselves from government policy. In his book, The Sacred Canopy, he writes that modern, secular America has demonopolized religion's hold on American values. Throughout much of American history, religious values not only inspired home, hearth, and the individual, but also the values of social life, economics, and politics. As religious affiliation has eroded, so has religion's monopoly over the source of public and private values. Secularization in American life has stripped American religion from having much economic, political, and social value, leaving religion as a purely personal and therefore subjective authority. In order to regain the cultural ground lost to secularization and find its new identity in the modern world, religion must do one of two things. Either it must

accommodate itself and become a purely personal affair and thereby accept its "limited sphere of influence" as a provider of values, or it must continue to resist current trends and the sources of secularization and offer alternative social, political, and economic values (Berger, p.129).

Jeffrey Hadden, a sociologist at the University of Virginia, suggests a different motivation in the movement of many American churches towards greater independence and confrontation with American policy. He writes that "secularization has helped to redefine the relationship between religion and the state. Religion no longer reaffirms the interests of the state but is free to redefine the relationship (Hadden, p. 27). Like Berger (and so many others, beginning with Vice-President John Adams, de Tocqueville, Robert Bellah's studies in civil religion, and Martin Marty's histories of American religion), Hadden speaks of a traditional, observable relationship of cooperation, common values, even at times common interests, which have characterized the relationship between church and state in American history. Hadden also sees secularization as a force which has disturbed and disrupted the previous relationship. But instead of perceiving this change as a detrimental force (at least initially) for the church, Hadden describes the break as one of liberation and opportunity for the churches. As the supporting values between church and state have been loosened, the church is provided an avenue of freedom whereby it can be "true to itself" and its operational

statements. Thus modern secularization allows the church to be the church and no longer the handmaiden for the state and its overseas interests.

But if these two sociologists begin to shed light on the reasons for confrontation activity on the part of churches towards American foreign policy, does the discussion above show that church agencies have succeeded in "renewing, resisting, or liberating" themselves from American foreign policy interests? If church agencies are no longer dependent upon government, are they now equal actors competing in the same foreign affairs arenas but with differing values and interests? These kinds of questions and the ambiguity they express form the backdrop of this thesis.

Two studies, both entitled The Politics of Altruism, provide contradictory conclusions and hypotheses as well as the theoretical starting point for this thesis. One of these studies, a book by Robert Sullivan, analyzes the history and actions taken by churchwide development agencies that participated in overseas federal food assistance programs. He argues that for twenty years, between 1945 and 1965, enough common interest existed between American food producers, the churches, and U.S. foreign policy makers and their policies toward Europe and, later, toward the developing world, that church and state could work together and provide food assistance. After elaborating on the interests of all parties involved in the triangular relationship and documenting the various actions taken by

denominational and ecumenical organizations, Sullivan hypothesizes that the partnership between church and state would collapse should the fragile framework of interests and resources binding the partners together continue to erode (Sullivan, p.389). The erosion which Sullivan saw was primarily due to America's increased security interests in Vietnam. The concept which binds the thoughts of Sullivan, Berger, and Hadden together is the word "separation," i.e., the process of separating from American foreign policy. To interpret briefly and metaphysically these three authors, the Kairos (pregnant moment) for this separation is now, and it has been brought on by the trends of secularism, modernism, pluralism, and an increasingly security conscious United States. The church emphasis then shifts to a more global focus on justice, equal participation for peoples and nations, human rights, and economic rights. This focus has been demonstrated as much through the words of Pope John XXIII and his preferential option for the poor as through the WCC's PCR.

Jørgen Lissner, who works for one of these church agencies, namely, the Lutheran World Federation in Geneva, Switzerland, has written a book with the same title as Sullivan's book but with a different conclusion. Reasoning from a descriptive model of church agency behavior, a revamped theory for political party and voter behavior, and his own case studies, Lissner argues that only under "conditions of extreme ideological conviction and member cohesion would a church agency bite the hand that feeds it (Lissner, p.268)." Highly charged debates alone will not dislodge a church's activities in support of

governmental interests. Thus, even the activities of churches during the Vietnam War were limited responses. Because agencies operate under the pressure and uncertainty of "income maximization" (the need to replenish funds and donors), only the most intense pressure, or internal organizational disruption, or unusual coordination of the many distinct groups which make up the agency, would move that agency to a theological or ideological goal that confronts or subverts official government actions and policies.

Whose work, Sullivan's or Lissner's, helps us to understand better the Mennonites and Quaker agencies working against their country's interests? Do church development agencies follow American foreign policies even in situations which do not lend themselves to their published understandings of justice and mission? Or, do the agencies strive to follow a seperate path, no longer tied to American interests overseas, and have their own independent understanding of global justice? A comparison of Sullivan's and Lissner's theses, a review of their evidence, and a summary of their conclusions and hypotheses provide the theoretical framework for this study. The next chapter of this thesis reviews their ideas.

In various ways, Sullivan, Berger, and Hadden allude to the opportunity available to American church agencies to reform their policies and activities independent of American foreign policy. Alongside the word "opportunity" stands its opposite -- "constraint." Both opportunities and constraints characterize a church agency's

internal operations and organization, its external relationship to federal agencies and national policies, and its operations in the host country that has asked for assistance. The plans, projects, and actions taken by a church agency exist in the tension between programmatic opportunity and realistic constraints. Chapter three of this thesis will look at three forms of constraint on the policies and actions of church agencies.

The first form of constraint concerns the identity and perceptions that church agencies maintain about themselves. Most agencies describe themselves and their worldly missions in highly theological and idealistic language. Such hard-to-pin-down phrases as "justice and equity," "equal participation," and others are the norm of church agency mission statements (some of which are included in the appendix section of this thesis). Historically, private voluntary organizations (PVO) have also said they do certain things better than their governmental counterparts because of what they are--independent, innovative, and quick to respond to changing circumstances in international environments. The accuracy of these perceptions is questioned in the work of Ralph Kramer (and others) and by some highly critical reports and evaluations by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) on private assistance and development.

The internal constraints on a church agency are the second major set of limitations affecting the agency's programmatic initiatives. Internal constraints include securing and maintaining adequate sources

of funds, the leadership (or lack thereof) for the agency, and the pluralistic make-up of the agency's constituency.

External constraints on church agency behavior are the last set of limitations on program freedom. Federal licensing and application procedures often place strings on the church agency's behavior and on who may receive the assistance. The very magnitude of some agencies' dependence on federal dollars for their operational budgets calls into question the programmatic freedom of those agencies.

Each set of constraints restricts the style and content of agency programming. Taken together, they complicate the desire of an agency to serve the "world's oppressed."

Using as a framework the theories and models of the Lissner/Sullivan debate, recent history, and the praxis and criticism found in the first three chapters, chapter four looks at evidence provided by a case study. This final chapter studies perhaps the most controversial foreign policy issue for American churches in the last ten years--American foreign policy in Central America. Outside of South Africa, no other area has received so much attention from American mainline denominations. One has only to look through church publication catalogues to see the concerns about Central America. Most Protestant denominations have operations in Central American countries. The question Sullivan would raise is whether conditions and opportunities presently found in Central America provide the impetus for the agencies to work for change. Does their published and verbal hostility towards official American policy

translate into local actions? Or do the constraints of history, including the agency's historical involvement on site, administrative and organizational details, governmental strings, and agency funding need limits their activism? To what extent are church agencies engaged in practices which seem to help Sandinista interests over and against American foreign policy wishes? If some agency provides significant services against official American policy (smuggling in replacement parts for nonworking American-made machinery), does this support Sullivan's thesis of an increasing trend towards conflict and separation between church ideals and government interests? Or do Lissner's more limited conclusions ultimately seem to be confirmed?

The case study is divided into four critical areas as examined through four questions.

(1) What was U.S. foreign policy in the region during the time of Sandinista rule? Specifically, what were the official U.S. interests in Nicaragua and what policies were adopted to promote those interests?

(2) What were the reactions of American mainline Protestant denominations to the region especially during Sandinista rule? Were there evident changes in their programming during this period of time?

(3) Using the records of Congressional hearings, interviews and denominational data when available, and other published denominational material (church periodicals, etc.), what was the church's position towards the region and towards American policy itself?

(4) How well do the Lissner and Sullivan models provide a framework for understanding church agencies with regard to American policy in the region?

Where possible, interview data from agency officials will be used to fill out the case study.

I acknowledge two limiting factors in the further exploration of the thesis. Both Lissner and Sullivan include Roman Catholic agencies in their studies. After repeated unsuccessful attempts at communication with CRS, I have limited this study to mainline Protestant denominations and the ecumenical organization of CWS.

Secondly, although the fundamentalist movement has received considerable attention in its efforts to affect American policy in Central America, it will not be a focus of this issue. There are several reasons for this:

a. Neither Sullivan or Lissner, the principal reference works for this study and the sources to which the thesis conclusions will be related, pay any attention to fundamentalist movements.

b. Fundamentalism in the United States is a documented historical phenomenon which reoccurs cyclically and crosses all denominational lines. Today, as in the past, fundamentalism as a movement has been centered around charismatic individuals, and rises and falls with them. With the evident decline of today's television personalities and evangelists, this pattern continues. Given the difficulty of evaluating even organized denominational reports (when they exist), a movement becomes very difficult to assess.

c. As a church professional who has received and continues to receive appeals, books, information, and newsletters from numerous fundamentalist cell groups nationwide, I can see easily a significant difference between them and Protestant and Roman Catholic agencies. The essential issue for mainline church agencies is justice. For the fundamentalist movement during the time period studied, it was anti-communism. Justice is a theological and religious issue, anti-communism is not.

It is my hypothesis that, in spite of recent contrasting examples, constraints upon American church development agencies outweigh the

opportunities for them to become global agents for change separate from official American policy. This will be the case even when they cannot support existing American foreign policies. The populations they represent are too divided, the internal and external constraints too numerous, and their continuous need for voluntary funding too apparent for strong, independent action which distances them from American national policy overseas.

Chapter 2

The Theorists: Robert Sullivan and Jørgen Lissner

Robert Sullivan and Jørgen Lissner have somewhat modestly described their books as works of observation and description. Sullivan describes the evolution "of a relational partnership between government and religions PVOs (Sullivan, p.9)." He admits to having made his study with no central thesis in mind (Sullivna, p.384). Lissner suggests that he analyzes and describes "political laws of nature governing the behavior of voluntary agencies" in order to "illustrate general tendencies in policy-making (Lissner, preface)."

In the course of describing a relationship, studying the "laws of nature," and identifying general tendencies found in the partnership between PVOs and government, both books, based upon dissertation, advance hypotheses which are totally integrated into their studies but have not been adequately tested. Sullivan's hypothesis states that a partnership has been formed between PVOs and government as a result of numerous factors.

> Because of these same factors, however, the politics of the partnership have been limited in intensity. Let these intervening factors disappear, that is, let the agricultural surplus dwindle, let international politics come closer to the Hobbesian model, let human needs continue to rise, and let officials of the voluntary agencies take their humanitarian mandates more seriously--let these changes occur and the partnership will either collapse or one of the partners will be subjugated to the other. In either case, the politics of altruism comes to an end. (Sullivan, p.389).

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In contrast to Sullivan, Lissner suggests that

> agency policy makers are most likely to let idealism prevail over other policy considerations, when all four components of the value

factor impel them to do so. They are highly unlikely to take an idealistic course, when only one component of the values factor prompts them to do that (Lissner, p.268).

The agency's "value factor consists of the interests of agency policy makers, the Third World, the agency's constituency, and an overall Weltanschauung." Rather than the idealism of humanitarian mandates, Lissner suggests that most PVOs operate under rules of income maximization, that is, they will:

(1) adopt a spread of policies which cover as wide a range as possible on the left to right scale (Lissner, p.229);
(2) adopt a vaguely defined Weltanschauung to appeal to as many people as possible (Lissner, p.229);
(3) try to politicize an issue only if such a step is likely to further its fund-raising efforts (Lissner, p.230);
(4) adopt and propogate an ideology which legitimates its pursuit of income maximization (Lissner, p.238); and
(5) take an unequivocal stand on an issue only when there seems to be a virtual consensus among its "old" and potential supporters (Lissner, p.245).

Why these behaviors occur will be described below in the Lissner material.

When taken together, these two descriptive books offer some insights and alternative models towards understanding the partnership's working relationship. Because they provide the most intensive studies available today of the church agency/government partnership, they provide the theoretical background for this study. Since they arrive at different conclusions, which I will treat as conflicting hypotheses, they raise questions about the validity, the evidence, and the relevant application of case studies. Under conditions of stress, Sullivan believes that the partnership would likely dissolve or lose its equal

partner quality, whereas Lissner believes that agencies are too constrained to act idealistically and would therefore seek ways to maintain the partnership.

This chapter has three goals: to describe briefly the method and major hypotheses of the Sullivan and Lissner studies; to examine their findings and conclusions; and to show how they arrived at their conclusions. But to contrast two authors' works is not enough; they can be compared also because they share "common ground."

Both authors focus their studies on the relationship between religious PVOs and the federal government. These institutions are often referred to as "the principals." Both authors analyze the policies which link the principals together. Both authors concentrate on the same subject of policy, that is, international development and foreign aid. Although with some differences, both men use "interests" and "constraints" as the building blocks for the partnership.

Sullivan describes what he calls "real" and "ideal" interests. Real interests are those which have present day solutions. The federal government works with real interests of foreign and domestic policy. PVOs operate through humanitarian and therefore ideal interests which can only be fulfilled sometime in the future (Sullivan, p.6). Only when PVOs compete with one another for limited resources and attention do they focus upon their real interests, and only where the ideal interests of the PVOs and the real interests of government overlap can the partnership exist.

Lissner's work revolves almost wholely around the inner deliberations of PVO policymakers and their decisions. Categorizing interests as "real" or "ideal" becomes awkward in Lissner's more microscopic world. The interests of the PVO, like those of the government, evolve over time and on different levels. PVOs, like government, are also held accountable to their constituents. For PVOs these constituents include the government itself, Third World groups, and various church constituencies. Policy decisions will be "needs based," that is, the PVOs must choose to increase its funding base, its prestige in comparison with other agencies, or the perceptions of others about its sense of caring and justice (Lissner, pp.37-39).

For both men, constraints are those things which limit the behavior, the policies, ot the freedom of choice for a particular agency. Constraints may be internal such as when an agency tempers its educational efforts on behalf of a Third World constituency in order not to alienate its donor constituency. Constraints may be external, such as accepting a government grant when that means limiting the region of choice where the agency may wish to work.

These two works are especially useful because they permit comparison. The authors rely on the same principal actors (government and the PVO), the same arena of activity (international developemnt and foreign aid), and the same building blocks of behavior (interests and constraints). What now follows are two summarizations of the two differing analyses of the government/PVO partnership and ultimately two

differing conclusions about the future of that partnership.

SULLIVAN

Sullivan examines three concepts in his study that suggest a disintegrating partnership between federal programs and PVOs. These concepts are the dynamic nature of the principals, the evolving cycles of the relationship, and the real and ideal interests which bring the partners together. The context of the relationship is international assistance through the distribution of American farm surplus.

The principals are broadly identified as religious PVOs and the federal government. The religious partner is more narrowly limited to the major distributors of foreign aid and development assistance, namely, CARE; CRS; CWS; LWR; and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). Sullivan also describes the activities of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, a coalition council which tries to represent a common PVO voice to the federal government.

Several things bind these agencies together. They are willing to accept government funds for their programs. They adhere to religious and/or humanitarian principles. They all seek to influence government policy and,in doing so, compete among themselves for status and influence.

The federal government is more narrowly conceived as the State Department and its Agency for International Development (AID), the Senate Foreign Relations and Agriculture Committees, and the House

Agricultural Committee. The Department of State and AID initiate policy for joint programming with PVOs in common areas of service (the world's poor). They promote these before Congressional Committees for financial assistance for international development.

The American agricultural community provides the resources which bring PVO and government together. Without a stock of surplus commodities, there would not be a partnership. This stock rises and falls in relationship to world events, world demand, and U.S. agricultural policies. Basically, these surplus commodities are linked to a system of price supports dating back to 1938. Although not meant to be an examination of price support policies, some explanation of these policies is helpful.

Price supports encourage production by offering an inflated price to producers. This added cost gets passed on to American and foreign consumers of American agricultural products. Price supports offer price stability by reducing the volatility of the marketplace. Although incomes are somewhat guaranteed, buyers of farm products are not. This distributional inefficiency within the market is compounded by government taking on the cost of storage and transportation of the overproduced commodity. By selling or giving away the surplus commodities, the federal government attempts to reduce its losses by decreasing its long-term storage costs. The price support system helps keep American farmers in farming.

When combined, these three "partners," the federal government,

church agencies, and producers of commodities, form an unstable and self-limiting triad. Its instability is caused by each partner's freedom of choice to remain in the partnership, the differing interests represented by the PVO community and the government, and the differing interests between various agencies and parts of the government. It is self-limiting in that it is dependent upon the availability of surplus commodities. The problem of what to do with the surplus American food (and secondarily the problem of world hunger and development) brings together the interests of PVOs and government. For PVOs, the relationship reveals the problem of government, a tug-of-war between agricultural interests and the needs of foreign policy (Sullivan, pp.27-32).

When viewed simplistically, the partnership should intensify during times of great surplus and diminish when commodities are scarce. Because of the PVO desire to help humanity and the government's job to interact internationally, some form of relationship should always exist. This is the simple economy of Sullivan's model which makes it so attractive. However, historical events from 1946-1967, the time period covered by Sullivan, complicate and strain the simple model of the partnership. What now follows is a review of those historical events.

Following World War II, the private sector and especially the church community struggled to meet the demands of European recovery and that continent's displaced and homeless population. The five organizations of Sullivan's study led the way in these efforts by donating the most

services (Sullivan, pp.12-16).

Congress bonded the relationship between American foreign policy and PVOs by the passage of two bills. Public Law 84 (1948) allowed public payments to those agencies listed with the President's Advisory Committee on Foreign Aid for stateside transportation costs incurred through foreign relief assistance (Sullivan, p.20). This generosity was expanded when the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 allowed the government to pay for the overseas freight charges of agencies supplying Marshall Plan countries (Sullivan, p.22).

The triad would become complete in 1949 when agricultural supplies were included in the expanding partnership. Section 414 of that year's Agricultural Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to donate surplus supplies to those PVOs listed with the Advisory Committee (Sullivan, p.26).

The Korean War interrupted the growing partnership. Surplus commodities were diverted from Europe to the war effort. Korea exposed two inherent problems for PVOs participating in partnership with government assistance. PVOs in Europe had made both short term and long term commitments to programs in the region, and the closing off of the supply of government resources did not eliminate those commitments. Therefore, PVO program expectations in Europe could not be met. Secondly, the shift of government emphasis from Europe to East Asia, because of changing world situations, suggested that future surpluses would be targeted to fit changing American foreign policy objectives. Limited

surplus commodities increased in foreign policy value. (Sullivan, p.36).

Because of increased wartime production during the Korean War, America's surplus commodity production ballooned. From 1952 to 1954, price support inventories increased from 1.3 billion dollars to 5.7 billion dollars (USDA Statistical Handbook-1967, p.30). To counter the problem, Congress passed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, better known as Public Law 489. The act included the following:

Title 1 - provided that surplus commodities could be sold for non-convertable currencies, rather than dollars;
Title 2 - authorized the president to donate food for famine relief to friendly countries or peoples; and
Title 3 - allowed the president to barter food for strategic materials and expanded the role played by paying for the transportation costs forshipping from national stockpiles to American docks for overseas shipments (Sullivan, p.38).

Not surprisingly, the partnership swelled with the expanding amount of surpluses and the loosening of regulations.

After a period of transition during the latter stages of the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy years saw a closer relationship develop between the government and the PVOs. PL 480 became a generous tool for those PVOs willing to follow the Administration into Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. The Peace Corps contracted out its services to willing PVOs. Alliance for Progress programming invited PVOs to work with the Administration, and PL 480 food supplies were expanded within the Food for Peace program (Sullivan, p.50).

If the Kennedy Administration seemed to share common humanitarian

interests with the church organizations, then the Johnson Administration represented the partnership's decline from a PVO perspective. Because of poor Eutopean and Soviet harvests, growing Third World populations, and increased American presence in Vietnam and the Middle East, the political value of food in foreign policymaking increased. Food no longer would be just surplus.

The Johnson Administration tightened the requirements of PL 480 by prioritizing the supply for different regions of the world. Vietnam had the highest priority, and no restrictions were placed upon the supply of food for those PVOs willing to work in that war effort. The Alliance for Progress countries were second in line, but here rationing of commodities was already in place. The rest of the world was placed in the third and lowest priority. PVOs could either accommodate American wishes or drop out of the program (Sullivan, p.168).

Program type priorities were added to the regional restrictions supervised by AID. It became advantageous for PVOs to promote certain types of programs over others. The rank order from highest to lowest in program priority was preschool programs, maternal/childcare programs, school feeding programs, institutional care, family feeding programs, and food for work (Sullivan, p.169). What makes this significant is that so much of the PVO efforts during the 1950's had been food for work programming.

In addition, an amendment to PL 480 allowed the president to restrict any assistance to those countries labeled as aggressor nations

(Sullivan, p.166). The Food for Peace Council, begun in order to consult with PVOs, was closed, and the Food for Peace office was renamed Food for Freedom (Sullivan, p.177). In these ways, the Johnson Administration systematically reconstructed the PVO partnership to conform to a more hostile world environment and a more agressive U.S. international presence. The Johnson years represent an increasing confrontation in the partnership between PVOs and government.

By surveying the history of the partnership, Sullivan identifies the varied and changing interests of government and the PVOs. When the model is left at its simplest stages, that is, "More food, therefore more partnership," both parties are satisfied with the partnership. The model becomes less useful, however, as the political scene becomes more complicated. Sullivan shifts his attention to those changing and conflicting interests of government and PVO.

American farmers are at the heart of the government's programs. Government wanted to satisfy agricultural demands for stable commodity prices and guaranteed markets, and the purchase, stockpiling, and use of agricultural surpluses overseas provided a means to accommodate those agricultural interests (Sullivan, p.372). Though foreign policy goals have shifted and changed within the forty year partnership, the desire to help the American farmer has remained constant.

If helping the American farmer was the major interest of government for pursuing policies of partnership with PVOs, then serving foreign policy interests was the second. Since the inception of the Marshall

Plan and the Act of 1948, the government has been able to target its influence through the assistance of PVOs to those areas most in need of assistance from the perspective of American foreign policy interests. Through changes of policy and regulations and its control over the resource base, the government has been able to redirect the program attention of the PVOs willing to receive government funds. The changes brought on by the Johnson Administration represent quantitative increases of government dominance which in one form or another had always been present in the partnership (Sullivan, p.373).

In Sullivan's analysis, solving problems in agriculture and foreign policy were the "real interests" of government in partnership with PVOs. However, using his definition, government also had two "ideal" interests which could be furthered through the aid of the PVOs.

The first was to compete effectively with the Soviets and retard world Communist expansion. The most important arena for this competition following the second world war was Europe. Once Europe was stable again, attention and resources could shift to countries on the world's periphery, such as Korea and Vietnam. Helping PVOs redirect their attention from Europe to the Far East and the developing Third World was part of these competitive efforts. In addition, the government shared with PVOs their ideal interest for preventing and eradicating world hunger (Sullivan, p.374).

The PVO interests of eliminating hunger and poverty and creating a just world order are ideal ones which look to the future for their

fulfillment. Their mission purpose of serving the struggling needs of humanity finds its roots in humanitarian and religious impulses. From a PVO perspective, using government resources to serve these interests makes both good sense and sound policy (Sullivan, p.374). Governmental assistance becomes a useful means to an ideal end. Sullivan extends his notion of "real interests" to PVOs as they compete among themselves for those limited governmental resources and to the battles each agency engages in to limit another's influence in governmental policy.

During the 1950's, CARE was a struggling agency seeking a stable source of funds which could support its desire for rapid program expansion. Among the PVOs, CARE consistently argued for increased dependence upon government and for expanding the means whereby PVOs and government could be mutually supportive. By emphasizing non-sectarian principles, it was able to win numerous government contracts. It saw no loss in its independence by emphasizing PVO and government cooperation (Sullivan, p.284).

The other major expansionist PVO was CRS. The Roman Catholic Church is a truly international presence with evangelistic intentions. Yet, because of its traditional alignment with Third World elites and the image problem this created for its work with the poor, the Roman Catholic Church sought new ways for securing greater influence in the Third World. Being able to secure a literally unending supply of funds could only be perceived as helpful for its developing nation mission strategy (Sullivan, p.303). The director of CRS once suggested that it could act

as the distribution arm of American foreign aid so that the government would not need a new infrastructure (Sullivan, p.291).

LWR argued against the expansion of PVO/government interaction. LWR is a smaller international organization in competition with Roman Catholic agencies. LWR argued for a 50% cap on governmental assistance in PVO programming in order that agencies could retain their independence (as contrasted to CARE which sought no cap). In line with an ethic of "self reliance," LWR pressed for "voluntarism" for PVOs, that is, agencies should rely on the resources of their own constituencies rather than depend so heavily on government funding. During the middle 1950's, LWR was the only agency that consistently argued against expanding PL 480 assistance (Sullivan, p.344). In the American Council of Voluntary Organizations, an organization designed like the United Nations Security Council where one of the principal nations' veto power can block action, LWR had considerable clout to block Council statements.

Because of its mixed constituencies of Protestant and Orthodox opinions, CWS found itself shifting between CRS and LWR positions on government funding. Finally, in place of a 50% cap on government money, CWS promoted 66% as being sufficient to assure agency independence (Sullivan, p.382).

Because of the numerous differences among the PVOs, they could seldom speak to government and others with one voice. This lack of consensus reduced their ability to make an impact on government policy on behalf of the world's poor (Sullivan, p.374). Outside of their

ideal interest of serving humanity, they had little success in uniting "for something." It was "against something," the more directive policies of the Johnson Administration, where some united PVO activity began to be seen.

Sullivan has laid the historical and political foundation for his hypothesis. The relationship between PVO and government has been limited due to resource scarcity and changes in world conditions. The generous availability of food during the 1950's and the limits of American power and influence helped to mask real and competing interests and agendas between church groups and official government foreign policies. The partnership was mutually supportive, but at the same time it was a matter of convenience. Should any part of the triad become unstable, that is, should the food supply diminish further, should government become more directive and ideological in its policies, or should agencies take more seriously their proclamations made on behalf of suffering humanity, then the relationship should come to an end.

If Sullivan's views were to be accepted, then the analysis and questions found in the introductory chapter would seem to have their answers. The confrontational tactics and policies chosen by churches during the Vietnam War and following would give credence to Sullivan's model. The answer would indicate that church organizations are taking their mandates seriously and becoming independent actors in international development when in conflict with American foreign policies. However, there is another view to be presented.

Jørgen Lissner accepts Sullivan's concept of a triadic relationship. Government and PVOs are the principal actors, and those who supply the resources act as "glue" to bring them together. Lissner and Sullivan part company in their assessment of a PVO's freedom of mobility once it is in a partnership relationship. Lissner argues that it would take an inordinate amount of unity within the various PVO constituencies and their competing interests before the PVO could respond solely from humanitarian principles on behalf of Third World interests. This leaves the reader to conclude that PVOs generally do something less than what is expected of them by their own mission statements and that they will try to maintain the partnership in their best interests.

Lissner creates a more sophisticated world of PVOs by identifying two "pure" models of agency behavior and the continuum of behavior options running between them. Like Sullivan's, Lissner's world includes idealist agencies that live by a set of principles that serve as normative judgments on their behavior. At the opposite extreme are income-max (incomes maximization) agencies whose primary principle is self-survival through a stable source of funds. Agencies usually identify themselves somewhere between these extremes, and no agency is one or the other all the time.

Agencies slide across Lissner's continuum as they realize the "opportunity costs" each action or program creates. Lissner's term, "opportunity cost," comes from economics. An opportunity cost for a

PVO would be all the alternative sources of funds, program directions, and newly targeted audiencies lost by a particular agency activity (Lissner, p.88). Because every decision or program of a PVO results in some risk for the agency, opportunity costs help to determine which of the PVO's competing interests will be satisfied. Although his thesis states that agencies will succumb to their immediate interests, Lissner's ideal argument is that a preoccupation with income maximization will cause more risk and damage to the long-term credibility of the agency than will a program of doctrinaire idealism (Lissner, p.227).

Lissner must answer two questions before his concept of income-max and idealist agencies and his hypothesis respond more from self-interest than idealism can be accepted: (1) how do PVOs operate, and, (2) which activities identify the form of the agency? Most of Lissner's work focuses on answering these questions.

Lissner draws upon two theories describing political party behavior to answer the first question. The first theory is derived from a study of Swedish party politics done by Bjorn Molin and associates (Lissner, p.71). The second comes from Anthony Downs book, An Economic Theory Democracy (Lissner, p.79). Lissner revises both in order to fit PVO activities.

Molin's model (see diagram) of political party behavior focuses upon the unmet needs which can be satisfied by party actions and programs. Like any organization, PVOs have needs which when satisfied allow them to prosper and remain secure. It is rational for a PVO's

program to try to meet its desires or needs. These include

(1) a desire to maximize the influence of agency values upon public opinion;
(2) a desire to maximize the agency's income; and
(3) a desire to maximize the agency's respectability and leverage with government and other agencies (Lissner, p.74).

The agency flounders or dies when these needs are not met.

FIGURE 1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK CONCERNING VOLUNTARY AGENCY BEHAVIOUR



Without even stating the obvious that these deisres may compete against one another, the diagram indicates clearly that each desire is influenced by a complicated tangle of internal constraints. If the final choice of agency behavior reflects uneasy choices and compromises between its competing needs, then the needs reflect the uneasy choices

and compromises found within the agency.

Values suggest the identity and purpose of the agency. The agency chooses its political behavior mindful of its values (for instance, a "right to life" value resticts CRS from involving itself in certain programs). The agency wishes to influence others through publicizing its values. But the public face of these values already represents a compromise, consensus, or merely a complication of the diverse values of the agency's constituencies. After agreeing upon a primary set of symbolic values (Weltanschauung), such as "love one's neighbor," each constituency brings its interests to bear on how the neighbor should be loved. The financial supporters of the agency, the policy-makers of the agency, and the Third World audience and service area of the agency create a dynamic struggle promoting their interests as the ones which should influence public opinion. Rarely do all interests coincide (Lissner, pp.74-79).

When an agency wishes to maximize its funds, it does so primarily by increasing its acceptability and popularity in the eyes of its supporters. People become supporters because they identify with the agency's values, causes and programs; certain actions and stands will also trigger the interests of the public. Which audience does the agency wish to target? Should the agency continue to appeal to its traditional supporters and emphasize the continuity of its programs and statements? Should it target a particular group of "potential members" and thereby emphasize the novelty of its programs and actions? The

availability of funds within the home country and/or the loss of trust overseas might all be at stake in how the agency decides (Lissner, p.78).

The appeal to increase the agency's respectability and leverage includes intangible and tangible resources. It is in the interest of the agency to increase the public perception that it is trustworthy, operates in good will, and believes in its call to work for justice and hope. Although draining resources from its program, these intangibles may be best accomplished through strategies of institutionalization. The quality and location of an agency's headquarters, the training and dependability of its personnel, its security in financial assets, and its ability to receive and work with government contracts (its own and the host country's) may or may not be the same for achieving the desired respectability (Lissner, pp.78-79).

When viewed through Molin's analysis, decision-making on behalf of the Third World or along humanitarian principles becomes a complicated process. It loses much of the uniformity present in Sullivan's work. Something so innocuous as "feeding the hungry" may rise or fall on the determination of who the hungry are, why they are so, and what impact this will have on the program. The concepts of opportunity costs, factionalism, and competing interests remove the romanticism surrounding the humanitarian work of PVOs. It is no wonder that final decisions by agencies seldom please all of their constituencies.

Lissner uses the Downs' material to fill in some gaps left by Molin and to minimize the perception that competing values provide for

an unworkable organization. According to Downs, the public values will be ambiguously construed so as to allow for any underlying disharmony.

By using the Downs' material, Lissner suggests that PVOs act like political parties in two ways. They use their ideology (or values) to fit their present purposes, and they seek to maximize their popularity through rational behavior. A PVO's values correspond to a party's ideology, while its income and support base corresponds to a party's voter popularity.

Lissner notes that the ideology of the political party is designed to woo the greatest number of people to the party platform and the party's leaders. The values chosen by the PVO are meant to do the same. If the only rational behavior of the party is to maximize its total number of voters, its ideology will try to minimize internal party controversy and at the same time encourage external party appeal. It will remain ambiguous as to its concrete application, programs, and prescriptions, offer easy handles of party identification to its members and thus avoid the irrational course of antagonizing the electorate (Lissner, pp.82-83).

Rational PVO behavior translates into increasing its income by attracting potential suppliers without losing current donors. The agency's public values are meant to gather support with a minimum amount of risk to the agency. Retaining "political neutrality" becomes a perfectly ambiguous value to encourage the maximum amount of agency supporters. Positions could remain moderate to attract financial

contributions. In Lissner's worst case scenario, the goal of maximizing income would predetermine the policies and public stands advocated by the agency. The maintenance of the agency would be held higher than the goals and principles under which the agency was formed. (Lissner, pp.83-86).

In answering the question of how PVOs operate, Lissner argues that they do not operate any differently from other organizations, political parties, or governments. They are no more idealistic or realistic. Agencies have needs which require satisfication. PVOs operate within a variety of internal and external constraints which limit their policy options. Their internal constituencies color their decisions and choices. PVOs will be drawn through the rational behavior of self preservation to increase their resource base. Because of this and the high, self-imposed ideals for mission which they carry, PVOs must make uneasy choices based upon lost opportunities for every action taken and program created.

Lissner also looks at the second question, that is, how agency activities can be identified as income-max or idealist. There are three activities in which the PVO engages: fund-raising, education, and advocacy. Actions taken by the agency in each category carry with them political costs and gains. The activities correspond and attempt to satisfy the agency needs indentified in Molin's model. Although the next chapter will develop the internal and external operating constraints of the PVO more fully, it is necessary to demonstrate Lissner's thoughts by using some examples from his text.

The underlying issue in fundraising is the balance between agency

programming independence, the need for money, and the desires of the donors. With each new donor and new source of revenue, the freedom of the agency is circumscribed by an additional set of interests. The primary sources of PVO revenue include government funding, funds from private corporations, funds from other non-governmental programs, and the general public. Each source creates its own problems for the PVO (Lissner, p.87). A too heavy reliance on one source or another can limit the style of programming as well as the policy content of the agency. The discussion below is restricted to Lissner's material on government funding.

Government grants often come with "strings attached." In order to receive money, agencies may be asked to ensure that their activities conform to the interests of the government. The priority given to certain world regions and types of programming during the Johnson Administration through the changing regulations of PL 480 money are clear examples of how PVOs can be asked to follow government's lead. In order to receive grants, PVOs are asked to comply with ever changing and more complicated administrative procedures, even though the agencies do not have the personnel resources often needed for the administrative burdens (Lissner, pp.89-119). In these cases and others presented in the following chapter, a relationship of dependence is created between donor and recipient.

In an effort to expand their influence with the public, PVOs engage in education and consciousness-raising efforts. Because so much of an agency's education program is related to its fund-raising and promotional literature, a conflict of interests can occur within the agency.

> This conflict may pit an agency's fund-raisers who are responsible for maintaining reliable sources of funds against project personnel, who advocate education and programming which may appear radical (although appropriate to the Third World circumstance) to the agency's traditional supporters.

As analyzed by Lissner, the education efforts of agencies play down the importance of ideology and minimize the conflicting claims of truth regarding the problems of developing nations. Rather than sharpening the differences of opinion for debate on North-South issues, ambiguity and political nuetrality become educational themes used to support traditional understandings. After reviewing numerous agency education efforts, Lissner summarizes their themes and their bias:

> The development problem is all "out there." It is caused by endogenous factors inside the low-income countries. We in high-income countries are outside spectators; our present standard of living is the result of our own efforts alone. The only, or most important, thing we can do to reduce poverty and human suffering in the Third World is to provide more aid resources (Lissner, p.158).

Instead of encouraging debate on the issues, agency education too often continues to promote ideas related to paternalism rather than to partnership.

Lissner further criticizes the agency education efforts on behalf of the Third World to Western donors by suggesting that controversial topics, like redistribution of wealth, colonialism/imperialism, debt, and First and Second World culpability for world poverty are left untouched. He asks somewhat cynically:

> What is the use of having morally clean but financially empty hands? The important thing is to raise funds so that we can support worthwhile activities in the Third World; others who do not risk being put out of business will have to tell the unpleasant truths (Lissner, p.150).

Thus, education becomes a handmaiden for financial solvency.

PVOs attempt to extend their influence and respectability within government circles primarily through advocacy. The role that a PVO chooses to play in relation to government influences both the intensity and content of its advocacy work. Lissner identifies six possible roles and relationships between government and the PVO. They are listed in ascending degrees of PVO criticism of government policy.

(1) Subservience role--the agency considers the interests of government to be its own and does its best to undertake a governmental request with no questions asked. CRS activities during Vietnam fall under this category (Lissner, p.206).

(2) Partnership role--the agency either complements government activities in a given region or supplements what is lacking in government programming. All of Sullivan's study of agency activity in regards to PL 480 funds fall into this category (Lissner, p.207).

(3) Compensatory role--the agency helps the victim of a particular government policy without addressing the policy itself. This is particularly operative during times of war, an example being the activities of the MCC during Vietnam (Lissner, p.208).

(4) Corrective role--the agency involved in advocacy fall into this category where PVOs take it upon themselves to be "a voice for the voiceless," pressuring government to reconsider a particular policy. The last ten years of United States-South African policy has produced numerous public statements of protest by nearly all mainline U.S. church groups (Lissner, p.209).

(5) Disobediant role--the agency attaches more importance to its own values than to a law in effect. The agency has no interest in overthrowing the existing government, but quarrels with and disobeys a law in favor of agency integrity. The American Friends Service Committee's attempts to supply the North Vietnamese fall into this category (Lissner, p.210).

(6) Subversive role--the agency involved in this activity does so out of moral conviction leading to outright confrontation with existing governments. The political order is seen to have lost

> its legitimacy and can no longer be supported by the agency. The rise of liberation movements, and the support by Nicaraguan church groups for the Sandinistas during their revolution against the Somoza regime fall into this category (Lissner, p.211).

The above role categories are fluid, that is, agencies may move from using one tactic in one circumstance to a different one in a later event. The internal dialogue regarding values and interests within the agency assures that this is so. On the whole, the roles most often claimed by religious PVOs in relationship to government are partnership and corrective, the latter becoming relevant only in recent years.

Lissner found six significant categories of public policy which had been most frequently addressed by agency advocacy efforts. These included the financial interests of the agency (tax policies, etc.), the resettlement of refugees, the quantity of government aid, the quality of government aid, international power politics issues, and the claim that the Third World had been impoverished by First and Second World interests. When it comes to the frequency of public statements, agencies tend to advocate their immediate interests more than global concerns.

> Voluntary agencies are most likely to resort to pressure tactics when their own operations or immediate organizational interests are jeopardized (e.g., financial interests, resettlement of refugee programs). They are somewhat less likely to take up issues affecting the Third World that have no direct bearing on their operations or immediate organizational interests (e.g., quantity of government aid, quality of government aid). And they are least likely to speak out on issues that touch on the political and economic self-interest of the high-income countries (e.g., international power politics and the enrichment/impoverishment mechanism) (Lissner, p.224).

Thus, in all three areas of activity identified by Lissner: fund-raising, education, and advocacy, the reality of internal and external constraints

due to competing interests tends to favor policies of stability and maintenance rather than change and outreach.

Lissner has answered his second question pertaining to the identifiable forms of activity which mark an agency as being either an idealist or an income-max agency. In each of his categories (fund-raising, education, advocacy), the PVO finds itself in dilemmas brought on by the competing goals for independence and security. Every category demands compromise from the PVO. Having provided a theory for PVO operation (the hybrid of Molin and Downs), an operating principle (the reduction of opportunity costs), and the activities whereby the principle is operative, Lissner is ready to state that all PVOs struggle between their two identities. All of their policies will reflect one eye's attention upon a stable income, and the other's upon the integrity of organizational values. They do not focus together easily.

Sullivan theorized that when confronted by increasing pressure to conform to government demands and policies, a PVO would opt for the freedom of its ideals and mission statements. Lissner, however, can find only two occurences which support Sullivan's hypothesis. One happens to be the Sullivan study of LWR resistance to increased government aid for food program assistance. The other example of the "politics of idealism" is the World Council of Church's Program to Combat Racism described in the introductory chapter. The general lack of purely idealistic political activity on the part of the radical demands of most of their mission statements if and when all their value-making constituencies--

Weltanschauung, policy makers, Third World interests, and donor interests, compel the agency to no other choice (Lissner, p.268). What makes this conclusion unfortunate is that the comparative advantage of the PVO over other development agencies, their ability to follow freely their ideals and values and form an alternative in the overseas development debate, is compromised away. They begin to resemble other public groups which do the same work, more extensively and sometimes better.

Therefore, instead of idealism, Lissner claims that PVOs opt for policies which do not undercut their financial base. They will

(1) represent a wide spread of policies to moderate their public appeal;
(2) adopt a vaguely defined working ideology;
(3) politicize an issue only when some form of financial gain can be realized;
(4) adopt working premises which will not isolate them from their primary supporters, including "blame the victim" and political neutrality statements; and
(5) adopt political stands only when old and potential supporters are in agreement (Lissner, pp.228-254).

Although Lissner's and Sullivan's theories are not mutually exclusive, Lissner states unambiguously that the evidence for Sullivan's hypothesis is meager. PVOs are tied to too many communities and audiences. The compensatory, corrective, and disobedient roles played by agencies during the Vietnam War are singular occurences, during an abnormal situation, and out of the norm for PVO/government interaction. There is a greater likelihood of government either changing its policies (as it has in the past) or resources running dry (as they continue to do) than religious PVOs becoming raw idealists and altruists.

These, then, are the two theories of Sullivan and Lissner. Sullivan

suggests that given certain changing factors, religious PVOs will more closely design programs in line with their ideals and values. Lissner suggests that the inner contradictions, rising opportunity costs, and external constraints will continue to pull PVOs away from idealistic programming. Given an unpopular government program in foreign policy, will church agencies stick to their guns and press the Third World agenda? Whose hypothesis is correct, or does it depend on the issue?

The next chapter will be a discussion of the constraints and opportunities, internal and external, which shape the life of the PVO as it acts in world events. The chapter details the PVO's Sitz im Leben by expanding on the ideas exposed above.

Chapter 3

Related Studies

The previous chapter compared and contrasted the theories of Lissner and Sullivan. This chapter seeks to establish the relationship between the two authors and the available theoretical literature. This is particularly important with Lissner as he represents a departure from more conventional thought for the role and powers of the PVO.

Several difficulties became apparent while researching this chapter. Data which evaluate the activities and organizations of religious PVOs are scarce. Studies which detail PVO activity responding to various foreign policies are rare. What research is available carries with it the added problem of a lack of consistent technical vocabulary, making comparison difficult. Nevertheless, enough information is available which calls into question some of the conventional understandings of PVOs, including their uniqueness as agencies and their claims for independent activities. These help support the Lissner profile of the PVO and its potential activity.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first critiques some of the self-perceptions PVOs have about their identity. These perceptions include their status of equality with government; their ability to act independently; and their claims to being innovative in program creation. The second section relates some of Lissner's constraints, namely, external legitimacy, fundraising, and leadership

characteristics, to the available literature.

The traditional understanding of the relationship of PVOs to government states that each entity approaches the other as an equal. This has been the dominant profile of the PVO/government relationship for Sullivan. This perspective attributes to PVOs certain characteristics which allow them to follow independent courses of action. These characteristics--independent, innovative, work with the "real poor," and others--are meant to separate the religious PVO from oublic and other private agencies that work in development. The religious PVO becomes unique and for some, "better." When these qualities are challenged, the validity of conventional perception is seriously questioned.

In her work for AID assessing PVOs and their project evaluation procedures, Judith Tendler identifies seven common PVO self-perceptions. PVOs think of themselves as

(1) better prepared to reach the poor,
(2) providers of participatory technique,
(3) more interested in process than content,
(4) flexible and experimental in their programming,
(5) more personal in style of operation,
(6) able to strengthen local institutions, and
(7) they all see themselves doing this in a more cost effective manner (Tendler, pp.15-31).

These seven characteristics form a relatively uniform perception of PVO activity regardless of the agency's history, style of operation, project audience, or project content. Tendler suggests that these "facts" are articles of faith in need of evaluation and scrutiny.

While studying PVOs in the United States, Israel, Great Britain, and Denmark, Ralph Kramer suggests a different yet complementary set of roles

characteristics, to the available literature.

The traditional understanding of the relationship of PVOs to government states that each entity approaches the other as an equal. This has been the dominant profile of the PVO/government relationship for Sullivan. This perspective attributes to PVOs certain characteristics which allow them to follow independent courses of action. These characteristics--independent, innovative, work with the "real poor," and others--are meant to separate the religious PVO from oublic and other private agencies that work in development. The religious PVO becomes unique and for some, "better." When these qualities are challenged, the validity of conventional perception is seriously questioned.

In her work for AID assessing PVOs and their project evaluation procedures, Judith Tendler identifies seven common PVO self-perceptions. PVOs think of themselves as

(1) better prepared to reach the poor,
(2) providers of participatory technique,
(3) more interested in process than content,
(4) flexible and experimental in their programming,
(5) more personal in style of operation,
(6) able to strengthen local institutions, and
(7) they all see themselves doing this in a more cost effective manner (Tendler, pp.15-31).

These seven characteristics form a relatively uniform perception of PVO activity regardless of the agency's history, style of operation, project audience, or project content. Tendler suggests that these "facts" are articles of faith in need of evaluation and scrutiny.

While studying PVOs in the United States, Israel, Great Britain, and Denmark, Ralph Kramer suggests a different yet complementary set of roles

claimed by PVOs. Kramer's work compares cross-culturally PVO performance, effectiveness, and operating style. For Kramer, the roles claimed by PVOs include being vanguards and innovators of programs and methods; providers of public services; guardians of values; and advocates in society.

When taken at face value, these lists lead to the conclusion of a unique stature and purpose for PVOs. They imply that PVOs provide more adequately for the needs of the Third World and in those nation's interests. The lists are important as they reflect a common understanding for the work of PVOs. These two writers (and others) challenge severely the accuracy of common understanding.

Tendler first questions the almost automatic conclusion that PVOs are participatory in their style of service delivery. Convention suggests that government agencies work with top-down techniques whereas PVOs use a bottoms-up approach. In assessing PVO project evaluations, Tendler not only found that this was a false dichotomy, but also what passed for participatory development for PVOs often did not include representation of groups served by the agency. PVO participatory development stood for a less centralized system which used local elites for distribution and planning (Tendler, p.iv.). In those projects studied PVOs practiced a more local form of trickle-down development using local elites for distribution, or continued to practice a "sensitive" form of top-down project management (Tendler, pp.15-31).

Tendler next targets the PVO claim to independent and self-reliant

service delivery. She suggests that rather than being independent of governmental assistance PVO success stories have strong links to governmental support and modeling. PVO and government partnership provides significant progress.

> PVOs and their supporters have made the case that PVOs are better at certain tasks than large donors and other public-sector agencies. The quest for the essence of PVO uniqueness has tended to obscure the fact in evaluations, that the outcome of many PVO projects is partly dependent on their relationship to the public sector. A project may succeed not only because the PVO is doing its part well, but also because there is a government entity doing its part well (Tendler, o.iv.).

Thus, some form of interrelationship and dependence upon government by the PVO is undeniable.

Tendler's other criticisms relate to the PVO's self-perception of being better providers for the poor. Inadequate participation limits the agency's ability to reach the poorest of the poor. Local graft and waste eliminates some of the available resources. In addition, the PVOs of Tendler's studies have settled for welfare-like programming to reach a relatively small portion of the population. Large donor research suggests that the poorest of the poor may be upwards of 60% of the total population and something other than welfare style projects need to be developed (Tendler, p.14). Tendler suggests finally that because PVOs have broadened their emphasis away from the charitable institution to the development agency, they may have lost their competitive edge and specialized competence at reaching then needy strata in developing nations (Tendler, p.68).

Kramer echoes Tendler's skepticism that PVOs are independent of

governmental relationships. Without questioning the PVOs claim to be a provider of services, Kramer's studies look at the nature of service delivery. In most of his cases, PVOs provide services as complements or supplements to other developmental programming given in a service area. Thus, most PVO programming is not unitary, but rather, a partnership activity in a larger development plan (Kramer, p.184).

Kramer's strongest objections to the "unique identity and operation" arguments are leveled against the PVO claims to innovation, experimentation, and flexibility. He rejects the notion that much pioneering and innovative programming takes place within PVO projects. This is due to their small size and limited funding for research (Kramer, p.192). Most innovation, experimentation, and research advancement takes place within large donor organizations like AID. PVOs duplicate rather than innovate.

The evidence for these claims comes from studying the program transferability from PVO projects to larger institution projects. Less than five percent of all PVO projects can be transfered to government ownership (Kramer, p. 183).

All of Kramer's contentions for innovation and experimentation are supported by Tendler's research (Tendler, pp.84-128). Because of their lack of funds, the limits to replicability by governments, the limits for research done by PVOs, and because development technology innovations are found in large donor institutions, it is reasonable to conclude that PVOs are not innovative but that some PVO projects have made some

innovations (Tendler, p.108).

Sullivan argues that because of who they are, PVOs can do certain activities better than government agencies. According to the Sullivan profile, PVOs come to the bargaining table as equal actors in the politics of development assistance. Scholars, such as Kramer and Tendler, challenge these beliefs. They not only call into question the root values of PVOs, but also suggest that the services they provide to the Third World are more similar than different to those provided by larger institutions.

Lissner's theory never accepted the idea that PVO activities represent a qualitative difference from any other political organization or public bureaucracy. On the contrary, Lissner suggests that PVOs operate as any other organization which is dependent on outside sources for funds and support. PVOs operate under constraints with valid operating costs. The most important constraints to independent policy-making for the PVO are its need for legitimacy, a secure and continuous source of funds, the quality of its leadership and the effects of increased bureaucratization brought on by the changing relationship with government. Although direct research in these areas is sparse, there is enough to discount the notion that Lissner only speaks for himself. What follows are complementary studies which link up with Lissner's constraint theory.

A Canadian study showed that there was a clear relationship between external legitimacy and the survival of a newly formed PVO. External

legitimacy was defined by the study as "having an organization action endorsed by powerful collective actors and the ability to develop strong relationships with external constituencies" (Singh, p.176). The study established that the death rate of newly formed organizations is more affected by a lack of external legitimacy and recognition than by internal changes and conflicts. The death rate remained constant when the internal changes of director, service area, goals and directions, clientele, and organizational structure were controlled. The death rate rose when tested against the perception of legitimacy supporting the thesis that PVOs need be concerned about the perceptions of others (Singh, p.171). The unanswered question asked by the author of the study was whether this relationship existed for already extablished PVOs (Singh, p.190). If the events surrounding the demise of Praise the Lord Ministries (PTL) is an indication, it can be suggested that the perception of external legitimacy continues to have an impact upon the life and action of the established agency.

The second major constraint in Lissner's model relates to fund-raising. Numerous sources have questioned whether the constant requirement for funding and the origin of those resources have a restrictive effect on PVO programming. Some religious PVOs believe external sources of funds do restrict program independence and hope to minimize the dangers to independent aciton by placing percentage restrictions for total budgets for governmental assistance (LWR-50%; CWS-66%). Other PVOs have tried to eliminate their dependence on government funding altogether. Based upon

1987-88 statistics by USAID, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) received only 1% of their budget total from federal sources and the AFSC only 5%.

A comparative study of Canadian and American PVOs indicates that choices of action or program do have a relationship to the funding secured by the organization. This can be noted in the types of development assistance provided by the agency. Canadian PVOs that receive Canadian governmental assistance with less regulation and restriction on the money's use perceived themselves to be involved heavily in providing technical assistance, local institution building, and advocacy. U.S. PVOs tended to see themselves as relief workers and providers of direct assistance (Gorman, p.124). Included within the appendix section of this study is a copy of the latest AID booklet on registration restricitons and regulations. Here the process that a U.S. PVO must take in order to receive federal assistance is outlined as are the qualifications for different grants in assistance.

Kramer finds two additional problems within the government funding/PVO relationship: vendorism and grantsmanship. In order to compete in a more opportunistic market by providing more services, PVOs target their operations and concerns to match changing environments. Vendorism is the process of tampering prices, whereas grantsmanship tampers with and controls the designs of projects.

When PVOs lower costs of service to make them attractive to AID requirements and interests, they practice vendorism. A cycle of

dependence is produced by lowering service prices and project costs so that the project could not continue without additional annual funds (Kramer, p.152). PVOs play grantsmanship when their projects are tailored to fit various legislative, bureaucratic, or governmental interests. The projects may look good on paper but have no lasting value, or the programs may have little in common with projects done by that PVO in the same country (Kramer, p.157).

Kramer summarizes his position on fundraising, PVO independence or dependence on government as a never ending cycle.

> The growing reliance on governmental funding results from a convergence of (1) the acute financial problems of voluntary agencies caused by a decline in real giving and increases in operating costs both aggravated by inflation, (2) the continuing expansion of governmental social service programs with more funds available for service from non-governmental providers, (3) lessened confidence in governmental administration of social programs. A cycle occurs--declining income leads to increased dependence leads to belief by donors that support is no longer needed (Kramer, p.144).

Bolling and Smith also summarized the problem of PVO/government funding relationships.

> The disadvantages of accepting AID money have appeared more slowly and have to do with the loss of independence, growing reliance on tax dollars, increasing acceptance of governmental controls and weakening ties to the private constituency which gave them initial support (Bolling and Smith, p.13).

These same problems reappear in a consultation between AID leaders and AID's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid in 1985 (AID document 845-0410, pp.9-13).

Consistant with the concern for the rise of multiple funding sources and their varied interests is the amount of staff and volunteer time

taken up solely for maintaining the organization. Fundraising becomes institutionalized through multiple donors to the possible deflection of the PVO from its primary goals. The requirements of fundraising can become so pervasive that fundraising, not direct service, constitutes the primary function of volunteers (Kramer, p.138). If the spirit of voluntarism is one of the values PVOs are said to maintain for the good of the national social fabric, then this fact casts a shadow upon the traditional understanding of volunteering for direct service.

One may conclude at the very least that a PVO's continuous need for funds, whether from private or public sources, affects its ability to program and direct its activities. The variety of evidence shown and the contemporaneity of discussion between PVOs and governments indicate that these concerns are still vital to the voluntary sector. If not altogether restrictive, the need for funds creates an intrusive impact on PVO programming.

Lissner contends that a PVO's leadership and bureaucracy restrain the activities of the PVO. At least two concerns within this hypothesis have come under academic scrunity. These include the impact of government funding and regulation upon leadership and the character and composition of PVO leadership.

Bureaucratization is a side effect of increasing complexity within governing bodies. Several things have worked together to bureaucratize the PVO. There has been an increasing tendency towards professionalism within PVOs (not altogether bad), making them more complex than the

simple charity organizations of past years. Link-ups with government agencies and governmental operation patterns have increased staff. Resources of staff time and funds shift to accomodate these expanding bureaucratic relationships (Rosenbaum, p.84).

The needs for administrative clarity, simplified registration procedures, and fewer regulations and paperwork continue to be issues separating PVOs and government in their mutual desire to work together (AID document 845-0140, pp.3-7). In passing it is interesting to note that these often justified complaints against the burdens of over-regulation compete with Tendler's request for further clarity in project evaluation.

Rosenbaum suggests that the increased reliance upon governmental funding has a deleterious effect upon PVO boards. Rather than being agents of creativity empowered to direct, maintain, and further the goals of the agency, PVO boards often become rubber stamps for the goals of governmental procedure (Rosenbaum, p.87). These findings mirror the concerns of Kramer over vendorism and grantsmanship. Thus, as leadership's dependence upon external funding sources increases, PVO program flexibility decreases encumbered by bureaucratization and administrative procedures.

In addition to the above, Kramer suggests that a PVO's board composition determines its ability and initiative to act fully in the Third World's behalf. Kramer finds that board membership is not as inclusive as the many constituencies represented by the PVO. Only 14%

of board members for the U.S. PVOs studied reflected consumer groups or interests of the PVO's service and activity. The vast majority of PVO board members continue to come from traditional business and professional elites (Kramer, p.115). By comparison, the boards of British PVOs studied reflected a 33% consumer group distribution amongst their members. The implications of Kramer's and Rosenbaum's works are that PVO governing boards do not distinguish themselves from any other board of trust in applying principles of greater participation and inclusiveness of diverse interests.

The work of James Woods further compounds the difficulty of accepting the view that a PVO's leadership is free and independently goal-directed. Woods combines the topics of PVO leadership and legitimacy. A PVO leadership's legitimacy comes in two versions: formal and informal. Formal legitimacy in leadership is associated with the documents to which some allegiance is kept. The informal legitimacy Woods speaks of is the ambiguous understanding of common values and goals which are accepted and practiced by the agency and its supporters. Informal legitimacy is as important for PVOs as any constitution (Woods, p.76). Tolerance for an action otherwise perceived as different from an agency's norms correlates with an acceptance that an agency's core values and purposes are still intact. When values no longer seem relevant or under attack, negative reactions from the constituency are likely to occur. One again can look back to the PTL ministry case or the intense discussions surrounding the leadership and purpose of the

National Council of Churches during 1988-89 (leading to President Ari Brouwer's resignation and a restructured relationship between NCC and CWS) to see the dynamics of informal legitimacy in action.

All of the above studies offer only circumstantial evidence in support of Lissner's theories. None of the above is singularly decisive or conclusive. When taken together, they begin to provide factual data for Lissner's theoretical discussions concerning PVO behavior, their operational constraints, their limits to freedom, and their effectiveness in providing service to their clients. The results of the above studies on legitimacy, funding, bureaucratization, governmental relationships, and leadership begin to suggest a picture similar to Lissner's own.

Lissner is critical of a PVO's claimed abilities to do what it set out to do on behalf of the poor. It might be helpful for comparison to place him alongside a typical citizen participation development policy advocate. By so doing, Lissner's criticism appears less radical and rhetorical and more realistic in its aims.

Malcolm Walker compares the possibilities of citizen participation (what PVOs say they do) and managed change. Citizen participation (for Walker) describes the activity where system change occurs through the democractic activism of people unrepresented by any national or local elite. It implies non-integrative, system threatening, conflict inducing change (Walker, p.6). To implement citizen participation implies major institutional changes at organizational and societal levels, power redistribution, and new decision-making techniques (Walker, p.26).

Politicians, administrators, and organized professionals can hardly be expected to support the types of change involved in this form of citizen participation.

The above vision is contrasted with managed change, a type of change which only seeks reform to counter injustice. Managed change does not involve the redistribution of power or new patterns of decision-making. The changes it seeks are under the control of current power-holders (Walker, p.5). Therefore, because of their limited egalitarian power distribution (Kramer's boardmember distribution percentage), their bureaucratic and professional hierarchy and organization, and their structural dependence on larger power and resource brokers (for funding, training, innovation, and research and development), it is unlikely that voluntary organizations would be able to participate in any real citizen participation movements for change. PVOs are limited to managed change operations (Walker, p.14). PVOs, by their nature, organization, and dependence upon governments, cannot offer the type of program which their convictions and mission statements generally support. This conclusion, Walker states, needs greater empirical evidence (Walker, p.29).

By not subscribing to the optimism of a Sullivan which when given the evidence of Tendler, Kramer and others seems unwarranted, and without succumbing to the pessimism of Walker, Lissner begins to speak as a critical centrist. Lissner is aware of the possibilities and pitfalls for PVOs providing quality service for Third World clients. Having at least provided a supportive base for Lissner's model thought, it is now appropriate to move into the case study.

Chapter 4

Church And State in Nicaragua: A Case Study

American Foreign Policy

The Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) marched into Managua, Nicaragua's capital, in July of 1979. Although support for the former Nicaraguan dictator, Anastazio Somoza, had dwindled considerably prior to the final Sandinista victory, it was difficult for American policy-makers to assess both the Marxist rhetoric of the Nicaraguan revolution and its leaders' intentions of maintaining close relations with its neighbors and the United States. America was not prepared for the speedy Sandinista victory or its broad popular base.

American response to the Sandinistas following their revolution was hesitant and ambivalent. Most American politicians did not welcome the new government with open arms for fear of the FSLN's Marxist leanings. The former model of dictatorship had become unworkable and unsupportable. The testimony before Congress by Carter Administration officials gave the Sandinistas a certain benefit of the doubt. Testifying before the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs (September 11-12, 1979), then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Vaky, suggested that

> our task is to work with our friends to guide and influence change, how to use our influence to provide justice, freedom, and equality to mutual benefit and thereby avoiding insurgency and communism. Nowhere will this task be more critical than in Nicaragua (Gov. Doc. No. Y4.F76/1:C33/5, p.17).

U. S. Ambassador to Nicaragua in 1979, Lawrence Penzuello, claimed that

the "government of National Reconstruction (the military junta) was generally moderate, not distinguishably Marxist in orientation, with pluralistic tendencies, and well known in international circles (Gov. Doc. No. Y4.F76/1:C33/5, p.25)." Mr. Walter Duncan, Vice-President of the American Chamber of Commerce of Latin America, suggested that the United States should supply reconstruction assistance and lenient terms of trade in order to revive the economy (Gov. Doc. No. Y4.F76/2:SE5/2, p.31).

These relatively benign impressions of the Sandinista leadership and favorable assessment of the revolution were echoed by Assistant Secretary of State Vaky before the full House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 27, 1979, as the Committee began deliberation on an aid package to Nicaragua. Vaky remarked:

> Our policy is to support the development of an independent and pluralistic Nicaragua working in a framework of regional cooperation with its neighbors. We understand and support what has emerged as the driving consensus among Nicaraguans today, to build a new Nicaragua, one that is different from the past and one that is capable of meeting basic human needs on a basis of participation. To this end, we seek a broad range of positive relationships with Nicaragua stressing mutual cooperation, respect, and non-intervention (Gov. Doc. No. Y4F76/1:C33/5:, p.6).

The Committee would ultimately and tortuously approve an aid bill providing emergency assistance to Sandinista Nicaragua.

The above testimony provides evidence for the short-lived Carter policy of positive engagement towards the Sandinistas and a comparison to what would so radically change under the Reagan Administration. Indeed, American policy would already begin to shift more towards confrontation during the latter days of the Carter Administration when

it became clear that the Sandinistas, through their revolution without borders concept, were supplying arms to the revolutionary party of El Salvador (FMLN). Carter, as a response, reinstituted arms assistance to El Salvador. Nevertheless, it would be safe to say that an amount of good will existed in the initial exchanges between the Carter Administration and the Sandinista leadership.

During the Reagan policy era, the evolving conflict between American churches and their respective development agencies and U. S. foreign policy emerges. What follows is a series of important events that indicate the highly politicized nature of the conflict; a review of official American foreign policy interests in the region; and a selective (rather than exhaustive) review of official U. S. policies and actions. Some attention will also be paid to the increased importance of Congressional debates on aid to the Contras, as these became focal points and arenas for church and PVO advocacy.

Time Tables of Events

Providing a relevant set of events which seperates the interests and ideals of Nicaragua or the United States may be as individualized as the one who makes the lists. For example, the authors of the book, Nicaragua Under Siege, use broadcast transcripts from "The Voice of Nicaragua" and Barricade International, the Sandinista international weekly newspaper, as their primary sources of information. The dates of key events, which one indicated in part below, provides a sympathetic listing of activities on the part of the Sandinistas

and the Nicaraguan people in comparison to the bullyish behavior of the United States.

February 1981 - The U.S. State Department releases a "white paper" depicting Nicaragua as the epicenter for arms traffic to Salvadoran insurgents. The payment of $15 million as part of a $75 million credit is suspended by the U.S.

March 1981 - Parade magazine discloses that ex-Somoza Guardsmen are being trained in the U.S. for paramilitary attacks on Nicaragua. $10 million credit for wheat purchases within the PL 480 program is suspended.

April 1981 - Indefinite suspension of all future bilateral assistance is announced due to supposed arms traffic to El Salvador; $11.4 million credit for rural development and educational and health care programs is suspended.

August 1981 - Honduras grants permission to the U.S. to build a military base in the Gulf of Fonseca, a body of water shared by Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.

December 1981 - President Reagan authorizes a $19 million CIA-directed plan for paramilitary and terrorist operations against Nicaragua. In apparent initial inplementation of this plan, terrorist attacks, code-named "Red Christmas," are launched in Nicaragua's remote northeast border area. Other immediate targets of attack are Nicaragua's only oil refinery and cement plant. U.S. representative to the World Bank vetoes a $500,000 project proposal for the development of agricultural cooperatives. Bomb explodes on AeroNica plane.

March 1982 - The U.S. government launches a major public relations effort to demonstrate the threat posed by Nicaragua. The effort fails to demonstrate that Nicaragua military dispositions are anything more than defensive. U.S. announces presence of 72 U.S. military personnel in Honduras and Honduran General Gustavo Alvarez authorized the transit of U.S. troops through Honduran territory.

March-June 1982 - 106 contra attacks in Nicaragua, including sabotage of bridges, warehouses, and crops; sniper fire against Sandinista soldiers.

February 1983 - 1,600 U.S. troops and 4,000 Honduran troops participate in Big Pine maneuvers. C-130

transports move $5.2 million worth of equipment to Mocoron, 25 miles from Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast border. U.S. press reports subsequently reveal that these arms were transferred by Honduran Army to ex-Guardsmen. Ex-Guardsmen ambush and kill 17 members of Sandinista Youth Militia contingent, who are protecting coffee pickers near Matagalpa; 50,000 Nicaraguans attend memorial service in Managua two days later.

July 1983 - U.S. sends 19 ships with 16,456 troops and dozens of fighter jets to the coasts of Nicaragua; also sends 4,000 U.S. ground troops for Honduras--operation is called Big Pine II. Reagan appoints Henry Kissinger to head a Commission on Central America. House Representatives votes down covert aid by passing the Boland-Zablocki bill (Dixon and Jonas, pp.19-24).

It can be equally said that other kinds of events occurred. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders gave the following information before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 12, 1983:

Since 1979 - $1.6 billion in aid has come from Western Democracies to Nicaragua.

January 1981 - Military arms interrupted enroute from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

August 1981 - U.S. officials travel to Nicaragua to listen to Nicaraguan concerns.

September 1981 - U.S. officials propose bilateral non-aggression pacts and renewed economic assistance if pluralism is given a chance. Rejected by the Sandinistas.

Spring 1982 - U.S. officials offer second set of negotiations and proposals and again are rejected by the Sandinistas.

October 1982 - Sandinista rejected a third set of peace proposals known as the San Jose Accords.

March 1983 - "Pro-Sandinista demonstrators" heap abuse upon Pope John Paul II's visit to Nicaragua (Gov. Doc. No. Y4.F76/2:Shrg.98-147, pp.13-15).

The above timetable seems to show a peace-loving United States government who is exasperated by a lack of constituancy in Sandinista

decision makers. The U.S. pursued relentlessly a policy of peace through negotiation only to find a wily recalcitrant set of Sandinistas thwarting every attempt at bilateral and multilateral dialogue. Enders' construction of events leads one to believe that both Carter's policy of constructive engagement and Reagan's early attempts at negotiation have failed and that more forceful initiatives are necessary.

It is clear that both of the above characterizations of the events leading to the escalation of conflict in the region are meant to affix blame upon the other side. For the purpose of this paper, it became necessary to construct a simpler and more readily identifiable time-table of events of common knowledge from which to question the reactions of church agencies. While the organization of the events below are likely to contain some bias, they received significant media attention, show an expanding political conflict between the U.S and Nicaragua, and are more annual in their emphasis and thus relate more specifically to a PVO's fiscal process.

1979-80 - Carter Administration Constructive Engagement policy and the approval of $75 million in emergency aid to Nicaragua.

1981 - Aid is terminated by the Reagan Administration.

February 1981 - State Department "White Paper" on Nicaragua is published and implicates the Sandinistas as the chief destabilizing agents of the region.

Spring 1982 - $19 million in covert aid is supplied to the Contras.

1982-83 - CIA covert activities; assassination training manual and mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

October 1982 - American attempts at multilateral dialogue in San Jose, Costa Rica, fail.

1983-84 - Honduras becomes regional staging area for

major military training excercises; Halcon Vista and Big Pine land and sea maneuvers.

March 1983 - $24 million in aid is approved by Congress for the Contras.

March 1984 - The U.S. Senate votes down $21 million in assistance for the Contras.

1985-87 - Congressional debate on Contra aid and the effectiveness of Contra policy continues leading to $75 million in resumed aid.

1986-88 - Nicaraguan policy declines exposure of Contra war attrocities in Newsweek and other periodicals; exposure of covert gun running and the Hassenfuss trial; the Iran/Contra affair comes to light and hearings begin.

The events above describe a general history of escalating pressure tactics by the Reagan Administration to reduce Sandinista effectiveness and power. This escalation was greatest from 1981-85 and waned following President Reagan's re-election. It highlights the actions taken by the Reagan Administration which include economic pressure, covert activity, negotiation, military pressure, and armed conflict through intermediaries. The timetable reflects the cautious (timid) response by Congress and the political battles for policy leadership between that branch of government and the White House. These events would be readily identifiable by church and church agency officials.

Having made mention of the politicized nature of the Nicaraguan conflict and attempted to provide some more objective series of events from which to build a case study, it is time to evaluate America's political interests in the region. What were America's interests which could produce so many confrontations between Congress, the Administration and the churches? Traditionally, U.S. interests are linked to security, political, and economic relationships. Central America

provides no divergence from these concerns.

Political Interests and Policies

U.S. national security interests focused on two issues. First, the region was considered a vulnerable flank of attack for aggression against the United States. This was most clearly elaborated when a new form of the "Domino Theory" resurfaced to identify what would happen in the region should Nicaragua remain under the Sandinista's leadership. The second security issue of the region's importance to the U.S. lies in the proximity of feeder lanes (shipping) to the Panama Canal Zone and America's coastal water routes.

The second major feature in U.S./Central American relationships comes from common political heritage. "Pan-Americanism" was to remain strong and unimpeded due to the region and the hemisphere's common past destiny of political struggle and independence. The irony of this reason for relationship stems from the frequent occasion when the United States finds itself in opposition to the other nations of the hemisphere on North-South issues (debt renegotiation, economic development, tariff regulation, etc.).

Economic linkages within the region are historical and longlasting and form the third general area of relationship between the U.S. and Nicaragua. There are considerable markets for U.S. and Central American-made products and agriculture. All of the nations in the region, with the exception of Nicaragua, retain most-favored nation status for purposes of economic trade. The policy allows certain

trade, tariff, and quantity privileges to most-favored nations. The loss of this privilege, the inconvertability of Nicaraguan currency into dollars, and the 1985 embargo on trade should be considered stiff punishment from one nation to another (Lowenthal, pp.2-3).

President Reagan outlined more specifically America's foreign policy interests as an extension of national security and East/West concerns. In an interview on March 29, 1984, with Le Monde, Reagan listed four interests which guided American policy towards the Sandinistas. In Reagan's words, America hoped to end Nicaragua's support of area rebels, specifically those operating in El Salvador. America wanted to isolate and eliminate Sandinista influence on any nation within the region and isolate Nicaragua from other friendly nations.

Secondly, America sought to sever the security ties which Nicaragua maintained with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Nicaragua was dependent upon the Soviet Union for arms and technology and upon the Cubans for military advisors and trainers. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's relationship with Cuba's Fidel Castro was cordial and visits to Havanna were frequent.

Thirdly, American interests were served by a reduction in Nicaraguan military capability. As stated by then Assistant Secretary of State Tony Motley before the House Sub-Committee on Western Hemispheric Affairs on May 2, 1984, "the Sandinistas are the largest military presence in the region, destabilizing the region and causing

fear amongst its neighbors. Hence, the need for American military maneuvers was to offset the military muscle of the Sandinistas and thereby restore the regional balance" (U.S. Government YF 76/1:C33/7, p.8).

Lastly, America sought to bring the Sandinistas to fulfill their revolutionary promises for democratic pluralism in Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration sought free elections where all parties could participate (Reagan, p.384). This final interest echoes the comments made by Contra leader Arturo Cruz as he spoke out in Foreign Affairs against the increased polarization of Nicaraguan politics and hardening of Sandinista policies against opposition.

The Reagan Administration policy choices became extensions of the four specific security interests outlined above (Nicaraguan isolation, elimination of Soviet and Cuban support, decrease of Nicaraguan military capability, and pluralism of power) and of the three more general areas of relationship (security, political-historical, economic) between the two nations. The policies, which became known as "Selective Containment," were a departure from Carter's "Constructive Engagement" policies, and harkened back to the containment goals of the Cold War.

It is ironic that, in spite of general and genuine public dissatisfaction with much of the progress of Selective Containment, the Reagan Administration was so successful in securing its policy objectives. Julius Murovchick offers the interpretation that

two equally unacceptable and unworkable foreign policy paradigms clashed during the years of the Nicaraguan conflict, effectively hamstringing any other alternative. The paradigm of "containment" for any evidence of Marxist influence collided with the "no more Vietnams" paradigm. The history of the Vietnam war made the first option no longer credible and paralyzed effective foreign policy debate with unrealistic hopes for the world (no more wars, no more losses, no more Vietnams) (Murovchick, pp.366-387).

Given U. S. interests in the region as expressed above and most clearly formulated in the National Bipartisan Committee Report on Central America (January 1984) and the State Department follow-up report of 1985, how did American policy evolve following the early expressions of support during the Carter years? Policy activities centered on five areas of activity--covert and paramilitary operations, economic isolation, verbal and military intimidation, regional approaches to stabilizationm and both positive and negative efforts at bilateral and regional negotiations. What follows is a review of major examples for these five areas.

The covert and paramilitary operations option was proposed as a reaction against the increasing military build-up of the Sandinistas and the ongoing flow of arms from Nicaragua to the rebels operating in El Salvador. Following a series of Salvadoran guerilla offences and victories in October 1981 and during National Security Council meetings in November 1981, the CIA proposed a set of military

initiatives which were intended to undermine the Sandinista regime. The proposals included:

(1) continuing Carter Administration plans to provide financial assistance to interest groups who were opposed to the Sandinistas;
(2) expanding intelligence gathering operations throughout the Central American region;
(3) assemblying, training, and arming a command unit of 500 Latin Americans to conduct military operations in Nicaragua but operate out of Honduras; and
(4) funding Argentine initiative for training 1000 Nicaraguan exiles for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government; or
(5) funding and arming Nicaraguan exiles already operating along Nicaraguan-Honduras border through the Honduran military (Walker, Thomas pp.431-432).

A presidential finding of December 2, 1981, gave the CIA broad authority for establishing all of the above proposals. The withdrawal of the Argentinians following the declaration of U.S. support for the British during the Falklands/Maldivas conflict left all Nicaraguan related covert activities in American hands. What began as economic sabotage raids on bridges and warehouses in 1982, escalated to the bombing of the oil storage facilities in the port of Corinto on October 4, 1983, and led finally to the aborted campaign to disrupt Nicaraguan shipping by mining her harbors in January 1984 (Walker, Thomas, pp.439-442).

The forces mentioned in the third through fifth proposals above would ultimately become the Contra forces, formed originally by the Argentine military and security forces and strengthened later by the CIA. Beginning in 1981 as a group of disorganized bands numbering less than a thousand men, the Contra forces swelled four-fold to 4200 troops

by July 1982 and to nearly 12,000 men by mid-1984. By 1984 the border conflicts had moved from the Honduran-Nicaraguan border to include Costa Rica and inland Nicaraguan operations. (The author had the opportunity in 1984 [February] to follow a day behind Contra forces in the Costa Rican highlands and in Northeastern Nicaragua.) The increase of Contra personnel relates directly to the Congressionally approved funding increases from $19 million in 1982 to $75 million in 1985, as well as foreign and private domestic funds and assistance. A thorough examination of the triangular relationship of Congress, the Contras, and the Administration (CIA, White House, National Security Council, and State Department) has been written by journalist, Roy Gutman (Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-87).

Economic Politics

The Reagan Administration had various economic policies aimed at creating hardship for the Sandinista Government and securing its objectives for the region. The loss of Most Favored Nation status, already mentioned, had the effect of making Nicaragua's cash crops of coffee, cotton, and sugarcane uncompetitive with its Central American neighbors. The technological embargo left many of the textile industries idle for a lack of spare parts. While in Nicaragua, the author witnessed the canabalization of machines in order to keep looms and mills operating. We were also told by Sandinista officials that some church groups came away with lists of spare part needs and returned with spare parts. The inconvertability of Nicaraguan

Cruzaros to American dollars also reduced Nicaragua's capabilities for international trade. In order to stockpile the precious commodity of dollars, all visitors to Nicaragua were forced to convert a minimum of their currency to Cruzaros upon entering the country and thereby spend on Nicaraguan foods and services.

The primary economic tactic used by the United States for leverage over Nicaragua was to reduce Nicaragua's ability to secure loans for development and repayment of debt from multinational organizations. Bilateral assistance, the $75 million program begun at the end of the Carter Administration, was halted shortly following the onstart of the Reagan presidency. From 1981, the United States effectively stopped any new loan for Nicaragua by voting against all new loan requests to the World Bank. In 1979, Nicaragua received over $179 million in loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development bank, whereas only four years later in 1983 that figure had been cut to $30 million.

Private sector banks were also not immune to American efforts to cut off available avenues of credit to the Sandinistas. In 1983, the U.S. government's Inter-Agency Exposure Review Committee, whose task is to rate the creditworthiness of under and nondeveloped nations, reduced the rating given to Nicaragua from substandard to doubtful. This was done in spite of the fact that Nicaragua was on schedule on its loan repayments to various nations on the massive amount of debt inherited from the Somoza government (Walker, Thomas, p.434).

The final act of economic punishment of the Sandinistas was announced and put into effect on May 1, 1985. The Reagan Administration placed a total economic embargo on all trade, goods, and services between the two nations. By observing the lack of common consumer goods and basic foodstuffs available in stores and markets in both rural communities and Nicaraguan cities, it was clear to me that the civil conflict and the above economic policies had the effect of stunting development, growth, and stability for Nicaragua.

Policies of Intimidation

Intimidation through the media, through intelligence, and through military activities, was the third focus of policies for securing America's interests. As one who traveled through Nicaragua at the height of hostilities in 1984, it was hard to recognize and reconcile the nation and people which I saw with the descriptions and rhetoric used by Administration officials. This is said knowing that events, actions, places, programs, and people can all be manipulated to show only one dimension (as was the case of the first two timetables of events). Typical Administration efforts to discredit and intimidate the Sandinistas and the legitimacy of their rule might include those of the United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick as she spoke of the Sandinistas being "more repressive than the Somoza dictatorship" (Walker, Thomas, p.435), or, "then Secretary of State Alexander Haig charging that the Salvadoran insurgency was being run totally out of Managua" (New York Times, February 21, 1982).

Administration claims were also advanced through the presentation of intelligence breifings and demonstration projects. In March of 1982, a CIA briefing was held where reconnaissance aerial photographs reportedly revealed new military installations built in Nicaragua with Cuban assistance. The photographs were later shown to be of an exercise and training camp.

Military intimidation and presence were consistant features of Administration policy during the buildup of hostility. The active presence of American military around Nicaragua began in October of 1981 with the Halcon Vista manuevers. The exercise expanded to several thousand troops and all branches of the American military forces with the start of Big Pine 1 and 2, and the Granadero naval exercises. American military aid to neighboring Honduras, the staging area for the manuevers as well as the primary operations center for the Contras, increased from $3.9 million in 1980 to $78.5 million in 1984, an increase of 10,000%! The perception of an American military threat to Nicaragua through the exercise was encouraged through statements such as those by then Assistant Secretary of Defense, Fred Ikle, as he called for a military victory by the forces of freedom in Central America and argued that the continued existance of the Sandinistas would require the partitioning of Central America similar to the partitioning of Europe (Walker, Thomas, p.444).

When not speaking directly to the security concerns of El Salvador and Nicaragua, much of the Kissinger/Bipartisan report on

executive training, and other human service needs were also included.

The Commission Report and its follow-up by the Secretary of State made efforts at defining the problems of Central America as regional, historic and chronic, systemic and related to just human needs. Ironically, many of the Kissinger report recommendations, particularly those dealing with human services development (education, literacy, health care, housing, and infrastructure reconstruction), had already begun to appear in Nicaragua following the Sandinista revolution only to come to a halt as resources shifted to military and security requirements.

Negotiation

The final area of Reagan Administration policies relate to attempts at multilateral and bilateral negotiations and diplomacy. It is safe to say that neither the United States nor Nicaragua trusted the other's motives. The intentions and proposals for negotiation seemed to shift with each additional deplomatic attempt.

Attempts at negotiation began with the then secret meetings between Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders and Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. They met in Managua in August of 1981 and continued contact through written communication until that October. America's chief complaints included Nicaraguan military assistance to Salvadoran rebels and the Sandinista military capability.

Following these early attempts at diplomacy, President Lopez-Portilla sought a means to increase Mexican influence in the hemisphere by

becoming a regional "honest-broker." Lopez-Portilla encouraged D'Escoto to meet with Secretary of State Haig in December of 1981 when a third complaint by the United States was raised. Haig insisted that the Sandinistas discontinue their policies of political repression and reserve their record on human rights violations. As these bilateral talks ended in failure, the Mexican President called for regional discussions seeking to include El Salvador and Cuba; however, the United States did not participate. Letters by Lopez-Portilla to the leaders of Venezuela and Columbia in August of 1982 would ultimately lead to the beginning of the Contadora process of January 1983.

The United States attempted its own multinational set of negotiations by inviting the Central American nations to a meeting in San Jose. The meetings were unsubstantial as Nicaragua refused to attend. America's reaction to the Contadora process was paradoxical, insisting that it supported the regional attempt at peace yet stating that all issues of the region must be solved and agreed to by all nations in order for there to be lasting peace (Walker, Thomas, p.443). The Secretary of State stated that the United States approved the September 7, 1984 (second) draft of the Contadora treaty so long as the areas of verification could be strengthened (U.S. Department of State, p.13).

A final set of bilateral conversations, again at the invitation of the Mexican President but this time acting on behalf of the Contadora Group, would begin on June 1, 1984, and end in January of the following year. Nine rounds of conversations between Nicaragua and the United

States were held in Manzanilla, Mexico, with no substantive results.

Marking the foreign policy directions of selective containment are these five broad categories of policy: covert and paramilitary activity, economic isolation of Nicaragua, verbal and military intimidation, regional plans for stabilization and development, and bilateral and multilateral attempts at negotiation. They substantially reflect Reagan Administration political interests for the region--Nicaraguan isolation, the elimination of Soviet and Cuban support, the decrease of Nicaraguan military capability, and pluralism of power. America's foreign policy in Central America would be altered with the disclosure of Contra war atrocities, the Iran-Contra disclosures, and the discontinuation of Congressional funds. However, up until 1986, American policy displayed a consistent increase of hostility and pressure--military, economic, intelligence, and political--to seek a change of government and alliance in Nicaragua. It is now time to move on the response to the interests and policies of the United States outlined above.

The Churches' Response

Why did American churches, and particularly their officials, take a keen interest in the decade-long conflict in Nicaragua? One observer ascribed church interest in the region to the following feelings and events:

(1) news concerning Salvadoran Bishop Oscar Romero's martyrdom and the murder of other church personnel;
(2) America's close geographic proximity to the region and the relatively easy access this provides for direct observation;
(3) a general knowledge of changes in theological thinking within the church, particularly the impact made by liberation theologies; and
(4) a general feeling that God fights for the oppressed in God's "preferential option for the poor" as specifically realized in the Sandinista revolution (Eck, pp.183-86).

In addition to the above, churches were affected by the same "no more Vietnams" fear that wracked the nation as well as the limited popularity of the Contra War (without supporting the Nicaraguan regime). All of these together helped create a climate for church advocacy and involvement.

American church involvement in the Nicaraguan conflict fell into four categories. These did not necessarily represent the average church member's committment or that of the local congregation. Responses by national church bodies included attempts at global education concerning Nicaragua, consciousness-raising activities within their constituencies and in the general public, advocacy through Congressional testimony, and policy and interest statements by church executives and church bureaus. Perhaps the most remarkable witness by mainline American churches had been their national appeals and statements on behalf of the Nicaraguan

revolution. The consistency found in the appeals made them remarkable.

Denomination Statements

Statements made by Protestant denominations as a whole were openly favorable to Sandinista efforts and hostile to American foreign policy in the region. American churches: denounced efforts by the Reagan Administration to destabilize the Nicaraguan government; were against funding the Contras; decried the increased militarization of the region; sought additional economic relief for Nicaragua; and were in favor of the Contadora process. The clarity by which national church executives and churchwide agencies denounced American policy and its aim is unmistakable.

Given what has already been said concerning WCC statements on South Africa, it would come as no surprise that the WCC would be critical of U.S. policy in Nicaragua and all of Central America. I begin with the statements made by the WCC because so many of the American denominations are members, more so than in the National Council of Churches. At its only comprehensive assembly during the Reagan presidency (Vancouver, 1983), the WCC criticized the U.S. by stating unambiguously: that U.S. efforts in Nicaragua promote death and fear; that U.S. support for Contra revolutionaries promotes regional instability; and that U.S. policy is an affront (moral) to life. The Sixth Assembly of the WCC resolved, therefore, to

(1) express the profound concern and solidarity of the worldwide community for Nicaraguan church communities and affirm their initiation for building institutions of peace and justice;
(2) oppose any type of military intervention by the United States and commend U.S. churches to condemn prophetically any U.S. intervention as well as advocate radical changes in U.S. policy; and
(3) support the peace initiatives of the Contadora group of Latin

American states (World Council of Churches, pp.99-102).

A typical statement by a mainline American Protestant denomination might be that of the American Baptist Church (ABC), included below. The affirmations are taken from A Statement of Concern: Peace with Justice in Central America. They were adopted while the ABC was in assembly on June 7, 1983, in Cleveland, Ohio.

(1) affirmed the work of international organizations providing development and relief assistance throughout Central America;
(2) affirmed the courageous and "historical" action of providing sancturary to Central American refugees;
(3) urged that all U.S. covert operations and actions of destabilization in Central America be halted;
(4) recognized the need for asylum of Central American political prisoners in the U.S. until they could safely return to their countries;
(5) urged that Central American peace initiatives be followed; and
(6) supported the rights of self-determination of Central American peoples.

This was followed within a year by a resolution of the General Board of the ABC, the policy council of the church, not only condemning covert U.S. operations but also overt operations, and also commending the U.S. to discontinue its support of the Contras (General Board Resolution Reference #8123:6/84). The resolution exhorted its members to continue vigilance in prayer, maintain their stewardship of relief and development assistance, and continue both the active witness of visitation to Central America and advocacy in the United States.

Several concerns stated by the ABC are common to many American denominations that actively criticized the policy of the United States. American churches commended the progress towards justice and opportunity for self-determination found within the Sandinista revolution and condemned the foreign policies of Ronald Reagan. Churches affirmed the process

of negotiation sponsored by Latin American nations (Contadora) and facilitated through international organizations such as the United Nations. Since the churches believed that the imbalances of class and economic injustice were at the heart of conflict in Central America, American churches favored continued, increased or resumed economic assistance to the nations of the region. Although the churches sought for the removal of all foreign military personnel from the region, unilateral American withdrawal was encouraged. Lastly, the churches did not take seriously the claim that the Contras represented the majority views of the Nicaraguan people.

No protestant denomination has been as outwardly critical of U.S. policy as the Presbyterain Church/USA (PCUSA). PCUSA statements when delivered in national assembly are examples of consistent purpose and evolving rhetoric in order to denounce the policies of the Reagan Administration. At its 195th Assembly in 1983, PCUSA issued its first resolution and set of recommendations identical in content with the ABC position. Only a call for a just, humane and generous refugee policy separated the statements of the two churches. Other statements followed and were approved at Assemblies 197 (1985), 198 (1986), and 199 (1987). The complete texts for 1985 and 1986 are included in this paper's appendices. The 1985 resolution criticizes the character and ehtical integrity of American officials and condemns the policies as being morally illegitimate. Following a lengthy introduction reviewing the ongoing witness of American churches against the Reagan policies, the 197th Assembly:

(1) declares to the United States government our firm conviction that current U.S. policy in Central America is not only ideologically misguided, politically mistaken, economically wasteful, and militarily risky, but also morally wrong and unjust; and
(2) urges the President and/or the Congress of the United States to change immediately the course of current policy not only for the suffering people of Central America but also for the moral well being of our nation (PCUSA, General Assembly Resolution #2197, June 1985).

The Assembly called for the following changes in policy:

(1) declare the sovereignity of Nicaragua and the right for self-determination;
(2) cease all efforts to destabilize the Nicaraguan government;
(3) remove military personnel from the region;
(4) renew all trade agreements and developmental assistance agreements with Nicaragua;
(5) declare support for the Contadora peace process;
(6) provide asylum for Central American refugees;
(7) rescind the 1985 executive order trade embargo on Nicaragua; and
(8) commended its members to continue in their efforts of advocacy, pledged support to those who act in conscience and civil disobedience, encouraged its congregations to become actively involved in providing sanctuary, and encouraged its members to become active in the "Witness for Peace" programs (described below) along the borders of Nicaragua and Honduras (PCUSA, General Assembly Resolution #2197, June 1985).

A final criticism by the PCUSA accused U.S. officials of being involved in campaigns of intentional information distortion.

> Whereas U.S. officials present distorted pictures of the situation in Central America...we call upon the U.S. Government, as a sign of a change in the course of U.S. policy, to stop all efforts to mislead the American people about the situation in Central America (PCUSA, Resolution #2197).

These charges of official information distortion and falsification had not been heard from church communications since the Vietnam War. Only two years after they were published, the charges and accusations would be found to be correct through the unfolding drama of the Iran/Contra Congressional hearings.

The 1985 Presbyterian statement identified other denominations

whose sentiment concurred with the PCUSA.

> Whereas the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, numerous other communions in this country and in Central America, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States, the World Council of Churches and numerous other bodies have issued similar statements for change in U.S. policy.... (PCUSA, Resolution #2197).

Indeed, many other churches had echoed the pleas for change listed by the Presbyterians and American Baptists. The United Methodists said:

> We are opposed to the United States being involved in the brutal conquest of a sovereign nation which is attempting to affirm its right of self-determination and to correct the injustices of the past. We believe that a continuation of present U.S. policies towards Nicaragua will alienate us from our friends in Central America and will destroy the image we want to project around the world that we are a nation committed to peace, with justice and freedom (E/SA, p.42).

The Episcopalians wrote:

> Be it resolved, that the Bishops of the Episcopal Church voices its opposition to efforts by the United States Administration to support forces seeking the overthrow of the present Nicaraguan government by use of arms, calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region and urges the Administration to support the efforts of the Contadora Group seeking a way of peaceful negotiation for solving the human rights and justice issues, including those of the Miskito Indians; and be it further resolved that a copy of this resolution be sent to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of State (Witness, July 1984, p.26).

A final example of dissent from a mainline church denomination against U.S. policy in Central America comes from a letter circulated within the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and sent to govenment officials, The letter's sentiments are in keeping with statements from the ELCA's predecessor bodies, the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in America. The letter was signed by 39 bishops including the Bishop of the Church, the Rev. Herbert Chilstrom. The letter read,

> As men and women of faith who have leadership responsibilities within our religious bodies, we seek U.S. policies in Central America that are consistent with our deep sense of morality and justice, policies that rely upon diplomacy rather than the force of arms. We support the Guatemalan Peace Accords, and the ongoing peace process in the region. Sending additional aid to the Contras in any form would violate the Central American peace plan and contravene the expressed wishes of President Arias of Costa Rica. This immoral Contra war policy must finally be ended (The Lutheran, March 2, 1988, p.18).

Years before, the American Lutheran Church had become active within the Sanctuary movement, antagonizing the United States Government by supplying sanctuary to El Salvadoran citizens and declaring them to be political refugees.

It is clear that at the national and episcopal levels of most U.S. mainline protestant denominations and the chief ecumenical organizations of those denominations (WCC and NCC), they were against all aspects of President Reagan's Central American policy. Dissent was consistent and steady. It broadly covered most major denominations. Criticism was deep as the churches condemned the policies on moral and political grounds. As stated earlier, not since Vietnam had so many denominations and church leaders expressed such deep outrage against a U.S. policy.

Testimony and Advocacy

Congressional testimony became the second avenue for showing church-wide discontent with America's policies. When called upon to provide testimony on human rights abuses, Nicaraguan policy, refugee status, or aid to the area (which was infrequent), church testimony was unequivocably critical of U.S. policy in the region.

Before moving to examples of highly critical advocacy during the

Reagan years, it would be helpful to hear the voice of the church during the Carter presidency as the Sandinistas came to and solidified their power. As can be imagined, many churches saw this revolution as a special historical moment, a kairos, which needed nurturing. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee on December 6, 1979, then director of the Latin American International Justice Peace Office for the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops, the Rev. Thomas Quigly, advocated the immediate provision of $75 million in aid as requested by the Carter Administration by saying:

> Because of this historic moment and America's dismal past, and the local (Nicaraguan) church's commitment (to the success of the revolution), the Church (Roman Catholic) with Protestant encouragement is in support of the $75 million aid request (Y4F76/2:SC5/2).

Church testimony before Congress turned decidedly negative to American policy with the change of Administrations. Numerous denominations advocated before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Aid showing their disapproval for additional assistance to El Salvador until the murderers of Catholic nuns were punished. The churches encouraged negotiation and dialogue with the Sandinistas. Those signing petitions to the Committee included the American Friends, the American Baptist Church, the American Lutheran Church, the Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches, the Episcopal Church, the Lutheran Church in America, the Disciples of Christ, the Church of the Brethren, the Mennonite Central Committee, the National Council of Churches, the Presbyterian Church/USA, the Reformed Church in America, the United Church of Christ, the United Methodist Church, the United Presbyterian Church/USA, the United Universalist Church, and the National Conference of Catholic

Bishops (Y4Ap6/1:F76/3/982/pt.3, p.419).

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops was again called upon to deliver testimony on affairs in Nicaragua in 1982, this time before the Sub-committee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. During a time when charges were being made by Administration representatives regarding increased levels of religious persecution by the Sandinistas, the Rev. T. Bryan Heir, director of the Office of International Justice and Peace for the Catholic Conference, advocated restraint against hasty decision making based upon conflicting testimony over persecution. The Bishops argued again for dialogue rather than confrontation (USGPO, Y4;F76/1:H88/23, p.716).

To emphasize the church's consistent advocacy on Nicaragua, Archbishop Hickey of Washington, D.C. came before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs on April 17, 1985. Speaking for the Catholic Conference of Bishops, Hickey testified on the church's concerns.

> Let me speak for our role in that country. The role of the U.S. in organizing, training, and funding the Contras is a pervasive and inescapable issue. Extra hemispheric intervention is particularly objectionable for its effect on raising a regional conflict to a new and more dangerous one. Our central moral concern at this point is for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and therefore for an end to all military assistance from any outside party. We oppose military aid from the U.S., the Soviet Union, or any other country to any party in the conflict in Nicaragua, whether the Nicaraguan government or any other military force in conflict with that government. We call for new approaches to Nicaragua. We urge all parties to accept the principles of dialogue (regional and national). We believe that significant U.S. economic aid should be provided to Nicaragua (USGPO, H381-52.4, Y4-F76/1:UN35:71, pp.114-115).

The testimony displayed the common threads of church interest; dialogue

and negotiation, economic assistance, and the abandonment of current American policy and aid to the Contras.

Church advocacy continued in other ways when not called upon to provide Congressional testimony. A letter and statement documenting Contra atrocities were circulated to all House Members prior to the March 1986 House of Representatives vote and rejection of the Administration's $100 million aid request to the Contras. The letter was signed by Bishop Phillip Cousins of the NCC and African Methodist Episcopal Church, President Avery Post of the United Church of Christ (UCC), the heads of the orders of the Benedictine Sisters, the Franciscans, the Capuchin priests and sisters of Charity, and twenty bishops of the United Methodist, Episcopal, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic churches (Christian Century, Vol. 103, No. 12, pp.353-354). The house campaign was the most intensive effort of interdenominational cooperation against the Administration's Nicaragua policies.

Consciousness-Raising Activities of the Churches

In addition to direct and official pronouncements by church leaders and their bureaucracies aimed at church constituencies, the third major effort at influencing American policies and perceptions can be called consciousness-raising. The close geographic proximity of the United States and Central America allowed direct contact to be a relatively practical method for influencing opinion. Churches sponsored information-gathering tours of the region. Indeed, the author was a part of such a tour in February of 1984 during a time of high tension between Nicaragua and the U.S. The Big Pine II military

operations had begun, Contra activities had moved to both northern and southern borders of Nicaragua, and information of the mining of harbors had become public knowledge.

A typical information tour would include clergy and bishops, seminarians (I was one at the time), lay people, and some church experts in theology and governmental policy. Our tour went for the purposes of gauging the tension, inspecting refugee facilities, speaking to governmental and private sector officials, and gathering data on religious persecution. The typical tour included visits with Sandinista officials in Managua, meetings with church and development agency leaders, business leaders and American Embassy Staff, trips to Miskito Indian regions and border areas, as well as tours showing Sandinista improvements in literacy, irrigation, cooperative farming, rural development installations and reindustrialization operations.

The frequency of these tours was remarkable. During a two week stay, we had heard of four other such tours which took place in the previous weeks, and met two others outside of the American Embassy Compound for the daily protest demonstration!

The reasons for these trips were to provide information to stateside church leaders and foster goodwill between the Sandinistas and the American people. Equally important for the Sandinistas was the public relations benefit that more Americans could "tell the story" of the revolution, its morality and accomplishments. That U.S. churches sponsored these trips with frequent regularity was an important sign to U.S. government officials of the churches' discontent over policy and

disbelief in government sources of information. After leading a winter 1983 fact-finding mission to the area, former Bishop David Preus of the American Lutheran Church declared that:

> (1) the root problem in Nicaragua is injustice (historical);
> (2) turning this (the Nicaraguan conflict) into an East-West struggle was a tragedy imposed by outside nations (the U.S.);
> (3) military means connot solve the problems; and
> (4) the Church had a responsibility to press for negotiation (Christian Century, Nov. 9, 1983, p.1010).

Thus, it is easy to conclude from the evidence of personal experience, feature stories and others' personal remembrances, that never before had so many church members from different denominations and levels of church participation been involved in information gathering and dissemination against American foreign policy interests. This form of consciousness-raising stands uniquely in the history of government and church relationships.

Church Education Efforts

Education forms the fourth and final broad area of church participation in the Nicaraguan conflict. The term "education" is used loosely. Denominations provided brochures discussing the conflict and its moral implications. An example is included in the appendices. Those leaving on fact-finding missions were given numerous articles, books, and journals to read and later distribute. Major church publishing houses such as Augsburg (ALC), Fortress (LCA), Cokesbury (Methodist), Westminster (Presbyterian), Friendship (NCC), and Orbis (Maryknoll), carried numerous books and authors writing on Liberation Theology, Central American Studies, the Sandinista Revolution and the Nicaraguan

conflict in their church catalogues. Church denominational magazines and weeklies included articles on events, people and congragational life in Nicaragua. An example would be the year 1988, a year when hostilities slackened and American Contra aid ended. The ELCA publication, the Lutheran, published 14 stories on Nicaragua and Central America in the 26 issues for that year. Yet, no denominational curricula on the Central American conflicts were ever published.

The positions on the Nicaraguan conflict of mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics were unambiguous and to a great degree uniform. The issues for the churches were moral and pointed to a lack of integrity and character with America's policymakers. The churches perceived the Sandinista revolution as moral and just with Christian overtones. America's increased hostility towards the Sandinistas was met by the critical contentions of American church leaders. The churches' combined efforts at proclamation, advocacy, consciousness-raising and education betray significant contempt for America's regional foreign policy.

Para-Church Activities

Before leaving this section of the case study on church activity on behalf of Nicaragua, it is important to identify some aspects of para-church involvements in the policy debate. These para-church activities were either to the right or left of the actions taken by mainline denominations.

Jim Wallis is the editor of Sojourners magazine and the influential leader of the group by the same name. In his magazine in 1984, Wallis published a pledge of resistance should an American invasion occur in

Nicaragua. Identifying the purposes of Sojourners to be in cooperation with the American Friends Service Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy and Laity Concerned, SANE, and Pax Christi, Wallis offered the following five point plan for resistance to American policy:

> (1) A signal for action will go out to regional, state and local contact people and groups.
> (2) People across the country will gather at a previously designated church (at least one in every Congressional district). These churches will be the gathering points for receiving and sharing information, for prayer and mutual support, for preparing and commissioning one another for action.
> (3) A nonviolent vigil will be established at the congressional field offices of each U.S. senator and representative. Each office will be peacefully occupied until that congressperson votes to end the invasion.
> (4) A large number of people will come to Washington, D.C. (in delegations from every area of the country) to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience at the White House to demand an end to the invasion.
> (5) The U.S. citizens in Nicaragua who are in active partnership with us will launch their own plan of action in Nicaragua in concert with us. Depending on the political situation, the timing of the invasion, and the posibility of getting into Nicaragua before or during an invasion, we will send other people to Nicaragua to join the actions of the U.S. citizens already there, if our partners in Nicaragua feel such an action would be advisable (Wallis, p.11).

The plan involved grass-roots organization, massive advocacy effots, and actions of civil disobedience, all which have become standard practices of Sojourners since their origins during the Vietnam War.

Wallis also organized a second group involved in Nicaragua and working against U.S. policy interests. "Witness for Peace" was designed to provide a cadre of labor who could work in the coffee and cotton export crop fields frequently affected by the presence of Contra guerilla warfare activities. The Witness workers provided both

the produce for much needed foreign exchange as well as a type of security curtain to people living in the war area villages. I had the chance to meet some Witness for Peace workers before they went into the fields to replace Nicaraguans who had been placed into military service. The Witness members represented a variety of church denominations and secular organizations (Christianity Today, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp.64-65).

Several patterns of church response appear when comparing the reactions of American churches and their development agencies with the roles they presume as described earlier by Lissner. Some agencies and church groups continued to be in partnership with the objectives and interests of the United States. These were primarily the fundamentalist organizations and evangelical churches. By their advocacy, consciousness-raising, and education efforts, most mainline churches displayed the compensatory and corrective roles of the church towards government policy relationship. Church advocacy emphasized that American policy and interests were morally wrong, misguided, and needlessly created additional victims in Latin America. Instead of being the Hemisphere's partner for development and assistance, the churches saw U.S policy take on the older role in Latin America of police officer and bully. In the churches' eyes, the Sandinistas were victims with morally justifiable grievances from a history of oppressive relationships with the United States and, therefore, due some level of tolerance, acceptance and compensation.

J. Phillip Wogaman offers a slightly different set of categories for interpreting a church's political behavior. His book, Christian

Perspective on Politics, identifies numerous possible political objectives ranging from the cultivation of a "general ethos" to a church's participation in the ultimate overthrow of a government. Three of his categories seem to fit American church activities against U.S. policy in Nicaragua.

The first of these political objectives seen in the activities of American churches would be their efforts at influencing the general cultural ethos by providing moral and religious underpinnings to the perspectives people use to decide issues. The endless set of church proclamations, pronouncements, and social statements provided by the churches to their constituencies and to political leaders, attempted to influence the moral climate for decision-making. The ethical appeals commonly used included caring for the poor, providing justice and fairplay, and caring for the underdog. All of the above ethical appeals are consistant with traditional American values and were meant to set these values in opposition to American governmental behavior.

Education forms Wogaman's second category of church political participation. The numerous examples of church sponsored trips to Central America, journal and magazine articles, and special symposia and forums that were provided by the denominations do not need to be reviewed.

Advocacy or direct lobbying is a third category from Wogaman's list of options for church political participation. The churches, through their presidents and bishops, their councils and commissions, and through their advocacy organizations, pressured for change in

government policy.

Although any of these activities would be considered "normal" by today's standards and are practiced by almost all denominations, very few of America's foreign policies aroused such uniform enmity. Churches continue to voice their concerns regarding civil rights, domestic welfare and entitlement programs, refugee concerns and Apartheid in South Africa. Nicaragua, on the other hand, received more attention and appeared different to most mainline denominations. Church involvement supported the perception of an enlightened, Christianity-related, revolutionary process which was in opposition to the former totalitarian regime (Somoza). The churches supported this perception to the extent of official and consistent protest against America's policies and interests. Nicaragua, became the subject of the most intense foreign policy disagreement between American churches and their government since the Vietnam War.

Church Development Agency Responses

Several authors used for the research of this thesis commented on the difficulty of receiving information from church development agencies. I found a similar reluctance as I made my requests for time and information. This project was to have evaluated the responses of five agencies--American Friends Service Committee, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, and the Mennonite Central Committee. Catholic Relief Services never answered letters, requests, or returned telephone calls. After offering full cooperation with this study, the American Friends Service Committee refused to cooperate. This may in part be due to a change in staffing at their Latin American Affairs desk. Church World Service provided general information about the agency, annual reports, and mission statements, yet did not respond to the survey or other requests in writing for specific information on the CWS Nicaragua program. As the advocacy of CWS is carried out in cooperation with Lutheran World Relief, the advocacy positions are known and included with the Lutheran World Relief report below. Only the Mennonite Central Committee and Lutheran World Relief provided total cooperation and the requested information. Hence, any conclusions to this thesis must be based on information from the latter two organizations.

The background information on the parent churches of these organizations already presented indicated the churches' profound reticence to support American policy in the region. Church education efforts, advocacy positions to government, proclamations and statements by

leaders, all reveal church hostility to the Reagan program in Nicaragua. The goal of this thesis was to assertain whether the programs of church development agencies reflected the advocacy positions and hostilities of their parent churches. Given the level of rhetoric on the part of the churches, would church agencies respond by providing more resources of money, personnel, and programming to the people of Nicaragua and the Sandinista government, and by doing so, diminish the criticism of the Lissner argument?

A survey instrument regarding agency program and policy was sent to the different agencies and their directors of Latin American Affairs (see appendix). It was no surprise that CRS did not respond. More surprising was the reluctance of CWS and the AFSC. Both CRS and CWS receive large quantities or grant money from AID for their global programs. CWS has undergone a tremendous upheavel through the restructuring process between the NCC and CWS. These reasons may account for these agencies' ambivalence towards outside evaluation. The administrative change at AFSC might account for the change in that agency's position.

The survey instrument asked the agencies for various types of information. The most general was regarding the agency's overall mission, income, and expenditures which could have been (and was) easily answered by a series of agency annual reports. The agency was then asked to provide financial breakdowns in dollars and percentages for their programs in Latin America, Central America, and Nicaragua. The yearly changes in money and personnel would indicate an agency's

expanding interest in Nicaragua and the region. The agency staff person was asked to describe any changes in agency program in Nicaragua and changes in the direction of agency program. The timing of these changes was matched to the changes in American foreign policy from 1979 to 1986. These years marked the steady increase of hostility between the U.S. and the Sandinistas and between the U.S. government and the churches. Lastly, the staff person was asked to provide any official advocacy positions, presentations, and correspondence taken by the agency during the time of the Nicaraguan conflict. When the questions are taken together, they cover the primary areas of political involvement for the church development agency as discussed by Lissner.

Lutheran World Relief complied with all requests. The Latin America Affairs director in New York supplied information about the LWR program in Nicaragua and a LWR advocacy officer in Washington, D.C., supplied information detailing the positions taken by LWR to Congress and Administration officials. This information was gathered through the survey, personal correspondence and follow-up telephone interviews.

LWR has been involved in Nicaragua since the 1972 earthquake. The ecumenical service agency CEPAD was formed on account of the earthquake and has been the consistent recipient of LWR grants and aid. Only briefly, in 1972, has LWR provided personnel on-site in Nicaragua. Nicaragua accounted for one-fourth of LWR's Latin American budget. While serving four nations, the Latin America budget equaled only 5% of LWR's total budget for aid and development. When I visited the country in 1984, the Evangelical Committee for Development (CEPAD)

described itself as an ecumenical relief and development agency which, when possible, tried to cooperate with the humanitarian goals of the Sandinistas for developing human resources. This fits with the program description provided by LWR:

> the purpose of CEPAD is to increase the organizational and technical capacity of community groups to become more productive and self sustaining (Exhibit LA-6; June 8-10, 1990: LWR Information Report).

Providing funds to an agency inplies approval of that agency's objectives. The objectives of CEPAD are to:

(1) equip community groups to organize and address the needs through technical assistance, training, and basic education;
(2) increase production through improved techniques in agriculture, animal husbandry and promoter training;
(3) increase access to potable water; construct latrines; construct and repair homes;
(4) construct social infrastructure including bridges, schools and silos;
(5) train community health workers and committees to improve health and nutritional status, especially of children;
(6) organize and train women in sewing handicrafts and basic health with assistance from trained volunteers;
(7) assist in development of Atlantic coast with program in agriculture, health and education; and
(8) operate preschool and adult educational program.

Grants by LWR untied and allow CEPAD to program flexibly with its resources.

Funding from LWR to Nicaragua remained constant throughout the years of foreign policy debate and change. After an initial grant of $140,000 in 1981, the largest grant given by LWR, grants remained at $100,000 or $110,000 from 1982 until 1990. These grants have been normally for one year; however, a three year grant of $300,000 was awarded and covered the years 1983-85. LWR's level of resource and staffing continued during the final years of the Somoza regime, the

Sandinista revolution and their consolidation of power, and into the post-Sandinista government. There appears to be little overt connection between LWR involvement in Nicaragua and changes in American foreign policy in the region.

LWR cooperated with CWS to operate and fund jointly an Office on Development Policy in Washington, D.C. Executive Director Norman Barth (LWR) letters of advocacy are included in the Lutheran materials in the appendicies.

LWR advocacy efforts began in 1983 as part of the debate in Congress concerning foreign aid priorities. LWR in conjunction with CWS, recommended that the U.S.:

(1) shift a portion of short term economic political aid (Economic Support Funds) to long-term development needs;
(2) channel funds through multilateral institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and the Inter-American Development Bank to support regional integration;
(3) reduce the level of military aid to the region to check the growth of militarization in the region;
(4) provide Economic Support Fund (political/security assistance) to El Salvador on the initiation of unconditional dialogue between the parties of the conflict; and
(5) provide funding for programs promoting agricultural self-sufficiency and those benefitting the poor in the region, including refugees (from an October 17, 1990 letter from Cheryl Morden, CWS/LWR Office of Development Policy staff).

The distrust of American policy is evident by the suggestions to use multilateral funding sources for grants, the curb on military spending, and the proposal for dialogue between rebels and the U.S. backed govenment in El Salvador. All of the suggestions questioned the directions of American policy, America's interests and its security considerations, and the Administration's perception of regional realities.

LWR's criticism of American policy continued when in 1986 the

agency urged Congress to oppose additional $100 million in military aid to the Contras as well as $30 million in "humanitarian" assistance. In a letter to all members of Congress, Barth and LWR joined the executive directors of MCC, AFSC, CWS, the Unitarian Universalists, Oxfam America, the Heifer Project, and the North American Medical Mission Sisters, in calling Congress to reject the aid package and replace it with only humanitarian aid donated through international organizations. The directors "educated" the members of Congress by reminding them of the customary definition of "humanitarian assistance" while pointing out the distortions of the Administration's viewpoint. "Humanitarian Assistance" was to be made available solely on the basis of human need, not for political purposes; it was to be offered impartially to all sides in a conflict; and it was to go solely to civilians and non-combatants. This was followed by a personal letter dated July 24, 1986, to Senator Mark Hatfield, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, in which Barth wrote, "As a private and voluntary organization with human needs programs throughout the Third World, we are committed to U.S. policies which underwrite effective (underlining is the author's emphasis) efforts to meet those needs." Barth protested Administration efforts to shift food relief funds from famine relief efforts in the Sub-Sahara to political balance-of-payments programs for certain Central American nations.

These protests against politicized use of aid were registered again on November 2, 1988, regarding the U.S. decision not to supply humanitarian assistance to civilians whose lives were disrupted by hurricane

Joan. Protest reached an apex when LWR along with CRS, CWS, MCC, Oxfam, and the Unitarians, submitted to Congress their documentation on Salvadoran government harrassment to the voluntary agencies and their regional staff.

Harkening back to Lissner's roles for development agencies, LWR took on the appearance of a compensatory agency in 1988. In cooperation with CWS, LWR worked with Congressional Staff to identify specific target audiences, war victims, who could be assisted through U.S. aid. Congress later passed the Child Survival Program for child victims of warfare in Central America. The LWR/CWS efforts appear similar to those undertaken by the same agencies following the end of the Vietnam War.

Several points can be raised about the advocacy of LWR. The first is that it tends to be cooperative advocacy. LWR joined with other church development agencies to register common positions and protests to Congressional and Administration leaders. This is in keeping with the widely held agreement of American churches against Reagan's Central American policies.

LWR advocacy efforts tended to distance the agency from American activities and yet retain a semblance of cooperation. The Agency distanced itself from American military policies, Administration definitions of humanitarian assistance, support for the Contras and frequently from the El Salvadoran government. LWR attempted to affirm its commitment to support and partnership with U.S. efforts for justice and humanitarian assistance as witnessed by the Barth/Hatfield letter.

Lastly, it should be noted that LWR advocacy came fairly late in the conflict between Nicaragua and the United States. By 1985 and 1986, Administration strategies against the Sandinistas and support for the Contra War (as outlined in chapter 3) were well established and the Nicaragua economy was in ruins.

Several conclusions can now be made in light of LWR's involvement in Nicaragua.

(1) LWR's assistance programs to Nicaragua continued throughout the conflict with little relationship to changes in American leadership and policy, or Nicaraguan leadership policy.
(2) LWR never committed personnel to Nicaragua.
(3) LWR advocacy efforts resemble closely the "corrective" and "compensatory" roles from the Lissner analysis.

Thus, LWR involvement does not provide evidence for the Sullivan predictions in spite of the great differences between American and church interests. Nicaragua represented a case where the interests of the United States in aid policy had become highly politicized, and the Lutheran Church, like most mainline denominations, took its mandate for justice, participation and inclusiveness more seriously. Strains between church and state were in evidence, but this was no real attempt to remove the church from relationship, dialogue, or efforts of cooperation. On the other hand, LWR advocacy resembled some of the Lissner material, and the limited program support appears to relate to the problems inherent in a pluralism of interests. Even though human suffering increased, and LWR appealed to its ideals for humanitarian assistance and justice, LWR involvement did not increase. In evaluating the performance of MCC, the next agency outlined, the

experience shows some commonalities as well as stark contrasts.

MCC began its work in Nicaragua in 1979 following the Sandinista assumption of power. Their programming steadily increased over the next ten years. MCC's presence in Nicaragua is in keeping with their approach and purpose in mission.

> Our service is expected to incarnate the love of God by standing with needy people. Our skills, resources, and influence will benefit others but we also expect to learn from and to be changed by the people we relate to. We want to incorporate the vision, concern and participation of the poor in planning and implementing program, and to find ways to transmit their voice to our constituents.
>
> Our work will be directed towards the most needy situations which are often scenes of conflict. Our service will attempt to be without racial, sexual, religious, or political qualifications. We strive for an identity with God's community that rises above national, racial, cultural or ideological affiliations (MCC Program Foundations, p.2, 1988).

In keeping with the above mandate for action, as tension and conflict rise so should rise the involvement of MCC.

Teh table below describes statistically the development of MCC's program in Nicaragua.

Table 1

Year	$ to Nicaragua	Staffing	% of Latin American Budget	Material aid ($)
1982	171,486	2	9	161,919
1985	291,483	5	12.4	574,126
1988	298,211	5	10.3	2,430,277
1989	346,919	11	12	2,688,782

Although the percentage which Nicaragua represents of the total MCC budget for Latin America has reamined relatively constant (33% increase

in 7 years), the total amounts of human, material, and administrative resources provided to Nicaragua by MCC increased dramatically to 1989. Agency program expenditures increased 100% in eight years. Staffing requirements increased five-fold. Program specialists were added to MCC's Nicaraguan presence. Material donations of food, clothing, medicines, seeds, livestock and other surplies increased by 2000%.

MCC, unlike LWR and CWS, requires little federal government assistance. In 1989, for example, MCC received only $72,875 in U.S. aid, which represents .2% of MCC's total budget (MCC, 1990 Annual Report). The money represents freight reimbursements for material assistance shipments. In comparison (and returning to the earlier quoted comparative study between Canadian and U.S. agencies), MCC received $4,213,730 (Canadian), or, 1/6 of its Canadian revenue, from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). MCC guards jealously its program independence.

As statistics increased, so has the program depth and breadth of MCC. What began in 1979 as a small program providing seed-money grants to CEPAD, local grants to Mennonite or Brethren Nicaraguan congregations, and educational retreats for Mennonite staff blossomed by the end of the next decade into a far-reaching program. By 1988 and 1989, Mennonite projects expanded to include the following:

(1) agricultural and irrigation projects;
(2) animal husbandry projects;
(3) theological education for professionals and laity;
(4) community development, self-help, and cottage industry projects;
(5) refugee assistance to Miskito indian camps;
(6) peace institutes and peace training classes;
(7) appropriate technology and well-digging projects;

(8) private sector business programs attempting to reincorporate the returning Contras into community activities;
(9) half-way house programs for returning and Sandinista imprisoned ex-Somocista Guardsmen;
(10) nurses training programs;
(11) medical relief programs to the Miskito indians;
(12) pre-school nutrition projects;
(13) peace tours for visiting North Americans; and
(14) the operation of two 22,000 person refugee camps for Salvadorans in Honduras (MCC Annual Reports for 1988, 1989).

The needs-based program of MCC expanded and diversified with the shifting political realities (reindtroducing Contras and Somocistas into society) and crossed the central mountains to serve the indigenous indian populations.

MCC was not left behind other church agencies in developing statements and proclamations for advocacy. At its annual meeting on January 26, 1984, in Blaine, Washington, MCC leaders announced that members were working the agricultural fields which were in war zones, sponsoring refugees in the U.S., and providing education on Central America and were, thus, already involved in the conflict. In addition to these, MCC issued a Call to Increased Commitment and Action which stated:

In faithful response to the call of God to stand with our brothers and sisters who are suffering as a result of the Central American crisis, we will demonstrate our commitment in prayer, service and prophetic witness.

We will:

- increase our aid to refugees, undocumented aliens and displaced persons in the United States through the provisions of safe haven and sanctuary in helping unrecognized refugees seek political asylum or gain "landed immigrant status". We commend the Canadian government for granting refugee status to those who have had to flee from Central America;

- aid endangered undocumented aliens in the United States through the provisions of bonding when apprehended;

- encourage a presence in conflict zones in Central America (e.g., Witness for Peace in Nicaragua on the Honduran Border);

- listen to and learn from Christians in the region to discern a biblical posture towards oppression and violence;

- increase our aid to refugees and displaced persons within Central America;

- join in public awareness-raising activities (for example, Central America Week, March 18-25) regarding the roots of the violence and the consequences of current government policies;

- in a spirit of deep concern, encourage leaders in our government to:

  --support broad negotiations, rather than the sending of arms, as a more constructive means by which the United States government can contribute to the resolution of conflict and violence in the region;

  --suspend the U.S. support of counter-government groups invading Nicaragua, and withdraw all U.S. troops from Central America;

  --provide generous economic assistance to the region with conditions that promote and protect human rights and distribute the economic benefits to all sectors of society;

  --adopt legislation (HR-4447 and S-2131) that would suspend deportation of Salvadoran refugees from the U.S until safe haven can be assured elsewhere;

  --call on other governments outside Central America to suspend military assistance.

Above all we commit ourselves to prayer asking God's guidance, strength and resolve in responding to these pressing human needs (Statement on Central America and Refugees in the U.S. - page two, Adopted at the MCC U.S. Annual Meeting, Blaine, Washington, January 26, 1984).

MCC supported and signed various advocacy statements of other churches and non-profit organizations, as has already been mentioned while describing the LWR advocacy profile.

The Director for Latin American Affairs for MCC insists that no relationship exists between increases and decreases in MCC programming

and changes in American foreign policy. "At no time did a specific U.S. act cause an increase or decrease in our program to Central America (responses to PVO survey)." Although traditional biblical and theological understandings of the Mennonites would lead to increased programs in a war-torn area, specifically the Mennonites' commitments to pacifism and non-violence, certain comments and conclusions relating Lissner's hypotheses to the MCC interest in the region can also be made. As the Mennonites have never been involved in a comparable relationship with the U.S. government as envisioned by Sullivan, his thesis cannot explain Mennonite behavior. Given the above circumstances and analysis, what can be said about MCC involvement according to Lissner?

(1) MCC values its independence and therefore reduces its dependence to a minimem on the U.S. government.
(2) MCC always has and still does represent a less pluralist denomination and its emphasis on participation is related to its highly decentralized structure.
(3) MCC expanded considerably its involvement in Nicaragua in proportion to the Reagan Administration's increased involvement with the Contras.
(4) MCC's advocacy concurred with the sentiments of other denominations and they cooperated in joint statements of outrage and concern.
(5) MCC programming cannot be seen as only charitable contribution or programs of national development and skill training, but its efforts with victims of war (Somocistas, returning Contras, Miskito indian populations, widows, etc.) provide evidence for a compensatory role as described by Lissner in addition to being a policy critic.
(6) Although denied by MCC leaders, MCC's involvement beginning with the onset of Sandinista rule and its subsequent expansion of involvement to deal with the victims of the American backed war suggests some relationship to American policy. Its call to constituents for renewed commitment to the Nicaraguan people, its projects in war zones, its work with Salvadoran political refugees (a concept frequently denied by the Administration), its acceptance of the Witness for Peace program and encouragement of its members to participate in Witness for Peace do not add up to "nonrelationship." Biblical and theological convictions

> cannot be discounted and may initiate a mission. They do not outline strategies or the extent of the mission. Developmental programming does not exist in a political vacuum.

Before leaving the case study and moving to the thesis summary and conclusions, I will make some mention of AFSC and CWS.

As stated earlier, AFSC refused to participate in this research following initial assurance of participation. Some reference to their work in Nicaragua can be gleaned from their public relations materials, "The AFSC International Program Bulletins." The Fall 1986 issue of the "B" identified programs working directly with the Miskito indians, school-to-school programs between American and Nicaraguan students, and health education projects. AFSC appears also on the various advocacy letters already presented above with Lutheran World Relief.

The author had the opportunity while in Nicaragua to speak with CWS personnel stationed in Managua and tour some CWS self-help project centers. These self-help centers produced hammocks and textile products. The CWS agent spoke about his agency's cooperations with CEPAD particularly in the areas of literacy and health care. No figures were given, nor could any be secured from CWS in New York.

Summary and Conclusions

So what happened to church agencies in Nicaragua? One agency (MCC) which had not been involved in Nicaragua began its work with the beginnings of the Sandinista regime and expanded its activities, programs, and resource allotments as U.S. hostility increased. This agency was a supplier of goods and services, an educator of its constituency and opposed selective engagement. Another agency, LWR, which had been involved through a surrogate agency (CEPAD) in Nicaragua since the 1972 earthquake, continued a constant and somewhat minimal presence throughout Sandinista rule. LWR's primary ministry seemed to be one of education and advocacy on behalf of Sandinista achievements and against the Reagan Administration policies. Do either Sullivan or Lissner help to explain these actions taken by the agencies? Is the original hypothesis of this study, that agencies would be too constrained by their internal and external constituencies to allow for any effective action for change, supported by the case study? The answer to the above question can only be a partial "yes."

Robert Sullivan hypothesized that church agencies and government would end their partnership relationship for foreign assistance should either commodity surpluses diminish, government activities become more politicized, or church agencies take their social justice mandates and theologies more seriously. The hypothesis was entertained in the midst of the Vietnam War after a decade of increased politicization surrounding the use of commodity surpluses and decades of increased church ecumenism, globalization, and social awareness.

The Nicaragua case would have been one which would have fit Sullivan's prescription. America's interest in the region and in the Sandinista government had become politicized and part of the larger East-West global struggle. These had been efforts by AID to impose further restrictions upon church agencies and their styles of operation. Through encounters with liberation theologies, church hierarchies and members had become more sensitive to the needs and demands of marginalized peoples. Yet, these strains did not break off the partnership between church agencies and government. CWS and LWR continued to use AID funds for their global relief and development projects including those in Central America. The continuation of LWR services in Nicaragua is as much a continuation of tradition as any political statement. In small defense of Sullivan, the case could be made that U.S. hostility towards Nicaragua did not cause agencies like CWS and LWR to leave their operations (direct service or surrogate) in Nicaragua. For all of the church's proclamation and efforts at advocacy indirectly on the Sandinista's behalf, these same advocacy letters refer to the traditional and ongoing partnership between government and church agency. Sullivan's thesis seems reasonable on the surface, but it is nor clear whether any one foreign policy would ever cause differences of opinion between government and church agency to turn into a divorce.

Lissner suggested numerous hypotheses. He suggested that unless there was significant agreement amongst the various constituencies represented within a church agency, it would break off relations with government resources. Lissner categorized church agencies as playing

certain roles--partner, compensator, corrector, etc.--in their relationship to government and to government policies. Lissner posited that the issue itself might determine the agency's role and that issues such as "international power politics and the enrichment/impoverishment mechanism" are the least likely to motivate church agencies to rise against their government's policies. Here again, one wishes to say "yes, but" when it comes to the churches' performances in regards to Nicaragua.

The response of MCC might support the Lissner thesis. MCC programming showed steady growth throughout the years of the Reagan Administration. MCC sought out locations where it could be true to its principles to witness to participatory non-violence in the midst of violent circumstances. Since World War I, MCC had a history of activities which showed its passion for peace alongside its nation's actions in war. But the make-up of MCC and its supporting constituencies do not share the same pluralism which marks the larger church development agencies. MCC's clear ideology, that of pacifism, is not shared by the larger mainline denominations that do not reject violence and war as legitimate foreign policy options for a nation-state. MCC also receives little from government assistance in its program budget. MCC's program direction in Nicaragua supports the Lissner hypotheses, but MCC does not completely fit the theoretical constructs used by Lissner to build his hypotheses (Molin and Downs).

LWR fits the theoretical description of the church-related development agency used by Lissner. Its international equivalent, Lutheran World Federation, is, indeed, Lissner's employer. LWR reflects the

constraints offered by a pluralist base of support, numerous relationships throughout the world, and fully integrated with AID resources. In its role as advocate, LWR rejected U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua and Central America, tried to educate its constituencies on the problems of Latin America (impoverishment, dependence, and liberation), and later worked with Congress to seek compensating means of redress to the Nicaraguan victims of U.S. backed policies. It did not commit itself to supplying additional personnel or resources except after a hurricane devastated the eastern coastline. The roles played by LWR included partner, corrector, and compensator (and for a few who smuggled in spare parts, disobedience) in a cause which was not directly related to its primary interests (church-state issues, quantity of development assistance, and refugee policy), and did not increase its physical presence and therefore ability to provoke change. LWR provides a mixed set of responses not entirely fitting to the hypotheses put forth by Lissner.

It appears that if one cannot confirm the Sullivan thesis, then only portions of Lissner's theses can be supported as well. These include:

(1) that a tendency exists for greater flexibility in programming by church agencies when in conflict with their government's foreign policy when they are not dependent upon USAID;
(2) that internal and external constraints do exist for church development agencies which impact upon the agency's program options;
(3) that the modern agency relationship to USAID changes from nation to nation, and foreign policy to foreign policy thereby eliminating the zero-sum relationship suggested by Sullivan;
(4) that a church agency's advocacy against its government's foreign policy involves less risk to isolating various components of its internal constituency or developemnt objectives; and

(5) that church agencies and their programs are more complex than imagined by either Sullivan or Lissner and frequently work in partnership with other first world and third world agencies to fulfill their development objectives.

These more modest conclusions (compared to Sullivan or Lissner) seem to reflect what happened to U.S. church agencies in Nicaragua.

In essence, this case study which sought to provide a test of (an application of) the Sullivan or Lissner model of church and church agency response to national foreign policy interests could only partially fulfill its goal. This is due in part to the fact that some agencies did not wish to participate and, therefore, the information they could provide was not obtainable. But the thesis that church agencies are too constrained by their internal constituencies for effective political action is only partially confirmed. Both Lissner and Sullivan construct their ideas and theories prior to the evolution of indigenous third world development agencies which have provided older church agencies with more options for service. Greater acceptance of the ideals of participation and liberation have changed church agency programs. Expanded governmental regulation since the mid-1970's has changed the character of church agency/government relationships. Work from scholars such as Wogaman, Nichols, and others, has also helped to fill in the picture of church agency political activity and to refine Lissner's ideas of risk, opportunity cost, constraint, and the method of decision-making used by the church agencies. More research into the evolving relationship of church and government needs be done as our world's political ideologies and alliances, religious demographics and preferences, and economic capabilities and futures change.

Appendix

The following documents and papers have been referred to in the body of this thesis and are included for reference and information. They help to document the style and extent of church and church agency response to the Reagan Administration's foreign policy in Central America and in particular Nicaragua. What follows are:

(1) two examples of church mission of purpose statements from the Mennonite Central Committee, and Church World Service (Appendix A and B);
(2) Central America resolutions from the American Baptist Chruch and the Presbyterian Church/USA (Appendix C and D);
(3) a church education brochure distributed by the PCUSA (Appendix E);
(4) the survey form used with the different church agencies (Appendix F);
(5) copies of advocacy letters written to members of Congress showing the churches' limited support for Administration policy (Appendix G);
(6) the listing of grants made by the World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism (Appendix H); and
(7) the document describing registration procedures for Non-Governmental organizations with USAID (Appendix I).

They are included as selected examples which describe the general sentiment and displeasure of mainline churches and church agencies with the Reagan Administration's Nicaragua policies.

Appendix A

MCC PROGRAM FOUNDATIONS - APPROACHES - PRIORITIES

Mennonite Central Committee is an agency of the Mennonite and Brethren in Christ churches of North America for domestic and overseas service ministries. These ministries are a Christian response to human need, a sign of hope and reconciliation and an integral part of the church's total witness.

This statement serves as a guideline for planning and implementing program and provides some criteria for ongoing evaluation. It updates a similar statement approved at the January 1976 Annual Meeting.

FOUNDATIONS

1. We minister "in the name of Christ." Our work is rooted in the compassionate God who calls us to be compassionate people. We understand the fullest revelation of God to be Jesus of Nazareth, who invites all people to be made whole, through the redemptive work of his life, death and resurrection and to follow his example as one who serves. We believe the loving God wills the well-being of all people and the healing of creation; that the first fruits of the new creation, the Kingdom of God, are manifest in the peoplehood called church.

2. We accept our weakness and failures which underscore our need to be led by God's Spirit and to be taught by the people with whom we interact. Helping others is most effective when the "helper" learns from the wisdom and experience of the people in the immediate situation.

3. We are an inter-Mennonite organization which includes persons from a variety of Christian traditions. We strive to embody the values and insights of this faith community in our ministries. We believe the Kingdom of God is good news to be proclaimed, an invitation to conversion from a life of sin, and to be lived out in lives of discipleship in community. We seek to reflect a biblical view of Christian life as the wholeness of word and deed, body and spirit, faith and life, worship and proclamation.

4. We have been established by the constituent churches as a service ministry for inter-Mennonite work among the disadvantaged peoples of the world. The broadly defined functions include: emergency relief; rural, community and organizational development; refugee assistance; peace, justice and ecological concerns; education, health and technical support; encouragement of local churches; and nurturing the gospel vision of reconciled people in a reconciled world.

5. We seek to be sensitive to the times in choosing priorities as a church agency. A primary source for such understanding is learning from the people with whom we work. We want to be particularly sensitive to the voices and hopes of local partners--churches and agencies. We endeavor to become a communication link between the people with whom we work and the people who support our ministries.

6. We are aware that human suffering is frequently due to unjust social situations and various forms of exploitation. To relieve human suffering is to be concerned for social justice. Our work for justice recognizes that substantial societal change will be authentic only if it includes the product of local energy and struggle. As North American Christians we confess our involvement in the imbalance of privilege between our societies and much of the rest of the world.

7. We want to be responsible in the use of resources--personnel, financial, material aid, to be self-critical and subject to evaluation. In order to avoid duplication and provide greatest coordination we expect to be in continual consultation with constituent bodies, local church bodies, Mennonite and Brethren in Christ mission boards, the Council of International Ministries, the Inter-Mennonite Home Ministries Council, the Council of Moderators and Secretaries in Canada and the United States, and Mennonite World Conference.

APPROACHES

1. Our service is expected to incarnate the love of God by standing with needy people. Our skills, resources and influence will benefit others but we also expect to learn from and to be changed by the people we relate to. We want to incorporate the vision, concern and participation of the poor in planning and implementing program, and to find ways to transmit their voice to our constituents.

2. Our ministry is rooted in the nonresistant, peacemaking example of Christ. We seek to understand the different points of view on violence but our own commitments to justice in social and political relationships will be as nonviolent missioners of peace and reconcilation.

3. Our ministry will demonstrate and articulate the good news in solidarity with local partners through healing, feeding, clothing, creating, planting, building, teaching, listening, advocating, visiting, organizing, encouraging.

4. Our work, whether short- or longer term, will be developmental in character. Development is a participatory, transforming process leading to greater dignity and self-reliance, greater vision and possibility, greater community and interdependence. Development cannot be done in isolation from the local and global milieu; it includes the spiritual as well as the material, the corporate as well as the individual.

5. Our work will be directed toward the most needy situations which are often scenes of conflict. Our service will attempt to be without racial, sexual, religious or political qualification. We strive for an identity with God's community that rises above national, racial, cultural or ideological affiliations.

6. Our most important resource is dedicated people willing to immerse themselves in difficult situations. Major effort must be made to recruit and nurture people who are willing to "fall into the ground and die" in life and service, so that the gospel of the Kingdom may bear fruit.

7. Our ministry recognizes the reality of the church in nearly every land. We expect our work and witness to be based on this reality and wherever

possible to be done in partnership and mutuality with local churches. Our goal is to strengthen local structures and leadership. We will give priority to program with Mennonite and Brethren in Christ churches and missions.

8. Our service cannot escape the realities of power in the world-system. The political, economic and cultural impact of North America is a major issue all over the world. Responsible action in today's world includes humbly "speaking truth to power" which includes a concern for the public policies of governments but especially of Canada and the U.S.A. Our experience, especially the reporting of returning workers can be a helpful witness in local communities, churches and at various levels of government.

PRIORITIES

Based on these foundations and approaches, in the context of existing program and current world dynamics, program planning for the next three years (1988-1991) will emphasize:

1. Being available for continued and new involvements in areas suffering from poverty, hunger, conflict and injustice.

2. Providing resources for hungry people and assistance to refugees through relief, increasing food production, improving health services and opportunities for employment.

3. Strengthening the world church and global consciousness by expanding the exchange dimensions of program, by circulating people from country to country as well as to and from North America.

4. Highlighting the peacemaking element of program through interchurch conversations, interpretation of our experience, encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflict and support of just public policies.

5. Preparing people for the future by providing training opportunities for younger people in cross-cultural situations.

6. Developing a more systematic program of in-service training as a response to rising expectations and the complexities of the world situation.

7. Instituting a research and interpretation element in program planning and evaluation, including the sharing of such materials through publication and public discussion.

Adopted at the MCC Annual Meeting, January 30, 1988

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There are many texts which inspire MCC activity. Some typical ones would include: Lev. 25, Deut. 5, Isa. 58:6-8, 61:1-4, Micah 6:6-8, Matt. 5-8, 25:31-46, Luke 4, 10:25-37, John 13:31-35, 15, Rom. 12-13, II Cor. 8-9, Gal. 5-6, Eph. 2:14-22, Phil. 2:1-11, Col. 3:12-17, Heb. 13:1-16, James, I John 3-4

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Appendix B

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE

DRAFT

September, 1984

THE 1985-87 TRIENNIUM EMPHASES OF CHURCH WORLD SERVICE (Proposed)

I. CONTEXT

A. HISTORY AND MANDATE.

Church World Service (CWS) was established in 1946 by seventeen Protestant churches which wished to provide their ecumenical ministry, heretofore undertaken in three separate agencies, with a broader and more permanent vehicle. CWS joined the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.(NCCC) in 1950, and the Council's Division of Overseas Ministry (DOM) in 1964, as the development. relief and refugee assistance agency of the NCCC. Church World Service was born under the pressure of the churches' commitment to respond to desperate need following World War II. Representatives of the church service agencies met frequently and built Church World Service as a joint organization whose fundamental idea was to provide a consortium for high efficiency. There would be no duplication of staff. no parallel administration, no competitive fund raising. The members of these agencies, moved to compassion, were determined to be as efficient in the use of their resources as possible.

In the 1950's there was increasing cooperation between CROP and CWS, culminating in CROP becoming an integral part of CWS. Also, during the 1970's, there was growing recognition of the need for working on socio-economic development issues within the USA. Thus a public policy advocacy program and a global education program were established as integral parts of CWS.

Church World Service has proven itself a flexible instrument in achieving these goals. New emphases have appeared over the years, but all of them point in the same basic direction for the churches response to pressing human need. Four ways in which Church World Service's efforts have changed illustrate the fluid nature of the organization. (1) Though the initial effort was primarily a response to World War II, CWS gradually expanded its visionf responsibility to include all countries or peoples, whether they had been directly related to the World War II disaster or not. (2) While emphasis had been primarily upon meeting emergencies, responding to disasters, and to refugee assistance and resettlement, more and more attention has been given in the last two decades to development and longer range ways of promoting human dignity, self reliance, and wholeness. (3) Increased attention has been given to the ways in which education and advocacy work in the United States can and should be an integral part of the promotion of human dignity and development. (4) Far greater attention is now given to the wholeness of the church, to mutual sharing of ideas, to taking seriously the views and perspectives of partner groups, especially those with whom CWS is attempting to work.

The ministry undertaken by member churches through CWS stems from God's acts of creation and redemption which confirm the undeniable value, equality, and unity of human life. CWS grew naturally out of the conviction that the Christian community is called to be a witness to, and expression of, God's creative power and redemptive love in human affairs. That conviction, grounded in Jesus Christ, animated by the Holy Spirit, and attested to in holy scripture in the ongoing community of faith, is central to the purposes of CWS. That conviction means that CWS is committed to the material, intellectual, social and spiritual well-being and wholeness of all people. It means that freedom in Christ refers not only to liberation from one's own sin, but freedom from the evil consequences of the sin of others, as that sin poisons human institutions and relationships. Thus, CWS's mandate, rooted in these convictions about what God is doing, and the nature of the covenant community's calling, is to promote human dignity, justice and wholeness in the social, political and economic dimensions of life.

To this end, human, material, financial and informational resources are channeled to overseas colleague agencies to support their work with the poor and oppressed in fulfilling emergencies and long term human needs. In the United States, CWS works for and with its member churches in refugee resettlement and domestic disaster response. In addition, recognizing that development relief and refugee needs require a wholistic response, member churches also have enabled CWS to undertake constituency education and public policy advocacy activities within the United States itself. These latter functions support CWS's primary responsibility in development relief and refugee assistance.

B. RELATIONSHIPS.

1. Member Churches. CWS is an expression of thirty-one Protestant and Orthodox churches representing over forty-million members in the United States. CWS cooperates with and is an agent of its constituent churches, which set policy and provide guidance on CWS activities and finances. Thus, CWS is accountable to the churches through the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. On behalf of the NCCC and its member churches, CWS is mandated to work in development, emergency and disaster response and refugee assistance. This mandate involves CWS in overseas activities as well as advocacy and constituency education in the United States.

2. Colleague Agencies. Overseas development, relief and refugee activities are usually undertaken by local social institutions, usually church related, to which CWS channels funds, materials and personnel. These agencies, referred to as "colleague agencies," share common values and purposes with CWS. In many cases, CWS relates to the service programs of overseas churches which have had traditional mission relationship with American churches. CWS also may provide seed money and personnel when support is

requested by interested parties wishing to form church-related service agencies. CWS either relates directly to these agencies or supports their work through a consortium of agencies or ecumenical channels. Such support complements and supplements the resources and capabilities provided by colleague agencies and the people in the local community with whom they work.

Diversity is probably the most salient characteristic of CWS relationships with colleague agencies. Use of the term "colleague agencies" indicates a long term commitment between CWS and the overseas agency which extends beyond the support of specific development projects. CWS is not interested only in discreet, readily identifiable field activities. It is committed to supporting these agencies as they become self-reliant institutions dealing with human needs in their own environment. This means that CWS often defrays a portion of the colleague agencies administrative budget, or supports agencies efforts to strengthen their administrative and programmatic capabilities.

CWS envisages itself primarily as a a partner in network of churches and agencies that learn and work together to promote human dignity, justice and self-reliance. Therefore, theological and practical insights of colleague agencies are another means through which CWS hopes to contribute to the enhancing of the quality of life, both overseas and within the United States.

In developing and maintaining relationships, the following characteristics of colleague agencies are considered important:

-- the agency's view of its role in society and, in particular, its emphasis on the unity and equality of all people and its commitment to be with the poor and oppressed;

-- the priority of the problems the agency seeks to address;

-- the agency's reflective and decision-making capabilities and style;

-- the agency's actual or potential capabilities for meeting objectives-e.g. its management and technical skills, its ability to undertake feasible efficient and effective approaches, its human relationships, its innovativeness;

-- the agency's quantitative and qualitative reporting procedures;

-- the agency's willingness to cooperate with others in a collegial style.

3. The World Ecumenical Network. In addition to these relationships with colleague agencies, CWS consistently maintains cooperative service relationships, both in the US and overseas, with numerous ecumenical councils and agencies. Since its

earliest days, CWS has initiated and cooperated with disaster response and refugee resettlement programs through local and regional councils of churches. CWS responds to such needs sometimes has provided the catalyst for the formation of a council or cooperative church agency. It is frequently through local councils or ministerial associations in the US that CWS/CROP community hunger appeals are organized and coordinated.

Overseas, CWS establishes and maintains supportive relationships with regional conferences of churches, national Christian councils, and their respective service agencies. CWS also participates on behalf of the service agencies of its member churches in the World Council of Churches Commission on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS). Through its member churches, CWS participates in the Ecumenical Resource Sharing System of the World Council of Churches. CWS also has active contact with the World Council of Churches Commission for the Churches' Participation in Development (CCPD).

4. Other Partners. CWS's mandate to meet human need may lead to cooperation with other Christian organizations, as well as with church-related bodies, secular organizations, government and quasi-governmental agencies. These include US based church agencies (e.g. Mennonite Central Committee, Lutheran World Relief, and Catholic Relief Services), other private agencies with similar concerns (e.g. YMCA-YWCA International, Oxfam, Heifer Project.) CWS also participates as a member of certain agencies within the US to strengthen advocacy and education efforts (e.g., Interfaith Action for Economic Justice, ACVA/PAID). In all such relationships, CWS is careful to maintain its own identity and philosophy of operation.

II. GUIDING VALUES FOR CWS' WORK

A. THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT.

Without presuming to articulate here a full theological statement for the grounding of its work (see the amplified statement formulated by CWS in 1980 "The Nature of Church World Service"), CWS understands itself as rooted in that covenant community of faith which over the centuries has stressed the centrality of a God who, known most fully in Jesus Christ,

-- calls forth order and purpose out of chaos, and establishes a harmony and unity of creation;

-- calls a people to special covenant relationship to act on God's behalf in achieving loving, restoring, reconciling, creative purposes;

-- calls enslaved peoples out of bondage and into new identity and special responsibilities;

-- speaks through the witness of prophets, for

righteousness, justice and faithfulness;

-- incarnates God's purposes in the world through the saving, redemptive power and witness of Jesus Christ, even to cross and resurrection;

-- indicates special concern for the poor, and uses the poor as special instruments of God's purposes in making all things new and renewed;

-- has brought the Kingdom into our midst, and who yet calls us through stewardship of God's gifts to bring the Kingdom more wholly into our midst;

-- calls people, individually and corporately to koinonia, to justice, love and wholeness

Grounded in these fundamental convictions about how God has worked and is working in history, CWS affirms that a Christian vision of the quality of life can result only when fundamental moral and ethical values are manifested in, and actively promoted by, the social, political, economic and personal dimensions of life. While life itself is impossible without basic physical necessities such as adequate food and shelter, the quality of human life cannot be measured exclusively in terms of physical well-being. Nor can it be measured solely in terms of the well-being of individuals in isolation from the well-being of others; personal fulfillment is a social as well as individual matter. These considerations lead CWS to be concerned with meeting basic physical needs of deprived persons, but to constantly see these needs, and struggle to meet them, in ways which enhance the prospects for the achievement of quality of life.

B. OPERATIVE VALUES.

CWS, as an integral part of the ecumenical family of Christians, takes seriously, and contributes to, the emergent understanding of what Christian churches should strive for in witnessing to God's purposes in society. Six main values have been highlighted which should be fostered in every CWS endeavor. Of every activity, from internal management of CWS , and fund-raising, through settlement of refugees, relief activities, global education and programs for socio-economic development, the question should be put: "Does this activity enhance in identifiable ways the values set out below?"

1. Justice. Justice means that all people shall have equitable access to resources, goods and services allowing for full human life. These include the necessities of life (food, shelter, clothing, health services), the factors of production (land, water, seeds, credit, tools), opportunities for personal development (education, associational freedoms), physical and legal security (human rights, legal rights, opportunity for employment).

Some implications for the work of CWS would mean that attention is given to direct assistance to the poor and deprived, rather than through a "trickle down" process; that root causes rather than symptoms are focussed upon; that communities more than individuals should be the main object of CWS work; that considerations of equity should complement considerations of good for individuals. Perhaps one of the most important implications is for economic justice. The effects of international banking, credit, and transnationals on jobs, local economies, use of resources, environment, and quality of life have important implications for CWS.

2. Participation. Participation refers to the natural as well as legal right of people, as individuals and communities, to participate in the shaping of the social. economic and political processes which deeply affect their lives. This principle affirms the dignity of each human being and recognizes the potential contribution all persons can make to the well-being of society as a whole. Transformation of society at large, and of individuals, requires the actualization of the inherent right of all peoples to contribute to the formation of the institutions, policies and decisions which affect most directly and deeply their own social realities and future.

Some implications for CWS might be greater attention to the processes through which projects and programs are planned and implemented, rather than an exclusive attention to efficiency or immediate results; a focus on communitarian and group efforts which stress collegiality rather than hierarchy; responsiveness to plans and priorities which emerge from the people to be assisted; greater attention to people who are marginalized in the normal and unjust social institutions and relationships.

3. Sustainability: Sustainability addresses the need to be stewards of the non-human natural environment in ways which preserve, quantitatively and qualitatively the resources on which quality of life depends. Sustainability is a commitment to the wise stewardship of resources and to the preservation of those resources for future generations. In any case, sustainability must be seen in the context of other value affirmations, and thus not be used as a pretext or excuse for not making resources available for poorer peoples today, as has been implied in some "no growth" arguments.

Some implications of this sustainability principle might be that CWS should encourage appropriate technology which puts relatively little stress on environment; assist consideration of long-range rather than short-run assessments of policy alternatives; focus on development and employment-related programs which will sustain community life in rural areas and reduce migration to large, overcrowded urban centers; stress developmental programs which emphasize renewable as contrasted with non-renewable resources; encourage in the more industrialized countries a sense of urgency about adverse environmental impact of much high technology, and

waste; call into serious question the danger of an ethos which defines the good life too narrowly in terms of material prosperity, growth and consumption; create wherever possible greater capacity for colleague agencies in poorer countries to challenge the theological, moral and practical adequacy of a high-growth, consumption model of society.

4. Self-Reliance: CWS understands self-reliance as a stage towards inter-dependence, not as self-sufficiency. Interdependence, partnership, and community cannot be built upon the kind of economic, political, social inequities which today characterize world society. A commitment to self-reliance is closely connected with the principle of participation and stresses people's right to be accountable for their own possibilities and actions. Implicit in CWS's commitment to participation and self-reliance is a recognition of the central importance of employment, both for individuals and communities' well-being.

Implications of this principle of self-reliance for CWS might include helping people to experience, especially in communities at the fairly local level, a sense of their own capacity to plan and work together to accomplish concrete or visible objectives of their own choosing; to work in such a way that CWS is experienced by the poor as a partner who has joined the efforts of the poor, rather than vice-versa; to encourage greater reliance on local resources and techniques, rather than the importation of solutions of technologies from outside; to help people develop technical and other skills which enhance their sense of worth and contribution to the larger society; to experiment with transferring CWS resources in ways which enhance a sense of freedom and responsibility vis-a-vis the local community more than to the "donor" partner; to constantly explore ways in which relief and emergency assistance, as well as settlement of displaced persons, lead to longer-term independence rather than continued dependency.

5. Working with Traditionally Oppressed and Vulnerable Groups (Women, those who suffer from racial and ethnic discrimination, children, and the materially poor).

CWS is acutely conscious of the oppression of women, victims of racial and ethnic discrimination, and the poor. It is too common and facile to think of poverty in static terms, to talk about "the poor" as if that were a mere quantitative description of some people's condition, remediable by more compassion and generosity on the part of the better-off or more socially powerful. CWS understands marginalization as a dynamic reality, whereby certain groups of people are oppressed by the institutions and policies of society. It also believes that the Gospel witnesses to the fact that the marginated and oppressed, are by the very fact of their margination (their having been forced to the periphery of power, status and possession) of special importance in the process of social transformation. They have a special vulnerability and need. Further, they have a particular strength as agents of social transformation, ironically just because of their weakness. Work with oppressed groups should suffuse all CWS programs.

The implications of such considerations for CWS could be significant attention to working with and through such oppressed peoples in the majority of CWS projects and programs; focussing specifically on ways in which women (especially those who are also marginated by race and poverty) have not only the right to be treated justly, but whose involvement is essential to effective socio-economic development; a greater sensitivity to, and enhanced capacity to learn from the understandings of the Gospel, the church and social realities through the eyes and experiences of such groups; a commitment to keeping the issue of marginalization and oppression of different groups from becoming competing concerns, but discovering ways to link efforts to overcome marginalization among the various categories.

6. Strengthening USA and Overseas Churches for Service. CWS sees itself as more than a resource delivery system. Projects and programs are not ends in themselves, but are the means through which people come to realize a higher quality of life.

One consequence of this commitment is that, as a part of the church universal, CWS is committed to assisting other manifestations of the church to grow in their capacity to witness through service to their faithfulness in their own setting. Strengthening the self-reliance and inter-dependence of the churches themselves, and of their agencies, is an important expression of the "participation" and "self-reliance" adduced above. CWS recognizes that administration - the ability to mobilize, allocate and manage finances, materials, people and information -- is the foundation on which projects and programs are built. It will therefore be a CWS priority to assist colleague agencies to meet their ongoing institutional needs.

One of the most telling and fruitful developments in recent years has been a growing sense of CWS' interdependence, an enlarging sense of common calling to service amidst a wide variety of understandings of what service should entail. CWS affirms the crucial importance of this growing together, this sense of mutual dependence amidst a diversity of gifts and perspectives, and commits itself to being an active partner in the ongoing collegial process.

What are some implications of this affirmation? One would be to continue to experiment with ways to develop greater reciprocity among partners in a situation which is still dominated by a "donor-receiver" mentality. In particular, CWS will continue to be actively engaged in the current explorations on "ecumenical sharing of resources." Here we are thinking not only of new ways to share material resources more sensitively and reciprocally. but also ways to share the more significant gifts of insights and perspectives on the nature of the Gospel, the calling of the churches, the vision of the quality of life, the adequacy of differing social institutions and relationships, the promises and threats of new possibilities and developments, such as those in the scientific and technological realms.

More specific implications of this commitment for the day-to-day work of CWS might include the following emphases: fostering of consortia or networks among churches and church agencies engaged in similar kinds of social justice and development efforts; giving modest support to church or para-church service agencies, even for some administrative and logistical costs; helping churches develop a new cadre of leadership trained to new styles of enablement instead of to play traditionally defined bureaucratic and hierarchical roles; serving to catalyze new and imaginative thinking about the churches' social service and transformation possibilities and responsibilities, based on the very experiences of success and failure within the CWS program itself; exploring and experimenting with how the churches can become more effective channels of communication in a world where such channels are increasingly skewed and monopolized by the self-interest of governments and commercial interests; discovering new ways to bring the perspectives of marginated and under-represented people into the decision-making processes of CWS itself.

Of particular importance is that CWS relate to strengthen Christian groups who suffer repression because of their commitment to human dignity and human rights, including the rights to religious freedom. Increasingly there is a blurring of religious loyalty and political loyalty, a fact which increases the hardship of minority, especially religious, communities. Yet religious liberty is one of the foundational human rights, closely linked to the preservation of other human rights. In the context of its total work, and in collaboration within its colleague agencies, CWS is committed to develop creative means to support the inner life of Christian communities seeking to witness to human rights and development in the context of oppressive political and cultural enviromments.

III. PROGRAM AREAS TO BE ACCORDED SPECIAL ATTENTION

A. MANDATED PROGRAM AREAS.

These broad principles which guide CWS's work apply to the inner life of CWS as an organization and the policies it develops to govern its work. They also are governing considerations in the three main programmatic areas which are the focus of CWS' mandate for service: emergency relief; assisting refugees and displaced persons; socio-economic development. As indicated above, CWS' original emphasis was upon emergency relief and helping displaced persons. In the last decade, however, socio-economic development has become a prominent focus of much CWS activity, not only in new development-oriented projects and programs, but also in the re-shaping of relief and displaced persons programs.

It is envisaged that in the 1984-87 triennium these three emphases will be continued. It is understood, moreover, that the modest resources that can be generated through CWS can meet only a tiny fraction of the need in any one of the three areas. This means that CWS is constantly obliged to limit its assistance in one area so that it will have some

resources in the others. The present document is in part an effort to highlight the range of opportunities and needs presented to CWS, and to establish the broad guidelines and parameters for the allocation of its limited resources.

1. Emergencies and Disasters. Natural and human-made disasters occur at a rate of about one per week. Today they are occurring more and more frequently, as a recent UN study shows. This is partly because the stress on the ecosphere (due in part to population pressures, erosion, heavy consumption and pollution) saps the capacity of the environment to absorb new shocks. Flooding is perhaps the most dramatic example. Emergencies, of course, know no geographic boundaries, but they have proven to be most frequent, and least manageable, in the poorest countries of the world. Underdevelopment makes poorer peoples more vulnerable to disasters. Even public policies designed to improve living conditions (such as stricter zoning laws in the world's cities, pushing the poor into squatters' settlements onto such places as frequently flooded delta land) sometimes exacerbate the problem for the poor still further. In the poorer countries, already hampered by relatively underdeveloped life-support systems, disasters take a greater toll, and require more outside assistance.

Emergencies also result from civil strife in many troubled places around the world. Food, shelter, and medical assistance are needed by civilian populations affected by casualties and the destruction of communities, crops, and productive facilities during armed combat. The violent effects of social unrest may also require emergency aid.

Poor and rich countries alike suffer from natural and human-made disasters, but it is increasingly evident that some of the most devastating disasters are pending in the richer countries, resulting from human-made conditions (toxic and nuclear wastes, acid rains, transportation of hazardous materials, oil spills, and in the longer run the mining of nutrients from the soil, etc). The links between emergency relief and development thus become ever clearer; the links between natural and human-made disaster become ever more evident; the links between emergencies in the poorer countries and the richer countries become ever more apparent. CWS is committed to working in such a way in disaster responses, within the USA and outside, to keep these links visible, and through its commitment to long-term development to mitigate the frequency, severity, and human ecological costs of such disasters.

What are some of the implications of continuing disasters for the work of CWS? CWS is pledged to support, primarily through the ecumenical network, those overseas agencies responding to immediate needs for food, clothing, shelter and medical supplies in an emergency. Once immediate needs are met, CWS will work to facilitate longer-term solutions. CWS recognizes that psychological and emotional needs materialize as quickly, and

sometimes as disruptively, as the physical ones. CWS affirms the special role the churches can play in ministering to these psychological needs, and pledges support to enable local congregations in disaster-prone areas to carry on this kind of ministry.

CWS emphasizes the need to build upon people's own coping capacities. Even emergency assistance should respond to and enhance local self-help initiatives. The key to recovery is people's self-reliance and participation. People's involvement in their own relief needs is a first step in the movement from relief, to rehabilitation, and finally to self-reliance. Longer-term responses emphasizing development are needed to complement emergency responses. CWS also recognizes the importance of devoting more effort to disaster preparedness, and prevention. Thus local and national church groups may be strengthened in their capacity to respond to anticipated disasters, the particulars of which cannot be known in advance. CWS's role in global education and public advocacy are important elements in the CWS strategy vis-a-vis emergencies and disasters.

2. Refugees and Displaced Persons. Today upwards of 15 million people are seeking new homes and a new future. The Sudan, Somalia, Central America, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Southeast Asia are some of the more visible signs of this larger problem. Perhaps one in every one hundred people in Africa is seeking refuge from physical, political, social and/or economic hardship. Percentages in Central America may be higher. Statistics both highlight and obscure the real human suffering they represent. Flight from one's own country usually represents desperation. The need to find safety form persecution, discrimination, warfare, or physical hardship forces refugees to seek asylum elsewhere. They need food, shelter, clothing, medical care, legal protection and other basic social services.

The importance of such services is often dramatized by the large number of particularly vulnerable groups--women, children, the elderly, the handicapped, the sick, the pregnant---in some refugee populations. Frequently, however, countries of first asylum are ill-equipped to cope with surges of new population because their own resources are strapped to meet the needs of their own peoples. Often countries of first asylum, while being able to receive and care for refugees, are politically or otherwise indisposed to receive them permanently, or even temporarily. Today we witness the growing phenomenon of "permanent" refugees, i.e. people who have no prospect of returning to their homeland, but who have little or no prospect of being integrated into a new environment. The prospect is for tens of thousands to spend their entire lifetimes in refugee camp environments.

CWS' response is on several intersecting levels. Most immediate and urgent is that CWS work with sister organizations, and especially the churches, to meet refugees' immediate physical needs. Voluntary repatriation is perceived as the most desirable

longer-term solution; often this proves impossible. Rehabilitation and resettlement are next alternatives, and CWS makes a major effort to help with such rehabilitation and resettlement. This normally requires collaboration not only with church and refugee organizations, but also with governmental bodies.

CWS sees itself as having further roles to play, however. Four specific roles seem to be increasingly important. Given the ignorance about, and frequent hostility toward, refugees and their plight, CWS increasingly assumes a responsibility for: (i) informing others about the true nature of many refugee situations, either because they do not come to public attention, or because their situation is being misinterpreted; (ii) raising public consciousness about the root causes of many refugee situations, and calling the public to greater concern for solving these great human tragedies; (iii) monitoring governmental policies re: refugees, and advocating policies more inn accord with Christian conscience and commitment; and (iv) giving greater attention to the development of a systematic theological perspective on refugee's rights and society's rights vis-a-vis refugees.

Thus, CWS' work with refugees and displaced persons is done collegially with a network of other agencies and organizations. While meeting immediate physical needs is paramount, CWS is pledged to approach its reponsibility toward refugees in a wholistic matter. Global education, advocacy before public and governments, and socio-economic development programs are all seen as essential parts of the overall CWS response to today's burgeoning refugee problem.

C. Socio-Economic Development. The third main area of CWS work, grounded in its mandate, is socio-economic development to promote justice, dignity and wholeness. Development has a particular meaning in the contest of CWS's work, differing from the traditional secular emphasis on economic growth, productivity and industrialization. CWS' understanding differs, too, from a trickle down theory of how the poor should be helped. CWS understands development in terms which make poor people the central focus of development, as the promoters and recipients of development efforts. The Nairobi Assembly of the World Council of Churches stated it succinctly: "the development process should be understood as a liberating process aimed at justice, self-reliance and economic growth. It is essentially a people's struggle in which the poor and oppressed are and should be active agents and immediate beneficiaries. The role of the churches is to support the struggle of the poor and oppressed towards justice and self-reliance." Endorsing this ecumenical line of thinking, CWS stresses the general values indicated above: justice, participation, sustainability, self-reliance, special attention to poor and oppressed groups, and strengthening church groups for service.

B. AREAS REQUIRING PRIORITY CONSIDERATION

Because opportunities for service and development are so vast and CWS's resources so modest, it is necessary to make decisions for strategic deployment of resources. For the 1984-87 Triennium the following concerns warrant major attention from CWS in each of its mandated program areas. These concerns have been identified by CWS-related persons, staff, colleague agencies and partners, and the denominations and CWS governing committee. Six main concerns have emerged as particularly suited to CWS's commitments and practical possibilities at this juncture. At the same time, CWS intends to keep a flexible style, and to be responsive to concerns and priorities as they many emerge during the Triennium within colleague agencies, or within the church agencies which work through the National Council of Churches of Christ (USA).

1. Community Identity, Cohesiveness and Action. At the center of CWS developmental efforts is a conviction about the primacy of small local communities as the building blocks of a self-reliant and participatory society. Too much church-sponsored social service work in the past has put a premium on individuals, and upon providing assistance from the outside to the needs of those individuals. CWS is committed to working with small groups of people, the poor and oppressed and in particular women, who may not yet have developed a consciousness of their common goals or possibilities.

Translating these objectives into practice is enormously difficult. Four particular difficulties illustrate the problem: 1) Established powers are acutely sensitive to any threat to, or disruption of, their power and authority; assisting the self-consciousness and growing self-confidence and assertion of the poor is a threat often put down brutally; 2) the poor and oppressed have for so long accepted their "inferiority" and dependence, and have not had the expectation or experience of working together with their peers to obtain their own interests; 3) the poor and oppressed frequently do not have the skills for self-reliance; and 4) perhaps most difficult of all, organizations like CWS, while they may speak about sharing power with the poor, or being in solidarity with them, have very little practical experience in how to actually achieve such solidarity. It has to be admitted that such empowerment of the poor is threatening to agencies like CWS as well, for both practical and philosophical reasons.

Yet CWS is committed to strengthening such groups of the poor and oppressed to discover and actualize their own identity and self-reliance. It recognizes that locally based, self-reliance groups are best able to meet the fundamental challenges to development, and to bring the poor and oppressed into the larger social processes.

The practical import of this commitment is that CWS will emphasize community organization more than community service. It will try to undergird programs and projects which emanate from a group

rather than from one or two individuals alone. It will undergird leaders that emerge from the community. It will strive to make contributions to concrete successes (improved water supplies, educational opportunities, legal services, modest community centers and/or schools, common irrigation schemes) so that the community will grow together on the basis of its corporate achievements.

Thus, CWS will attend to experimental ways to knit the ties of community consciousness and action, convinced that in the long run these will be more productive and sustainable than emphasis on short-term material achievements. In this vision of its task, however, there is a clear link between the development of community consciousness and empowerment, on the one hand, and greater provision of material and participatory need on the other.

CWS affirms that support for these "base communities" is a prime target of its work for the Triennium, believing that such communities can work in a comprehensive, wholistic, and practical way to foster new attitudes, new self-reliance and new effectiveness in achieving community developmental objectives. Such experiments can have a multiplier effect on the emergence of other such communities.

2. Food Production and Distribution. "At least one in every eight people on earth suffers from malnutrition severe enough to shorten life, stunt physical growth and dull mental ability. When one speaks of human rights or basic human needs, the right to food is the most basic of all." (Presidential Commission. "Overcoming World Hunger" May, 1980, p. 3).

Perhaps most distressing at the beginning of this Triennium time is the prospect that one hundred million people in Africa will suffer this malnutrition in the years just ahead. Food production in Africa is not keeping pace with population increases, and in some countries may be declining absolutely. Malnutrition has many causes, differing from place to place: infertile land or inadequate water; lack of fertilizer or appropriate seeds; unskilled labor and inappropriate technology; unjust patterns of land ownership and control; lack of technically trained leadership; lack of an infrastructure or credit, marketing, and price supports, etc. to help the farmer; lack of employment and subsequent loss of purchasing power to buy food; stress upon commercial crops to be sold overseas rather than production of food to be consumed on the local level; allocation of food according to age or gender; distribution and storage shortcomings; disasters of flooding and drought.

While the reasons for malnutrition are enormously complex and intertwined, CWS is committed to working with its partners and colleague agencies to address issues of hunger and malnutrition as they themselves feel enabled and compelled to act. This means that CWS will act on its hunger priority in a number of ways. One way is to help meet the emergency food needs of people in the

midst of a disaster. At the same time. it will try to use even these emergency programs to promote longer term self-reliance and development. In addition to direct food assistance, CWS will continue to try to influence American public policy on such issues as food aid, the development of an emergency food reserve.

Another main area in which CWS responds to hunger is through support of innovative development projects or programs for food production and distribution. The involvement of women--who are often the primary agricultural producers--in these programs is a special priority. Some of the main examples of production and distribution programs are the provision of seeds and fertilizers or tools of production; encouragement and support for the development and use of appropriate technology suited to local conditions; helping to develop the "infrastructure" of relationships and institutions which peasant farmers need, such as production, storage and marketing, or the encouragement of collateral employment (handicrafts, cottage industries, rural artisanship) to generate purchasing power for rural families.

Clearly, to combat poverty and hunger in rural as well as urban areas, those who lack employment--agricultural laborers without steady or full-time work, peasants without land, small farmers, tenants on dwarfed holdings--need meaningful work and steady employment. CWS. through its colleague agencies, is pledged to broad-scale support of such usually small-scale programs to overcome hunger and malnutrition.

At another level, however, CWS is intent on attacking hunger and malnutrition through efforts to influence public opinion and public policy regarding food production and distribution. Through educational programs, CWS intends to raise the consciousness of citizens not only about the urgency of world hunger, but about the reasons for it, and how the international community, including the USA, is implicated in the scandal of hunger. These educational efforts will permeate the entire work of CWS. but will be especially important in the activities of the US regional offices, and in the entire Education and Fund-Raising nexus.

Through global education in CWS, such issues as use of prime land for export crops, the key role of women in development, the movement toward large-scale farming and agribusiness, inappropriate high technology, salination and desertification. deforestation and its consequences, etc. will be explored in the churches. Further, the same office will continue to provide information about the policies of governmental and inter-governmental agencies as they relate most directly to hunger and malnutrition.

Complementing these efforts of emergency relief, of support for projects and programs, of global education, will be an ongoing and intensified effort to monitor and influence US official attitudes and policies as they affect prospects for overcoming hunger. For example, CWS will continue, through its collaborative Washington

Office, to study proposed legislation. official positions to be taken before world conventions, changing policies of such "hunger-sensitive" programs as USAID. Through such study the churches will be encouraged to take certain positions and actions to promote policies which promise to reduce suffering from hunger and malnutrition, both in the USA and outside.

3. Community-Based Primary Health Care. Patterned too frequently after western models, health systems in the poorer countries tend to provide "highly qualified specialists using narrow technologies which benefit the few." Health systems have been described as "professionalized, institutionalized and pharmaceuticalized" in ways which tend to deprive the poor of adequate health care. Health care is expensive, is concentrated in urban centers where a minority of the population live, and emphasizes curative medicine rather than promotive health. Since a very high percentage of one's healthfulness is attributable to environmental, nutritional and educational factors, far more attention to preventive medicine (or "promotive health") could be obtained, especially for the poor, through community-based primary health care emphasizing local level health workers. Especially important in alleviating hunger and health problems, is provision of clean, readily available and adequate water resources.

Integral to this emphasis on primary, community-based health care is the promotion of maternal, infant and child care services. Since it is estimated that 40,000 children die daily as a result of malnutrition and illness, Primary Health Care programs will emphasize infant and child nutrition to include: promotion of breast feeding; promoting and providing immunizations; promoting calorie/protein intake of infants and children; and teaching and promoting oral rehydration techniques.

An important aspect of the Primary Health Care program will include programs to promote the planning of families with emphasis on spacing. Primary health care can then have a direct positive influence on burgeoning population in both an indirect and a direct manner. Indirectly, it is increasingly evident that family planning will often result in an improvement of the life expectation and standard of living for couples in their communities. The presence in the local community of female health workers can lead to an increased impact on maternal child care and in planning for families by couples.

Thus, through community-based primary health care there is a convergence of some of the main guiding values and concerns of CWS. Women are accorded the primacy they warrant not only in the interests of their human rights, but are enabled to play more effectively the central role which they have in the entire development process. Further, emphasis is placed on the community itself making decisions about its own future. thus promoting self-reliance and participation. Justice and sustainability are enhanced because decisions are much more fully based on the local community and its own possibilities.

In cooperation with the Christian Medical Commission of the World Council of Churches, which has done pioneering and effective work in promoting health care of the type described below, CWS pledges to foster new understandings of health, new concepts of how health can be achieved (not just delivered), new and more indigenous (physically, culturally, psychically) means to offer preventive and curative treatment. CWS believes that these can be best accomplished through an emphasis on enabling local communities to assess and meet their own needs with only minimal, but sometimes crucial, assistance from outside. This does not mean that CWS will eschew all material aid, and all "high-technology" health assistance, but it does mean that, in collaboration with other ecumenical agencies, CWS will put a premium on local community-based promotive health efforts.

4. Global Education. We live in one, deeply interconnected world. The materially richer, more industrialized countries are systemically involved in the institutions and policies of the poorer countries. Richer nations, pursuing their own interests, often undermine the prospects for self-reliance and participation, and help to perpetuate poverty and injustice. Because of its economic, political, military, communication and cultural power, the USA plays a pre-eminent role in shaping global policies, and deeply influences the internal policies of many countries. This influence is exerted, consciously or not, through official governmental policies, through transnational businesses, through mass media and highly developed information systems.

CWS intends to play a major role in helping the broader church constituency understand the ways in which life-style and decisions in the USA affect, adversely as well as positively, the prospects for a higher quality of life in other countries of the world. CWS is more than a channel of information; global education efforts are designed to help people develop the analytical tools and skills to see not only what is happening, but why it is happening, and how policies might be changed and improved. In these efforts, CWS is a partner with other agencies, in the churches and outside. But CWS' own history and global involvements in practical development efforts, and its connection with the ecumenical network, give it a unique opportunity and responsibility in education for global awareness.

To this end, and in response to strong support of education and advocacy given by colleague agencies overseas, CWS affirms its role in global education.

5. Public Policy Advocacy. Important as are the many projects and programs of CWS which put primary emphases on solidarity, building relationships and sharing human and material resources, these are very small in relation to the size and impact of US governmental policies and actions. A myriad of government action across a broad range of concerns--from food aid to trade regulations to immigration law and support for foreign

governments--have a profound effect on the lives of poor countries and people around the globe. In addition, laws and regulations relating to private and voluntary organizations may affect CWS program operation.

Thus, public policy advocacy is an important part of CWS's efforts for the Triennium. As with global education efforts, CWS is well-situated to urge constructive USA policies affecting those with whom it works in the poorer countries. CWS and member churches' relationships allow them to share the perspectives of those who are deeply influenced by USA actions, but who have no role in determining what those actions are.

Consequently, CWS pledges itself to continue to work with denominations and with other ecumenical agencies on issues of national policy affecting CWS relationships and program. In addition, CWS will seek a collegial relationship with other groups advocating similar positions. It is envisaged that this Triennium will afford even greater need and opportunity for public advocacy efforts, and CWS intends to intensify its efforts in this field.

6. Links Between "Underdevelopment" and Militarization. One of the major justice, participation and sustainability issues today is militarization of rich and poor countries alike. The "national security state," ostensibly designed to protect citizens against external threats, has become an instrument to pacify and oppress the citizens themselves. Even without war being declared, bombs dropped and weapons used, militarization takes a frightful toll on the possibilities for socio-economic development. Huge resources are squandered, concentration of power is condoned, repression of dissidents is sanctioned, secrecy and deception become the rule rather than the exception. In the name of security, the main values of a free society embodied in the notions of justice, participation, self-reliance and sustainability, are forfeited. Devastating as this is for materially rich societies, and especially the poor within those societies, militarization is even more catastrophic for poorer peoples in poorer countries.

While recognizing that other branches of the National Council of Churches of Christ (USA) have primary responsibilities to address the issues of militarization, CWS has a particular experience and expertise which it is committed to using against increasing militarization at home and abroad. That expertise is rooted in its specific experience of the ways in which, in the many countries in which it works, obsession for military security undermines development efforts. Though it is not yet clear just how this concern will be pursued (at least it will be addressed in the global education efforts), CWS believes that it, as an integral part of the churches, has a special responsibility to keep ever before it and its constituency the links between militarism and the persisting injustices, poverty and oppression of systemic "underdevelopment".

IV. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The values which CWS affirms for society-at-large should characterize the internal life and relationships of the organization itself. the nature, quantity and management of resources require as much critical analysis as the ends to which they are directed.

Human and organizational relationships are at the heart of CWS' work. As an ecumenical organization operating as an agent for its various member denominations, denominational support is of fundamental importance to CWS. In addition, the generation of sizeable resources through the CROP network, along with the educational work which accompanies the generation of those resources, makes the relationships of that network of key significance in the overall CWS enterprise. Accountability to the USA churches and CROP network, however, is complemented by responsibilities to overseas colleague agencies and, more fundamentally, to the poor and oppressed with whom these colleague agencies work. Sometimes tensions arise in the midst of these multiple accountabilities.

CWS pledges itself to continued dialogue, analysis and strategizing on a number of key issues pertaining to resource management i its own internal life as an organization. Some of the most important of these issues are the following: 1) the proportion of total resources to be allocated, respectively, to emergency responses to disaster, aid to refugees and displaced persons, and socio-economic development; 2) the role of expatriate personnel in CWS decision-making and programming; 3) the strengths and weaknesses of differing ways of funding the work of colleague agencies, including block grants, designated giving and consortia; 4) trade-offs between the size of a program and its quality; 5) the conditions and limits of collaboration with governmental agencies and the use of governmental funds; 6) the impact of material resources and the possibility that they undermine objectives such as self-reliance; 7) the real or perceived tensions between constituency education and fund-raising; 8) the extent to which availability of resources determines program objectives; 9) the ways in which substantially more solidarity with the poor can be made operational rather than a slogan; 10) concerned efforts to bring women and minority persons in the CWS/CROP leadership staff in far more systematic ways.

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These are the broad parameters of CWS' work for the 1985-87 Triennium as we see them at the beginning of that period of work. They set the direction of our work, but flexibility and readiness to modify have characterized CWS in the past. That flexibility should continue. More importantly, it will be the ongoing task of every department or unit of the organization to project programmatic consequences for their area of work, based on this common vision and commitment.

Appendix C

RESOLUTION OPPOSING AID TO THE CONTRAS

Resolution and Appeal to Congress Adopted by the
198th General Assembly (1986)
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Minneapolis, MN
June 1986

Whereas, the 195th General Assembly (1983) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), in a major social policy statement on Central America, called on the United States government to "immediately cease all efforts, direct or indirect, to destabilize the government of Nicaragua or to intervene in its internal affairs" (*Minutes*, 1983, Part I, p. 763) and to "withdraw all economic and military support for incursions by counterrevolutionaries from Honduras into Nicaragua"(Ibid., p. 764); and

Whereas, the 196th General Assembly (1984) urged "the United States government to recognize the terrible, destructive effects of its aggression toward Nicaragua in terms of human lives lost in the fighting, in terms of the effect on the economic well-being of the already very poor Nicaraguan people, and in terms of the prospects for peace in the region"; "to reverse its policy of increasing military intervention to unseat the current government of Nicaragua" (*Minutes*, 1984, Part I, p. 335); and

Whereas, the 197th General Assembly (1985) expressed its appreciation to the Congress of the United States for terminating government funding for the contras in October 1984 and urged Congress "to reject pleas for so-called 'humanitarian' or 'non-lethal' aid for the contras because such aid would in effect be logistical support for the counterrevolutionary army and would free other contra funds for the purchase of guns and ammunition"; and

Whereas, despite these pleas from our three predecessor General Assemblies and similar pleas from the national governing bodies of other Christian communions, ecumenical bodies and secular groups, Congress has reversed itself and resumed funding for the contras; and

Whereas, supporting the contras (whatever aid to an army in the field is called) is unjust, illegal, counterproductive, detrimental to the prospects of negotiating a settlement, and harmful to the national interests of the United States;

Therefore, the 198th General Assembly (1986) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)

1. Reaffirms the petition of the 195th General Assembly (1983) to the United States, Cuba, the Soviet Union, Israel, and other involved governments through all appropriate channels and persons to . . . press diplomatically for international agreements with all parties involved to eliminate immediately the traffic of arms into and within Central America.

2. Adopts the following Appeal to the Congress to Stop Funding the Contras.

3. Requests the Stated Clerk to send a copy of the appeal to every member of Congress as quickly as possible, with copies to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and other members of the National Security Council.

4. Requests the Stated Clerk to send a copy of the appeal to every synod, presbytery, and session and to make additional copies available for wide distribution in the church.

5. Invites synods, presbyteries, sessions, and members of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) to endorse this appeal of the 198th General Assembly (1986) and to so inform their elected representatives in Congress.

An Appeal to Congress to Stop Funding the Contras
From the 198th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
June 1986

The 198th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the national governing body of our communion, composed of elected regional representatives of whom one half are clergypersons and one half are ordained lay of-

ficers in congregations, meeting in regular session in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in June 1986, herewith solemnly appeals to the Congress of the United States to stop all funding for the Nicaraguan contras in their war against the government and people of Nicaragua.

We believe that in supporting the contras the United States is supporting an unjust cause being pursued in terroristic fashion by a brutal faction whose military leadership and well-documented atrocities are morally unworthy of support. Our government is morally accountable for the actions of its agents.

We believe that in supporting the contras the United States violates the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States and other conventions and treaty commitments. By our own illegal behavior, we undermine the fragile respect for the rule of law in the world.

We believe that United States support for the contras is counterproductive in light of stated United States commitments to democratic pluralism. In response to the destabilization created by the contras, the Nicaraguan government has reinstated a wartime emergency decree, has increased its military forces, and has become more dependent on the Soviet Union. Thus, support for the contras has produced some of the very conditions it was supposed to prevent.

We believe that supporting the contras decreases the prospects of a negotiated political solution to the conflict in Central America. It encourages administration leaders and others in the United States seeking the unconditional surrender of the Nicaraguan government, not negotiation with it.

We believe that supporting the contras is harmful to the national interests of the United States. It creates fear and suspicion among other nations in Latin America, forfeits the approval and support of our allies, and increases instability and the prospects for regional war.

On these grounds, detailed below, we base our appeal to cut off funding for the Nicaraguan contras now, for the sake of the suffering people of Nicaragua and the moral integrity of our own nation.

1. Supporting the Contras is Unjust

a. *In supporting the contras, the United States is supporting an unjust cause.*

Public statements about the intention of the United States in supporting the contras are ambiguous, if not contradictory. In his press conference of February 21, 1985, the President said he desired to "remove" the government of Nicaragua "in terms of its present structure" and to make the present government cry "Uncle." On June 11, 1985, the President said, "We do not seek the military overthrow of the Sandinista government." But whatever the intention of the United States may be, the intention of the contras is clear: They seek to overthrow the government of a sovereign nation that is recognized by virtually all the nations of the world, including the United States, and whose popular support was confirmed by a two-thirds majority of the Nicaraguan people in November 1984, in an election which compared favorably with other elections our government has strongly endorsed.

To seek to destabilize such a government is unjust. In supporting such a cause, the United States is acting unjustly. The United States has no moral right to seek by force to impose its will on the people of Nicaragua, either directly or through surrogates. *We do not agree with everything the Nicaraguan government has done. But one does not have to defend every Nicaraguan policy to insist that the United States has no moral right to seek through military means* to force Nicaragua to change its actions. We Americans would certainly not grant to any other nation the moral right to impose its will on us by military force. We cannot claim for ourselves a moral right we deny to others.

b. *In supporting the contras the United States is supporting a brutal faction whose military leadership and well-documented atrocities are morally unworthy of support.*

An April 1985 report from the bipartisan Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus makes clear that forty-six of the top forty-eight military commanders of the main contra force, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) are former members of Somoza's National Guard. Their dominant presence, in light of their history of violent repression of the Nicaraguan people, raises serious questions about the "democratic" commitment of the FDN.

The atrocities committed by the contras are well documented by church and other human rights groups as well as reporters. For example, the May 1984 national newsletter of *Witness for Peace*, a group of North American Christians who have traveled to the war zones of Nicaragua to stand with the people of Nicaragua under attack in a United States government-sponsored war, reports:

> Contras kidnap to impress Nicaraguans into the mercenary army. They also kidnap to terrorize villages. A number of Witness for Peace teams have talked with families of kidnapped men, women, or children. Some of these loved ones have been found by the families: dead, sometimes burned, sometimes dismembered so that they cannot be given a decent burial. . . . A contra saying is, "We cannot win, but we can kill." Again and again Witnesses for Peace have talked, prayed, and mourned with families whose members have been taken away, tortured in unspeakable ways, or shot before their very eyes. A frequent act of the contras is beheading.

Americas Watch, a highly regarded human rights monitoring group, documented in its July 1985 *An Americas Watch Report on Human Rights in Nicaragua*, this conclusion:

> After several on-site investigations into contra practices, we find that *contra* combatants systematically murder the unarmed, including medical personnel; rarely take prisoners; and force civilians into collaboration.

c. *In supporting the contras, the United States is supporting the infliction of morally abhorrent suffering on the people of Nicaragua.*

According to figures of the Nicaraguan government, from 1980 to September 4, 1985, the contra forces murdered 3,652 people, wounded 4,039 persons, and kidnapped 5,232 persons. During this period, 240,000 Nicaraguans lost their homes, and 7,582 children were orphaned. When the casualties of Nicaraguan contras are included, the combined totals amount to 11,000 Nicaraguans dead, over 5,000 wounded, over 5,000 kidnapped, and a quarter of a million forced to move to other areas. This represents an incredible toll of human life and suffering for a small country such as Nicaragua, with a population of merely 3.5 million.

Two Presbyterian physicians, Drs. Maj and Justin StormoGipson, working in public health services in Jinotega, Nicaragua, as commissioned personnel of our denomination, expressed their anger over the suffering of the Nicaraguan people in their newsletter of August 1985:

> It's been discouraging for us to have to halt our rural outreach work because of the danger of contra attacks. It seemed that we were just getting into a regular routine of rotating rural clinics, where the townspeople of each village were coming to expect our visits about every two weeks, when we were forced to come to a dead stop. . . . In one recent case we couldn't approach a particular village because there are people in the area that consider this type of organizing—to build latrines and clean water systems—a "communist" activity and it would put the participants in personal danger.
>
> We are frustrated and angered by the suffering imposed upon the Nicaraguan people due to the loss of important human services because of contra attacks against civilians and the diversion of personnel toward defense. And we are wondering how long this contra offensive will last. It appears to be a demonstration of force intended to justify the 27 million dollars that the U.S. Congress recently agreed to appropriate to them.

According to *The New York Times* of November 25, 1985, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliot Abrams has said that "the purpose of our aid is to permit people who are fighting on our side to use more violence." We are morally repelled and anguished that our government in our name and with our tax dollars is supporting the infliction of such violence and suffering on the people of Nicaragua.

d. *We dispute the factual bases for the arguments offered by our government as moral justification for support of the contras.*

(1) It is claimed that support for the contras is justified because Nicaragua is a totalitarian state repressing its own people, and we have a moral obligation to help people trapped in a totalitarian dungeon fight for their freedom. However, while we recognize that the Nicaraguan government has not achieved the open and free democracy we would like to see, the citizens of Nicaragua do enjoy many freedoms. We are in constant communication with many church groups in Nicaragua who assure us of this. Our own church-commissioned personnel in Nicaragua assure us of this. Many Presbyterians from the United States have visited Nicaragua and have seen with their own eyes the situation there. We concur with the judgment of Americas Watch in its July 1985 report:

> In Nicaragua there is no systematic practice of forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings or torture. . . While prior censorship has been imposed by emergency legislation, debate on major social and political questions is robust, outspoken, even strident. The November 1984 elections, though deficient, were a democratic advance over the past five years of Nicaraguan history and compare favorably with those of El Salvador and Guatemala. . . The Sandinista Party obtained a popular mandate, while the opposition parties that chose to participate secured some 30 percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly.

(2) It is claimed that support for the contras is justified because Nicaragua's military buildup threatens its neighbors, and we have a moral obligation to aid those who depend on us. But Nicaragua is not a military threat to its neighbors. Certainly it is engaged in a military buildup. It is a nation at war, under attack by a foreign-supported army. One would expect it to prepare to defend itself. Moreover, Nicaragua cannot take the possibility of an invasion by United States forces lightly. Nicaragua has been invaded by the United States three times in this century alone. For most of the period from 1912 to 1933 Nicaragua was occupied by United States troops. And Administration spokespersons over recent years have repeatedly said that direct United States military action against Nicaragua could not be ruled out. No one should be surprised that Nicaragua is building up its military forces. But Nicaragua's armed forces compare unfavorably with the combined armed forces of its neighbors. Its air force, a key component in modern invasion strategies, is greatly inferior to that of other countries in the region. According to Department of Defense figures reported in *The New York Times* on March 30, 1985:

> The Salvadoran and Guatemalan regular armies, with 48,000 and 40,000 troops, are each nearly as large as the Nicaraguan Army, which has 40,000 regular troops and another 20,000 militia members on acuve duty, according to Defense Department figures. When all the other Central American armies are combined, they are far larger than Nicaragua's.

Moreover, if Nicaragua invaded one of its neighbors, the United States would surely come to the defense of that country. Nicaragua knows this. That is why Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockman of Nicaragua said, "To believe that [we would invade another nation] is to believe that in addition to being evil, we are also insane." (*The New York Times*, March 30, 1985.)

(3) It is claimed that support for the contras is justified because Nicaragua represents a threat to the national security of the United States, and we have a moral right to defend ourselves from such a threat. We are not persuaded that Nicaragua represents a threat to our national security.

Those fearing a Nicaraguan threat to the national security of the United States envision the Soviet Union acting through Nicaragua as a surrogate. The threat is perceived in three forms:

(a) **Threat from Nuclear Weapons.** The fear that the Soviet Union might install nuclear weapons in Nicaragua assumes that the Soviet Union would consider its 1962, 1970, and 1979 understanding with the United States over Soviet military use of Cuba as applying strictly to Cuba alone and not to Nicaragua also. Improbable as this scenario is, there is nothing to prevent the United States from negotiating with the Soviet Union an extension of the understanding now in force that would include Nicaragua.

(b) **Threat from Conventional Forces.** An attack by Nicaragua against the United States would be suicidal on the part of Nicaragua, even with Cuban and Soviet backing. The United States, through several rounds of joint military exercises in Honduras and naval maneuvers in the region, has already given a clear signal of both its capacity and its intention.

(c) **Threat to and from the United States' "Southern Flank."** This is the so-called "domino theory" by which Soviet Union-inspired and Nicaraguan-supported intervention would cause the collapse of one Central American government after another and finally result in the downfall of Mexico. This theory slights the fact that poverty, oppression, and injustice are the primary causes of unrest in Central America. The proper policy response to fears of falling dominos is support for structural changes that would provide hope for the poor and desperate of the region, not support for *those who seek to overthrow a revolution that has initiated some of the structural changes required.*

(4) It is claimed that support for the contras is justified because the contras are "the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers." Such a claim libels our Founding Fathers. We concur in the words of Representative Edward Markey:

> The contras are nothing like the Founding Fathers I learned about in school. George Washington was not a rapist, Sam Adams was not an assassin, Tom Jefferson was not an arsonist, John Hancock was not a cutthroat. And the country they founded has no business financing a band of thugs who violate every principle we stand for.

In sum, we judge that supporting contras is morally wrong and unjust because of their cause, their character, and the consequences of their action. We find that arguments to the contrary distort and misrepresent the realities in Central America and threaten to undermine our own nation's values. Shortly after the Bay of Pigs affair, Walter Lippmann wrote the following words that are worthy of recall today:

> A policy is bound to fail which deliberately violates our pledges and our principles, our treaties and our laws. . . The American conscience is a reality. It will make hesitant and ineffectual, even if it does not prevent, an un-American policy. . . In the great struggle against communism, we must find our strength by developing and applying our own principles, not in abandoning them.

2. Supporting the Contras is Illegal

We are a church body, not a court of law, but we find convincing the arguments of legal authorities who assert that United States support of the contras is illegal. One such group of authorities is the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, whose legal memorandum of April 15, 1985, was concurred with by over one hundred law school deans and professors. The memorandum's argument may be summarized as follows:

a. On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua commenced a proceeding against the United States in the International Court of Justice (the World Court) claiming that the United States had, since March 1981, engaged in and been responsible for military and paramilitary acts in and against Nicaragua in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States, other multinational treaties and principles of international law. The Administration responded by challenging the Court's jurisdiction to deal with the dispute and demanding that Nicaragua's application be stricken from the docket. The challenge was rejected by the Court on November 26, 1984, by a fifteen to one vote. Confronted with this rebuff to its views, the Administration announced on January 18, 1985, that it would not participate in further proceedings in the case. But this position is both illegal, a violation of the treaty-like commitment by our government to provide six months notice if it intended to withdraw from its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and a betrayal of the principle of the rule of law in international affairs. In the committee's judgment, the attempt to withdraw leads one to conclude that the Administration has no confidence in its case on the merits.

b. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) provides: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations." The Administration's aid to the Nicaraguan contras constitutes aggression under the UN General Assembly's definition of aggression and violates Article 2(4) of the Charter.

c. Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) states: "No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements." The military support for the contras clearly represents an intervention "directly or indirectly" in the internal affairs of Nicaragua proscribed by the OAS Charter.

d. The torture and summary execution of civilians by the contras violate the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons, the principles of the Nuremberg Charter, and the binding norms of customary international law. The secret CIA manual prepared for the tactical and ideological instruction of the contras clearly indicates that our government has not only tolerated but encouraged such violations of international human rights.

e. The mining operation conducted by the CIA was plainly in violation of international law. As a blockade, it constitutes an act of war in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as well as the OAS Charter. Moreover, the notification to other nations clearly required for such action was not given.

f. The Administration is violating both the letter and the spirit of the United States Neutrality Act by collaborating in the contras' military expeditions against Nicaragua, and Article I, Sec. 8, of the Constitution, which prohibits presidential authorization of covert invasions or mining operations against another country by "private armies," whether or not directed by the CIA.

g. It was the United States which urged most strongly at Nuremberg that aggression be considered an international crime, and, as Supreme Court Justice Jackson, the chief United States prosecutor at Nuremberg, stated there: "If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us."

3. Supporting the Contras is Counterproductive

The alleged purpose of supporting the contras is to "pressure" the Nicaraguan government to negotiate with its enemies.

open up its society to pluralism, reverse its military buildup, and reduce its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union.

But if these are the goals of the United States, supporting the contras as a strategy must surely be judged a failure. Our pressure has not induced change in the negotiating stance of the Nicaraguan government; it has not caused the government to "open up" its society any more; it has not reversed the military buildup; it has not reduced the ties of the Nicaraguan government with Cuba and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the administration's policy has produced the results it was allegedly intended to prevent. The Nicaraguan government has become more adamant in its refusal to negotiate with what it regards as a surrogate army of the United States, led by the Somocistas it struggled so long to overthrow; it has reinstated portions of an emergency decree, imposing wartime restrictions on normal political and civil liberties; it is spending roughly half of its budget on the military; and it has become more dependent on the Cubans and the Soviets both militarily and economically.

Current policy is not only counterproductive; it proposes no solutions. It has not settled any of the substantive issues between Nicaragua and its neighbors or the United States, and it holds no promise of doing so. All that the United States is doing is inflicting great suffering on the people of Nicaragua. Current policy represents carnage without cause.

We do not find it surprising that current policy has failed. Our own government would surely not yield to the pressure of terrorist activity that sought to make us cry "Uncle." Such actions would make us stiffen our resolve. We have no reason to believe that the Nicaraguans will do otherwise.

4. Supporting the Contras Decreases the Prospects for a Long-Range Political Solution to the Conflicts in the Region

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), like the national governing bodies of many other Christian communions and secular groups, has repeatedly called for nonmilitary, political, negotiated settlements of the conflicts in the region. So have the governments of the United States, of Nicaragua, and of numerous other nations in the region and world. We know of no government whose public posture is against negotiations.

Does our government's support for the contras increase or decrease the prospects for a negotiated political settlement? The Administration claims that supporting the contras increases the prospects. It argues that without pressure of the contras' attack, Nicaragua would have no incentive for negotiating. We believe, on the contrary, that supporting the contras decreases those prospects. Instead of being an inducement to the Nicaraguan government and people to negotiate, it creates an ever firmer resolve to resist.

We believe that the evidence supports our assertion. By inflicting great suffering on the people of Nicaragua, through support of the contras and by other means, the United States has intensified the nationalism of the Nicaraguan people and deepened their determination not to bow to domination. It has increased their mistrust of our nation, whose past intervention and support for their oppression is vividly remembered, and provided an external enemy on which to blame all Nicaragua's problems. But it has not compelled—and is not likely to compel—the Nicaraguan government or people to cry "Uncle" or to recognize an army of terrorists financed by the United States as a legitimate party with whom to negotiate.

In fact, United States' support for the contras makes a negotiated settlement virtually impossible. The Nicaraguan government has repeatedly declared that it will not negotiate with what it regards as a mercenary army that has virtually no support from the people of Nicaragua except what it can commandeer through intimidation. It has said again and again that it will fight to the end rather than join in a pact with former National Guardsmen of the hated dictator Somoza. Thus, continued support for the contras practically guarantees a continuation of the conflict.

This last reality—guaranteed continuation of the conflict—is so readily apparent that informed citizens can only wonder if that is not the real intended purpose of support for the contras. Certainly, the repeated rhetoric of the President and other administration officials would support the view that they seek the unconditional surrender of the Nicaraguan government, not negotiated accommodation with it.

The assumption that the Nicaraguan government must be forced or induced into negotiations itself flies in the face of facts. The Nicaraguan leaders have repeatedly and publicly professed readiness for bilateral discussions with the United States, proposing specific places and occasions, while United States government officials have consistently rejected such proposals and opportunities. In addition, the actions of the administration to frustrate the multilateral Contadora process for seeking a negotiated regional solution in Central America have been widely reported and criticized.

beginning at the time of Nicaragua's unexpected public announcement on September 21, 1984, that it was prepared to sign the draft Contadora agreement.

All the available evidence then, points to a conclusion that the principal resistance to a negotiated solution in Central America comes not from Managua but rather from Washington. Thus, continued congressional support for the contras impedes the possibility of a negotiated, long-range political solution to conflicts in the region in two ways: It strengthens the resolve of the Sandinistas to resist an imposed military solution and it encourages the forces in the current administration whose goal is to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, not negotiate with it.

We see no hope in current administration policy. We see only more bloodshed, destruction, and sadness—even the possibility of direct involvement of United States armed forces. The Congress should not tolerate such policy, much less legitimate it with funding. Ending support for the contras will evidence congressional priority on negotiation, not negate it, particularly if accompanied by measures that induce both the Nicaraguan government and the Executive Branch of the United States government toward negotiation and away from armed confrontation.

We are convinced that a negotiated settlement either through the Contadora process or through bilateral negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua, or both, would be in the best interest of all parties concerned. We are further persuaded that if the United States put as much time, energy, and resources into supporting the Contadora process as it now puts into supporting the contras, a negotiated settlement could be achieved. The first step required to achieve such a settlement is for the United States to stop supporting the contras.

5. Supporting the Contras Harms the National Interests of the United States

The government of the United States is responsible for fostering and protecting the legitimate interests of the United States in the world. But if our previous arguments are valid, supporting the contras harms rather than serves those legitimate national interests.

The United States has a legitimate national interest in fostering respect for justice and the moral rights and responsibilities of nations. But by unjustly supporting the contras, the United States diminishes such respect and forfeits the approval and support of its policies by even its closest historic allies.

The United States has a legitimate national interest in fostering respect for international law. But by supporting illegal actions against the government and people of Nicaragua and by withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the World Court, the United States undermines respect for international law.

The United States has a legitimate national interest in helping secure a just peace and stability in Central America. But by supporting the contras, the United States perpetuates and threatens to escalate violence in Nicaragua, increases the prospects of a wider regional conflict, strengthens sectors historically identified with injustice and oppression, and raises the specter of direct involvement by United States' armed forces.

The United States has a legitimate national interest in helping secure a negotiated settlement to the conflicts in the region. But by supporting the contras, the United States diminishes the prospects for such a settlement.

The United States has a legitimate national interest in fostering a pattern of relationship in this hemisphere based on mutual respect and recognition of mutual interests rather than on imposition of the will of the stronger on the weaker. But by supporting the contras, the United States provides its enemies in the region and around the world solid grounds for their charges against our nation.

It is imperative that the Congress recognize how harmful to the long-range interests of the United States our government's support of the contras is. Representative Lee Hamilton reminds us of that harm with these words:

> Our policy must be placed in the larger context of Latin America. Any short-term gain the United States might receive from overthrowing or intimidating Nicaraguans would be offset by a wave of anti-Americanism in reaction to U.S. tactics such as the embargo or aid to the Contras. In the view of Latin America, these tactics are "big stick" Yankee interventionism.

Elder Statesman George Ball makes a similar point. Noting that in the year 2000 there will be 600 million people in Latin America with 60 percent of them under the age of 25, he observes:

> . . . we must coexist in the same hemisphere with a swelling freshet of increasingly disenchanted people rebelling at their inheritance of poverty, discrimination, and repression. So long as we continue our arrogant interference to preserve frozen patterns of a corrupt past, we shall remain their enemy.

Conclusion

Supporting the contras is unjust, illegal, counterproductive, detrimental to the prospects of negotiated settlement, and harmful to the national interests of the United States. Thus, we appeal to the Congress of the United States, as our elected representatives, to stop funding the contras.

We are aware that the prospects for peace, democracy, and prosperity in Central America are, at best, uncertain. We are also aware that developments in Central America have legitimate strategic and political significance for the United States. Current United States policy, however, subordinates legitimate concerns to an ideological litmus test. The issue is now being framed in terms of how one stands on communism, and in the United States, to be perceived as being "soft on communism" is a severe political liability, both in the government and in the church. Some who oppose current policy may well run short-term political risks. Yet in spite of risks, what is right must be upheld. For the sake of the suffering people of Nicaragua and the moral integrity of our own nation, we call on the United States Congress to cut off funding for the contras now.

RESOLUTION ON UNITED STATES POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Adopted by the 197th General Assembly of the PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) June 1985

Whereas the 195th General Assembly (1983) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) adopted a major social policy statement in which it expressed the views that

-- Poverty, oppression and injustice are the primary causes of unrest in Central America.

-- Some form of social revolution in Central America is an unavoidable fact.

-- In Central America, the specter of communism is being used to justify terrible acts of brutality and inhumanity.

-- In the United States the possibility of expanded Soviet and Cuban influence in Central America is being used to justify continuing military and economic support for governments that engage in systematic brutality against their own people; and called for a radical change in United States policy in Central America; and

Whereas the 196th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (1984) repeated the call for a change of course in US policy in Central America; and

Whereas the 194th General Assembly (1982) of the former United Presbyterian Church (USA) and the 195th General Assembly (1983) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) have urged, commended and affirmed the offering by congregations of sanctuary for Central American asylum seekers "in all appropriate ways. . .including the provision of shelter, food, social services and legal aid;" and guaranteed the denomination's support for those who have provided sanctuary "as a way of showing Christian concern" for the refugee; and

Whereas the Confessions of previous General Assemblies of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (UPCUSA and PCUS) have traditionally affirmed freedom of conscience, calling on Presbyterians to exercise that right in appropriate situations where government policy is deemed to be immoral and/or illegal;

Whereas the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, numerous other communions in this country and in Central America, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States, the World Council of Churches, and numerous other bodies have issued similar pleas for changes in US policy; and

Whereas, despite these persistent pleas for a change in US policy, the United States government has not only continued but significantly increased its support for a military force in El Salvador that engages in systematic brutality against its own people, its militarization of Honduras, and its aggression against Nicaragua, and has shown no serious commitment to seeking a non-military negotiated settlement of the regional conflicts; and

Whereas, by pursuing its current policy the United States government shares responsibility and makes us as citizens accountable with others for a continuation of a civil war in El Salvador that has already claimed an estimated 50,000 lives; the continuation of a conflict in Nicaragua in which more than more than 9,200 members of the Nicaraguan armed forces and civilians reportedly had been killed, kidnapped, or wounded by the end of 1984; and the increasing role of the military has further weakened democratic practices in Honduras; and

Whereas United States officials present distorted pictures of the situation in Central America -- claiming, for example, that the Salvadoran Army and Air Force "do not conduct indisciminate bombings or artillery shellings [against civilians]" (State Department, August 22, 1984), while Americas Watch, in its August 1984 report on human rights in El Salvador provides evidence that "thousands of noncombatants are being killed in indiscriminate attacks by bombardment from the air, shelling, and group sweeps. Thousands more are being wounded. . ."; claiming that "the purpose [of the military exercises in Honduras] is training. It is an ongoing process." (Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs Langhorne Motley, August 3, 1983), while a National Security Council directive of early 1984 called on the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense to continue naval exercises in Central America to "maintain steady pressure on the Nicaraguans" in order to "demonstrate a large commitment and resolve." (The Miami Herald, February 1, 1984); claiming that the November 1984 election in Nicaragua was a "sham," while responsible observers (such as representatives of the Latin America Studies Association) report otherwise; and charging that the Sandinistas provide substantive amounts of military aid to the guerrillas in El Salvador, even though the United States has been unable to produce for the public convincing evidence of this charge; and

Whereas the President of the United States has publicly stated his desire to "remove" the Sandinista government and/or to make it cry "uncle"; has requested additional funding for the contras; and has indicated that the option of using U.S. military force against the government of Nicaragua cannot be ruled out; and

Whereas, numerous partner churches in Nicaragua, deeply concerned about the increased violence, disruption of the economy and climate of fear that has gripped the Nicaraguan people, have appealed to the Presbyterian Church and other church bodies in the United States for strong and clear witness against US military activity in Central America, expressing growing fear of possible direct US military action against their nation; and

Whereas, in recent months, many Presbyterians have been led by their consciences to join other person of good will in pledging to resist any major escalation of U.S. military involvement in the region, either through legal protest or through non-violent civil disobedience; and

Whereas, we belong to the God of peace and justice who wills peace and justice for all the world's people and who calls us to make peace and seek justice; and

Whereas we recognize this One alone and no other as Lord and give to this One alone and to no other our ultimate loyalty and allegiance; and

Whereas, in loyalty and allegiance to this One we must speak the truth as we see it;

Therefore, the 197th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA):

1. Declares to the United States government our firm conviction that current United States policy in Central America is not only ideologically misguided, politically mistaken, economically wasteful, and militarily risky, but also morally wrong and unjust.

2. Urges the President and/or the Congress of the United States to change immediately the course of current policy, not only for the sake of the suffering people of Central America but also for the moral well-being of our nation.

3. Calls on the United States government, as signs of a change in the course of US policy,

-- to provide active and visible support for dialogue, ceasefire, and negotiations to end the war in El Salvador;

-- to declare its intention to terminate all military and economic aid to the government of El Salvador unless a negotiated settlement has been reached by a specified time; and to move toward the termination of military aid by ensuring a periodic reduction in such aid from current levels;

-- to pledge and provide massive economic support for reconstruction and needs-oriented economic development in El Salvador once a negotiated settlement has been reached;

-- to declare publicly its respect for the sovereignty of Nicaragua and its recognition of the right of Nicaragua to self-determination as a nation;

-- to stop all efforts to mislead the American people about the situation in Central America;

-- to cease all efforts, direct or indirect, to overthrow, destabilize, or militarily threaten Nicaragua;

-- to renew all trade and development assistance relations with Nicaragua;

-- to reduce its military aid to Honduras and to remove US military personnel from Honduras;

-- to discontinue US military exercises and maneuvers in and around Central America;

-- to provide no military aid to the government of Guatemala;

-- to publicly declare its support of the principles of the peace treaty proposal of September 7, 1984 of the Contadora nations (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama); and to support in deed as well as word the Contador nations' and all other serious efforts to achieve negotiated resolutions to the disputes among the countries of the region;

-- to provide immediately safehaven to all Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in this country without documentation, by granting them "extended voluntary departure" status or some equivalent status.

4. Expresses its appreciation to the Congress of the United States for terminating U.S. funding for the Nicaraguan contras in October 1984 and urges the Congress (1) to reject pleas for so-called "humanitarian" or "non-lethal" aid for the contras because such aid would in effect be logistical support for the counterrevolutionary army and would free other contra funds for the purchase of guns and ammunitions; (2) to extend indefinitely the current prohibition (which expires September 30, 1985) against the use of any U.S. funds by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense for support of military activities for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua; (3) to enact legislation that would prohibit the introduction of U.S. armed forces into or over the countries of Central America for combat purposes without prior consultation with Congress and (4) to take other initiatives to change the course of U.S. policy in Central America.

5. Pledges its support for changes in US policy which hold promise of leading to peace with justice.

6. Rejects the President's claim that "the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary treat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" of such a magnitude as to constitute a "national emergency" for the United States; opposes the trade embargo against Nicaragua which became effective May 7, 1985, which, among other things, makes more difficult the provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Nicaragua by U.S. church groups; and calls on the President to rescind his executive order imposing the embargo.

7. Expresses its firm opposition to any escalation of military intervention in the region by the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, or any other foreign power.

8. Pledges its support for those who, in conscience, feel led to engage in public nonviolent civil disobedience in resistance and are prepared to suffer the consequences of such action.

9. Joins the General Assembly Council in calling on governing bodies and Presbyterians to continue to press for the changes in US policy called for by the General Assemblies; to continue to study the complex situation; to engage in regular and ongoing prayer for the people and churches of Central America, and for the leaders of all the nations involved that they might be led to seek peace and justice; and to prepare for more intense, persistent and visible witness in the event of a major escalation of United States military intervention in Central America; and encourages all synods and presbyteries, through their Peacemaking or other appropriate committees to give major and sustained attention to these acts of faithfulness;

10. Commends all governing bodies and members of the church who seek to relate their faith to this moral crisis in the life of the nation.

11. Commends all Presbyterians who have become Presbyterian Advocates on Central America, and encourages others to join this network of Presbyterians committed to advocating the public policy recommendations of the General Assembly.

12. Commends all Presbyterian and other congregations that, at legal risk to themselves, have declared their churches as places of sanctuary in respect for the sanctity of human life; pledges to them its support; encourages other governing bodies to offer sanctuary; and encourages each presbytery to establish a Sanctuary Task Force to undergird the ministry of sanctuary.

13. Commends all Presbyterians and others who, as expressions of their solidarity with the church and people of Nicaragua, have participated in the "Witness for Peace" along the border of Honduras and Nicaragua; and encourages others to share in or support this witness;

14. Commends the board and agencies of the General Assembly for their work in advocating the policy changes called for by the General Assembly and for facilitating the advocacy of church members, and calls on boards and agencies, in light of the continuing crisis, to intensify their efforts.

15. Directs the Stated Clerk to communicate this resolution to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and appropriate congressional committees.

The following statement of concern was adopted at the Cleveland Biennial, June 7, 1983, by the delegates present with a vote of Yes 678, No 206, abstain, 83.

Statement of Concern: Peace with Justice in Central America

In 1981 the Biennial Convention of the American Baptist Churches, USA, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, passed a Statement of Concern on El Salvador. Since that time human suffering has continued to spread throughout Central America. U.S. supported regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala are responsible for the kidnapping, torture, illegal detention, and death of thousands of civilians and the displacement of more than a million people from their homes and families. In Honduras, some of these practices have begun to appear. Escalating attacks from Honduras into Nicaragua have raised fears of full-scale war between these two countries. Government troops in Guatemala are pursuing a policy of genocide against indigenous populations.

As Christians, American Baptists, and United States citizens we are particularly concerned about the role of our government in this suffering. In these countries' recent history our government has supported oppressive and totalitarian regimes. Our government's policy seems only to be concerned with the short-term benefits to the United States and/or transnational business people. In Nicaragua, land reform, increased medical benefits, greatly improved education, more and better food for the populace, and popular support for the Sandinista government are testified to by our American Baptist ministers and missionaries and various other impartial witnesses in the country. However, [illegible]

[illegible] American Baptist and other Christian churches and sisters of Central America repeatedly call for our help in stopping the suffering in their countries. Meanwhile, U.S. military aid and intervention in the region spirals upward. U.S. covert operations against the government of Nicaragua have been admitted by the State Department. It is time that the U.S. government seek opportunities for peaceful resolution rather than increasing militarization.

Therefore:

— We reaffirm the 1981 Biennial Statement of Concern on El Salvador.

— We affirm the work of the Board of International Ministries, interdenominational church programs, and other agencies who are giving needed aid, care, and ministry to the refugees from Central American political and economic violence.

— We affirm the historic and courageous actions of American Baptist Churches providing sanctuary to Central American refugees.

To avert the tragedy of larger war and loss of life in Central America and to contribute toward the establishment of peace with justice in the region, we urgently call upon all governments to:

1. Stop military aid and intervention in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
2. Stop covert operations and all other destabilization efforts against all governments of Central America.
3. Support vigorously a negotiated political solution between all parties in the conflict in El Salvador and support Central American peace initiatives which call for talks between the U.S. and Nicaragua and between Honduras and Nicaragua.
4. Grant temporary asylum to Central American refugees until they can safely return to their countries.
5. Work through United Nations and other agencies to provide food, health care, and safety to the refugees in the Central American refugee camps.
6. Support self-determination for the peoples of Central America. We urge the General Secretary of the ABC/USA to communicate these concerns to the President of the United States, all members of the United States Congress, and to public and church media.

The following resolution was adopted by the General Board of the American Baptist Churches, June, 1984 by a vote of 123 for, 11 against, 4 abstentions. General Board Reference #8123:6/84

Resolution on Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua)

INTRODUCTION

> Sisters and Brothers, with the Gospel as our basis we consider it our duty to do everything within our power to avoid the immense calamity that hovers over us. For that reason we are making a desperate and urgent plea to all of you that you will offer us invaluable aid in these efforts . . . to promote peace in our area.[1]

This plea for peace, addressed to all American Baptists in a telegram from Nicaraguan Baptists, outlines the anguish, fears, and hopes of a part of the population of Central America.

The region is marked today by violence, repression, suffering, and death. In the spirit of I Corinthians 13:26, "If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together," American Baptists hear the cry and sufferings of the people of Central America and stand with them as partners in faith.

SAYING "YES" TO LIFE

The resurrection of Christ is for us the fundamental sign of God's triumph over death, sin, and oppression. This compels us, as His witnesses, to say *no* to death and *yes* to life. American Baptists have striven to be faithful to the message proclaimed by Jesus Christ, of hope to the poor and dispossessed, the infirm, the persecuted and the imprisoned (Luke 4:17-21). We have sought to answer his call to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and shelter the homeless (Matt 25:31-46); and have responded to his invitation to be peacemakers (Matt 5:9). The Gospel has been the basis for our ministry of witness and service.

The challenge for American Baptists is to affirm life and, in the midst of the valley of death, to say *yes* to God's Kingdom.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The entire region is being touched, to some degree, by the violence and conflict which threatens to engulf El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. El Salvador has the promise of a new government but the undeclared civil war, terrorism, torture and death squads, wide abuse of human rights, and the continuing gap between rich and poor threaten the stability of that new government.

Nicaragua has come through its revolution with the Sandinistas in power. It is now under attack by counterrevolutionaries (*contras*) a majority of them loyal to the former regime, and all heavily supported by the U.S.A. Neighboring Honduras has rapidly become a staging area for the military assaults, with the consequence of a military buildup that seriously affects its society.

American Baptists have a long and valuable relationship with Baptists in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and continue to work through BIM missionaries and the Baptist Council on World Mission. Baptists in Honduras have exchanged friendly visits and periodic contact is maintained through International Ministries.

The conflict in Central America is regarded by some as an attempt at a communist take-over — a battle of ideologies. Others would say that the key issue is not an ideological struggle, but an effort to end the grinding poverty that has brought desperation to so many people. The long centuries of colonial rule, military dictatorships, control by the wealthy few of production, goods, and income: these have led to poverty, illiteracy, lack of development in every sector, and the denial of dignity, freedom, and meaningful living for the masses of the people. All of these are seeds from which the present situation took root.

Geographical proximity to the U.S.A., the availability of radio, television, and travel have contributed also to the rising expectations of the common people and the goal of a better standard of living. When such goals are thwarted by oppression, conflicts tear the fabric of society. This has happened today in Central America.

Historically, the tendency has been to rely on military force to halt the stirrings of unrest. The United States has a long history of such intervention in Latin America — over 30 times since 1850. But the valid complaints of the poverty-stricken are a reality for every visitor to Latin America to see. These needs have been addressed countless times both by leaders of our nation and our churches. The killing in El Salvador by a right-wing death squad of two American workers sent to help with land reform indicates that the heart of the problem was being reached and the power structure was being threatened. The history of repeated military suppression of the outcries of the poor in Latin America is a failed policy which should call us to deal more realistically with the root problem.

Current U.S.A. policy of heavy military support comes at a high price — U.S. military aid to El Salvador for 1980 was $5.9 million. In February, 1984, the U.S. Administration asked Congress to approve $311 million in further

military aid for El Salvador, exceeding the total of all military aid sent to that country in previous years. The CIA is known to provide military and financial assistance to each of the three contra groups operating in Nicaragua, a number between 12,000 to 18,000 strong. Military exports to Honduras in 1983 amounted to $61 million. Military grants requested for 1984 (supplemental) and 1985 total $100 million. At the end of March, 1983, U.S. military personnel in Honduras numbered 26. By November, 1983, it was 6,000. On average, there have been 2,000 American soldiers stationed in Honduras since August, 1983.[2]

American Baptists cannot remain silent in the face of the messages of faith and the pleas for support that have come from our fellow Baptists in Central America. Therefore, we commend to American Baptist churches the following:

1) that we honor, support, and pray for our Christian brothers and sisters in Central America who carry on the ministry of Jesus Christ, seeking to live faithfully amid opposing viewpoints and often dangerous conditions;
2) that we honor those Christians from North America who have expressed their witness for peace through visits or letters to encourage and maintain links of fellowship with Christians in Central America;
3) that we support and pray for our missionaries and mission board staff who continue to work in that area or make visits to help maintain a ministry of hope;
4) that we respect those churches that, responding to the leading of God's Spirit, are providing sanctuary for refugees fleeing certain suffering and death in Central America;
5) that we continue to provide aid through our world relief program with food, clothing and medicines to the homeless, the refugees, those caught in tragedies as a result of the violence around them;
6) that we urge our government to accept as refugees those who out of extremity and fear for their lives, flee to our shores;
7) that we encourage our people to study seriously the history and background of the rich culture and the conflict in Central America, seeking deeper understanding rather than accepting simplistic views of the struggles of those nations which date back to the Spanish conquest in the hemisphere;
8) that we strongly urge our nation to lend its strength and prestige to the rejection of a military approach, in favor of a policy of negotiation and empowerment to deal with the roots of the problems. In so doing, we would urge the following:
   (a) that the U.S.A. cooperate with the Central American nations seeking such negotiations (the *Contadora* group),[3] the efforts of the United Nations, and to express support of constructive talks such as the recent one initiated between U.S. Secretary of State Schultz and Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua;
   (b) that the U.S.A. emphasize a policy of assistance in relief, economic development and reconstruction, eliminating covert and overt CIA activities against Nicaragua, reducing the threat of invasion through massive military presence in Honduras, and ending the program of excessive military aid to El Salvador;
   (c) that we pray for and communicate with the leaders of our nation regarding our Christian concern for a peaceful resolution in Central America, maintaining a deep awareness that God's judgment is upon us all in our stewardship to bring justice and righteousness upon the earth.

POLICY BASE

American Baptist Policy Statement on Human Rights:

1. the right of every person to choose a religion freely, to maintain religious belief or unbelief without coercion; the right for communities of faith to meet together to engage in public worship, . . .to speak prophetically from religious conviction to government and society, to live out religious beliefs, and to be free from governmental intrusion, coercion, and control in the free exercise of conscience and religion;
6. the right to follow the dicates of conscience, to express dissent individually or in groups to prevailing ideas, governments, and institutions;
9. the right to human dignity, to be respected and treated as a person, and to be protected against discrimination . . . . ;
10. the right of ethnic or racial groups to maintain their cultural identity and to develop institutions and structure through which that identity can be maintained;
11. the right of citizenship in a nation, to participate in the political process, to form political parties, to have a voice in decisions made in the political arenas, to be secure from fear of deportation or expulsion, to emigrate and to have political asylum;
12. the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention and from torture; the right to a just and open trial with the opportunity to confront accusers and the right to humane treatment if incarcerated;
13. the right to a just process for the redress of a violation of a person's or group's human rights.

American Baptist Policy Statement on Immigration and Refugee Policy:

1. continue our historical role as an advocate of human rights for immigrants, refugees, and migrants;
4. continue to raise the consciousness of the Church and society regarding the needs of refugees, their contribution to American society and the Biblical truth that we are all God's children.

In addition we call for:

(1) provisions for emergency admissions beyond the annual ceiling;
(2) review of numerical limits every ten years . . . .

F. We affirm the following definition of a "refugee" as found in the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980:

(b) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, . . . who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

American Baptist Policy Statement on Military and Foreign Policy:

The United States should work to remove injustice and lack of equal opportunity and seek allies to promote justice throughout the world.

Nonmilitary means to resolve international conflict must be sought and practiced on an intentional and continual basis.

Military funding should be examined in light of the total needs of a nation and with the recognition that human needs must be met if a nation is to be secure.

. . . .

Global understanding and cooperation are essential to the pursuit of peace . . . . National actions and priorities continually need to be reassessed in light of this global interdependence. The needs and rights of all peoples must be respected if there is to be a solid foundation for peace.

Social and economic justice, as well as concern for human welfare and potential, are essential elements in national security. Social, economic, and political structures that do not respond constructively to the needs of people contribute to the causes of war and global instability.

Additional Policy Bases:

American Baptist Resolution on Human Rights in Latin America:

1. In obedience to God as American Baptists, we condemn oppression and exploitation in Latin America in its many forms: economic, political, racial, religious, and whether open and visible or hidden and subtle;
2. We encourage American Baptist to engage in study and action: to understand the problems of Latin America today, to seek ways to express solidarity, and to engage in action with the peoples of Latin America on behalf of economic betterment and human rights;
3. As American Baptists, we shall support programs in Latin America which work for the economic betterment of the poor:
   (a) . . . .
   (b) . . . .
   (c) through encouragement to U.S. Government, United Nations, private and church development programs which especially assist, with appropriate technology, the poverty stricken and racial minorities to secure land and achieve economic growth.
4. We urge the United States Government to develop and activate a concrete and sound policy on Latin America that will foster peace, provide economic betterment for the majority poor, and give strong support for human rights in all Latin American countries;
5. We express solidarity with the churches of Latin America. . . .

American Baptist Resolution on El Salvador:

1. We express our deep sense of community with our brothers and sisters in El Salvador who are caught in the present conflict in their land.
3. We encourage American Baptists to engage in study and discussion, in order to understand the circumstances which led to the current crisis, and to take action to express their concerns to our nation's leaders. Specifically, we urge American Baptists to state their views to the President, Secretary of State, and members of the Senate, . . .
4. We encourage American Baptists, through the One Great Hour of Sharing Offering, to provide relief and reconstruction assistance for the people of El Salvador, recognizing that they will have long term needs to achieve economic justice.

Board of International Ministries Resolution on Nicaragua:

1. We register our opposition to the United States Government intervention in Nicaragua, whether by overt or covert means.
3. We urge the United States Government to cease its support of counter-revolutionary forces operating out of Honduras.
5. We reaffirm our solidarity with the churches of Nicaragua in their work for all of the people, and urge American Baptists, in the name of Christ, to give material and spiritual support to alleviate their suffering.

STUDY RESOURCES

The following is a partial list of materials available for study and discussion by individuals and groups:

BOOKS

Barry, Tom, *et. al.*, *Dollars and Dictators*. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1983.
Lernoux, Penny, *Cry of the People*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1980.
Lernoux, Penny, *Fear and Hope: Toward Political Democracy in Central America*. New York, New York: The Field Foundation, 1984. (Concise, readable, excellent analysis of the region.)

c place to pray together
ools of Central America.

er a group of persons to
ut Central America for at
the next 24th day of the

ner a group would covenant
24th of each month.

our church or synagogue for
s on the 24th of each month
bout Central America. Publicize
ur community and places of

specific in your prayers. Pray
ctual persons, places, incidents,
ional votes, etc. known to you.

- Pray positively. Ask for the infusion of strength, power and wisdom into the spirits of the oppressed and those who resist injustice, both in North America and Central America. You may wish to visualize specific persons, villages, etc. bathed in God's light, empowered to be "saints in the light". (Col.1:12)

- Imagine a scene in which Jesus walks down a street in Nicaragua or in the corridors of Congress; let the scene unfold before your mind's eye as he encounters persons.

- Share readings from such first sources as the *Gospel in Solentiname* by Ernesto Cardenal (Orbis Press).

- Use one of the following passages as a basis for meditation and prayer: Psalms 7, 10, 17, 20, 23, 27 (and many others), the Magnificat and following (Luke 1:46-55, 67-79), references to God's authority over worldly principalities and powers (Col. 1:11-20, Ephesians 6: 10-20, Romans 8: 18-39—very powerful passages in connection with Walter Wink's new book, *Naming the Powers* (Fortress Press).

- Keep us informed of activities in your community, either through your denominational office or:

Inter-Religious Task Force on C.A.
Room 563
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10115
(212) 870-3383

Copies of this brochure are available
for $6 per 100
from the
Inter-Religious Task Force on
Central America
or your
denomination.

Pray for PEACE in Central America

Appendix E

In a major policy statement on Central America, the 195th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA) (1983):

- expressed its view that "Our nation is providing support for the powers of death in Central America";
- recommended major changes in US policies in relation to the region and its individual nations; and
- called on Presbyterians to advocate these policy changes in fulfillment of a special responsibility we bear as Christians who are citizens of the US.

General Assembly recommendations to the US government include the following:

- Work toward negotiated rather than military solutions
- End military aid to Central America and withdraw all military advisors from the region
- Cease all covert and overt activities to destabilize governments
- Press for international agreements to end the traffic of arms to Central America
- Recognize the sovereignty of each nation to determine its own political and economic institutions
- Press for the protection of human rights
- Adopt a just, humane, and generous refugee policy
- Increase development assistance

Said the Assembly:

"The church in North America cannot be the church in Central America, but it can stand with sister and brother Christians in the region as they cry out against the powers of death."

General Assembly recommendations regarding US relations to specific nations include the following:

El Salvador: Withdraw immediately all US military advisors; end military and economic aid; accept the principle of a negotiated settlement; facilitate the engagement of all major groups in negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

Guatemala: Reinstate the embargo on military equipment; withdraw all military advisors; use influence to stop the persecution of Indians; help establish a nonmilitary international presence to safeguard displaced persons.

Nicaragua: Affirm and support the right of Nicaragua to self-determination; stop all efforts, direct or indirect, to destabilize the government; cease efforts to block international monetary aid; resume US economic aid.

Costa Rica: Encourage and strengthen the democratic tradition and offer substantial economic aid.

Honduras: Withdraw US military advisors; withdraw all support for incursions by counter-revolutionaries from Honduras into Nicaragua; increase economic aid.



Responding to the mandate of the General Assembly, the agencies of the church—including the Washington Office—are giving major attention to advocating these policy recommendations.

But we need your help! To be effective, our advocacy efforts in Washington must be matched by your advocacy efforts across the country.

Thus, we urge you to volunteer your services as a PRESBYTERIAN ADVOCATE of the General Assembly's public policy recommendations on Central America.

As an ADVOCATE, you will ***receive:***

- REPORT TO PRESBYTERIANS, a bimonthly publication of the Washington Office presenting news and views on public policy issues of major concern.
- CALLS TO ACTION ON CENTRAL AMERICA, occasional pieces issued at critical moments in the policy-making process when your advocacy with your Senator or Representative would be most effective politically. (CALLS will be issued irregularly. Depending on whether you are in a swing state or district, you will receive few or many CALLS.)

As an ADVOCATE, you will be ***expected:***

- To **act** in support of General Assembly recommendations when you receive a CALL TO ACTION.
- To **encourage** others to act also.

For this special effort, we are looking for Presbyterians who will commit themselves to **action** for the sake of peace and justice in Central America. If you are prepared to make a commitment, please return the form on the reverse side.

Appendix F

Agency Survey on funding and program development in Nicaragua, 1979-1988
Michael Kuchinsky, June 1990
University of Richmond, Graduate Department of Political Science

Name of Agency _____

Does your agency have a mission statement? If so, please include.

What is your agency's policy on receiving federal government assistance for your agency's development program?

What is your agency's total budget for developmental assistance? Please attach most recent annual report.

What of the total budget represents U.S. assistance in PL 480, transportation, grants, etc.

What percentage of total budget reflects your agency's Latin America and Central America program? In 1990? In 1988? In 1985? In 1982?

Of your agency's Central American budget, what percent reflects your agency's contribution to Nicaragua programs and projects? In 1990? In 1988? In 1985? In 1982?

pg. 2 Agency Survey on funding and program development in Nicaragua, 1979-1988
Michael Kuchinsky, June 1990

Since 1979, has the level of funding by your agency for Central America or Nicaragua projects increased/decreased as a percent of total budget? How do you account for the changes?

Please describe the type of programs and projects which your agency operates in Nicaragua. When started? Number of staff? Goals of project? Total annual cost.

Has your agency added or discontinued programs in Nicaragua since 1979? What types of programs have been added or discontinued?

Where have these added or discontinued programs been located?

Did/does your agency have any formal statement on the Sandinista Revolution or its governance? If so, what was/is that statement? Please attach.

Was your agency involved (independently or ecumenically) in advocacy activities to Congress or the Reagan Administration in regards to that Administration's policy in Central America? If so, what was that advocacy and when did it occur? If available, please attach statement.

Over the past decade, events happened which might indicate United States hostility towards the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. During the same time, many churches and denominations have been on record in support of Sandinista efforts and policies while critical of American foreign policy in the region. The following list represents activities of American foreign policy which have been perceived by critics to be provocative and/or threatening. In relationship to these events, did your agency change (increase/decrease) its levels of funding,personnel, or advocacy? If so, what were these changes, and when did they occur? (See next page for list of events.)

pg. 4 Agency survey on funding and program development in Nicaragua, 1979-88. Michael Kuchinsky, June 1990.

1979-80 Carter administration debates and final funding for Sandinistas

1980-81 Reagan Administration cut-off of Carter funding of Sandinistas.

1983-84 U.S. intelligence activities--mining harbors, training manual

1984-85 Military activities/war games; Big Pine I, Big Pine II

1985-87 Congressional debates and policy changes on Contra-aid increase

1987-88 Exposures; Hassenfuss affair and gun-running, Contra attrocities covered by American news media, the onset of Iran-Contra.

Thank you for your time and effort. Once I have received your returned survey, attachments and other data, I will be in contact with you by telephone for any further clarification or additional information. I look forward to your comments and helpfulness.

Rev. Michael Kuchinsky (Chaplain to Newberry College)
1188 Woodridge Ln.
Newberry, SC 29108

803-276-6910 803-276-5010, ext. 294

Appendix G

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE/LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF

Office on Development Policy

July 24, 1986

Hon. Mark O. Hatfield, Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Hatfield,

I am writing to express a concern about the $300 million in aid funds being considered for transfer to Central America. The transfer is proposed, as you know, in the FY 87 House-passed military construction appropriations bill now before your Committee.

As a private and voluntary organization with human needs programs throughout the Third World, we are committed to U.S. policies which underwrite effective efforts to meet those needs. The House approach would allow the use in Central America of funds previously made available for African famine relief, Food for Peace, and development assistance.

We were pleased with enactment in early 1985 of the African famine relief supplemental and with the subsequent use of the resources provided. However, since earlier requests that some of the funds from the $225 million reserve be used for additional activities in Africa were rejected, the use of such funds now for purposes unrelated to their provision is indeed troubling.

So, too, the suggestion that PL480 funds and AID development assistance resources supply some of the $300 sought for Central America. There are many claims on food aid far more compelling than those in Central America. FAO's June report on Foodcrops and Shortages notes abnormal food shortages in six Sub-Saharan African countries and unfavorable crop prospects in two others. AID is already reducing its development activities this year in a number of countries where needs are substantial, with further budget cutbacks likely in FY87. Thus there are hardly funds elsewhere to spare for Central America.

It is true that some of the resources to be transferred from Africa to El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica in the form of Economic Support Funds may underwrite basic human needs activities. However, it is likely that large amounts will be balance of payments support. People in need stand to suffer twice from the transfer: once in the areas from which the funds are preempted, and again in Central America, where the poor are not likely to benefit substantially.

122 C STREET N.W., SUITE 300, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 · 202/783-7501

We hope that you and the other senators on your committee will find a way to prevent the transfer to Central America of human needs funds provided for other purposes and to encourage their use as intended.

Sincerely,

Norman E. Barth III
Norman E. Barth
Executive Director

LETTER FROM EXECUTIVES OF PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNING AID TO THE NICARAGUAN CONTRAS

March 13, 1986

Dear Member of Congress:

As you prepare to vote on assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, we ask that you consider the views of organizations such as ours with long involvement in providing humanitarian assistance and with some familiarity with the human suffering caused by current US policy toward Nicaragua.

We recommend that you vote against providing $30 million in so-called humanitarian assistance to the Contras. Such aid distorts the concept of humanitarian aid as understood internationally and in the United States. It does not meet the customary tests: that humanitarian aid be made available solely on the basis of human need, not for political purposes; that it be offered impartially to all sides in a conflict; and that it go solely to civilians and non-combatants. Mislabelling the $30 million imperils the integrity of bona fide humanitarian aid and of agencies like our own that seek to provide it. It also risks the future of people whose life depends on it.

The $30 million is, of course, part of a larger $100 million request that includes $70 million for outright military aid. The pursuit of a military solution to the current conflict between the US and Nicaraguan governments is likely, we believe, to continue to create needless suffering among the poor in the region with whom we and our colleague agencies work. **We urge Congress to insist on US actions that are regional and diplomatic in character.** Such actions would be in keeping with the counsel of US allies in Central and South America and in Europe who have all opposed military aid to the Contras. We particularly lament the pressure brought by the Administration against governments that have opposed such aid, most recently the holding up of an AID development loan payment to Costa Rica.

We therefore urge your rejection of the Administration's $100 million request, both its so-called humanitarian assistance and military aid elements. While some are considering a "compromise" that, in one way or another, would approve the former while rejecting the latter, what would be compromised, we believe, would be the integrity of humanitarian aid itself.

Given the reality of human need in the Nicaraguan/Honduran border area, we urge that the US provide humanitarian assistance to

refugees and displaced persons wherever they are, through international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Because the US is a party to the conflict, we would urge against the provision of humanitarian aid through bilateral channels.

Thank you for giving consideration to our views.

Sincerely,

Norman E. Barth, Executive Director
Lutheran World Relief

Asia A. Bennett, Executive Secretary
American Friends Service Committee

J. Richard Butler, Executive Director
Church World Service

John Hammock, Executive Director
Oxfam America

Alden R. Hickman, Executive Director
Heifer Project International, Inc.

Sister Sheila McGinnis, Superior
Sector North America
Medical Mission Sisters

Richard S. Scobie, Ph.D., Executive Director
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee

Reg Toews, Associate Executive Secretary
Mennonite Central Committee

For further information, please contact Jim Matlack, American Friends Service Committee, 1822 R St. NW, Washington, DC 20009 (483-3341) or Larry Minear, Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief, 122 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20001 (783-7501).

November 2, 1988

Oxfam America

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Boston, MA 02116
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Telex 94-0283
OXFAM BSN
FAX (617) 338-0187

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513 Valencia St., #8
San Francisco, CA
94110
(415) 863-3981

RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN AID TO NICARAGUA

The undersigned agencies of InterAction, express our dismay at the decision of the U.S. government not to offer aid to the victims of Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua. Though we hereby take no position on current U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, we deplore withholding humanitarian aid for political reasons. Humanitarian aid should be given to civilians in desperate need. We would urge the U.S. government to reconsider its position and, based on its long history of providing humanitarian aid to people in need, offer humanitarian aid to the people of Nicaragua.

Signed,

Oxfam America
American Friends Service Committee
Church World Service
Lutheran World Relief
Operation California
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
Trickle-Up Program
Institute for Cultural Affairs
Eritrea Relief Association
Surgical Aid to the Children of the World

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE/LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF

Office on Development Policy • 110 Maryland Ave. N.E. • Building Mailbox #45 • Washington, D.C. 20002-5694 • 202/543-6336

October 17, 1990

The Rev. Michael Kuchinsky
Newberry College
c/o Chaplain's Office
Newberry, SC 29108

Dear Rev. Kuchinsky:

I apologize for the delay in responding to your request for information. The legislative schedule has been especially hectic the past few weeks, which has made it difficult to find time to review our files so that I might try to assist you.

If I understand the focus of your study, you are interested in the impact of U.S. policy toward Central America on the advocacy positions and policies of Lutheran World Relief. The following is a brief overview of those activities over the past seven years.

1. The Office on Development Policy, which is jointly sponsored by Lutheran World Relief and Church World Service, in 1983 developed a series of policy recommendations concerning Central America and the Caribbean. We recommended that the U.S.:

   -- shift a portion of short-term economic political aid (Economic Support Funds) to long-term development needs;
   -- channel funds through multilateral institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and the Inter-American Development Bank to support regional integration;
   -- reduce the level of military aid to the region to check the growth of militarization in the region;
   -- condition Economic Support Fund (political/security assistance) to El Salvador on the initiation of unconditional dialogue between the parties to the conflict;
   -- provide funding for programs promoting agricultural self-sufficiency and those directly benefitting the poor in the region, including refugees.

2. In 1985, LWR engaged in very little direct advocacy on Central America. It did express, to appropriate congressional leaders, the concern of the AID Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Assistance that neither U.S. private and

voluntary organizations nor the U.S. Agency for International Development become involved in administering so-called "humanitarian assistance" to the Nicaraguan contras.

3. By 1986, LWR became more active in opposing U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan contras. Norman Barth, executive director of LWR, signed a letter to members of Congress urging opposition to a requested $100 million in aid, including $30 million in so-called "humanitarian" assistance, and approval of genuine humanitarian aid to refugees and displaced persons in the region (see attached).

4. The persistent characterization of assistance to the Nicaraguan contras as "humanitarian" prompted greater efforts by LWR to clarify with policymakers the nature of genuine humanitarian aid. We sought to educate Members of Congress, Administration officials, and the news media about the criteria for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations, as detailed in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. LWR's Office on Development Policy also provided leadership within the PVO community to review principles and policies related to the provision of humanitarian assistance in conflict situations.

5. Throughout this period, LWR advocated U.S. assistance for victims of the warfare in Central America. In 1988, we worked with congressional staff to identify specific humanitarian needs for victims of the war in Nicaragua that might be addressed by a U.S. aid package. Congress eventually approved assistance for a Child Survival Program for child victims of the warfare in Central America.

6. LWR also urged Congress to adopt a better regional balance within the U.S. foreign aid program, suggesting greater amounts of aid for Africa and lesser amounts for Central America, as well as better balance within the Central America region itself. In July, 1986, Norman Barth wrote to Senate Appropriations Committee members objecting to a proposed transfer of funds previously designated for African famine relief, food aid, and development assistance to Central America (see attached).

7. Concern about the politicization of humanitarian assistance, particularly in conflict situations, led to a closer scrutiny of the use of U.S. aid funds in El Salvador. LWR urged that U.S. development and food aid not be used to support the political/military activities of the government and armed forces of El Salvador. In correspondence to Senate Foreign Relations Committee members, we stated, "We believe it crucial as a matter of both policy and principle for development and humanitarian assistance activities to be independent of military objectives and involvement."

In 1988, LWR urged the U.S. to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to victims of Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua (see attached). The U.S. refused to provide such assistance because of its political differences with the government of Nicaragua.

LWR joined with five other private and voluntary organizations in March, 1989 to present written testimony to the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee describing the problems that humanitarian aid providers were experiencing in El Salvador (see attached).

I hope that this brief summary of LWR legislative activities related to Nicaragua will be useful to you in your study. Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Cheryl Morden

GRANTS MADE IN 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Liberation Movements

Guinea-Bissau

African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 170,000

Angola

People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 78,000
The Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 60,500
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 37,500

Mozambique

Mozambique Institute of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 120,000

Namibia

South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 80,000

South Africa

Lutuli Memorial Foundation of ANC (African National Congress) — 1970, 71, 73, 74	$ 32,500
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC — South Africa) — 1973, 74	$ 17,500

Zimbabwe

ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) — 1970, 71, 74	$ 30,000
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) — 1970, 71, 74	$ 30,000

Other African Movements and Groups

Zambia

Africa 2000 (1970, 1971)	$ 20,000

Tanzania

Sixth Pan African Congress — 1974	$ 12,000
	$ 688,000

NORTH AMERICA

Black Movements and Groups

USA

Malcolm X Liberation University (1970, 73)	$ 13,500
Southern Election Fund Inc. (1971)	$ 7,500
Coalition of Concerned Black Americans (1971, 73)	$ 13,500
All-African News Service (1973)	$ 3,000
Free Southern Theatre (1974)	$ 5,000

Indian, Eskimo Movements and Groups

USA

Institute for the Development of Indian Law (1971)	$ 2,500
American Indian Movement (1973, 74)	$ 21,000
Americans for Indian Opportunity (Oklahoma Indians) (1974)	$ 5,000

Canada

Inuit (Eskimo) Tapirisat of Canada (1971)	$ 2,500
National Indian Brotherhood (on behalf of CREE) — 1973, 74	$ 12,500
Indian Brotherhood of the North-West Territories (1973)	$ 7,500

Chicano Movements and Groups

USA

United Farm Workers Organizing Committee AFL-CIO (1971, 74)	$ 17,500
El Paso Education Research Project (1973)	$ 5,000
Puerto Rican Organization working for economic and social justice (to be named) — 1973	$ 6,000

Support Groups

USA

Southern Africa Committee (1974)	$ 4,000
	$ 126,000

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

Indian Movements and Groups

Colombia

Committee for the Defence of the Indian in Colombia (1970, 71)	$ 20,000
Native Regional Council of Cauca (CRIC) — 1973, 74	$ 20,000
Alianza Campesino Indigena en Lucha por la Tierra (1974)	$ 15,000
	$ 55,000

B/fwd.		$ 55,000
Bolivia		
Bolivian Project in Aid of Indian Liberation (1971)		$ 12,500
Paraguay		
The Indigenist Association of Paraguay (1971)		$ 2,500

Black Movements and Groups

Colombia	
Colombian Foundation for the Defence of Natural Resources and Black Workers (1973)	$ 10,000
Caribbean	
Christian Action for Development in the Eastern Caribbean (1971)	$ 5,000
	$ 85,000

ASIA

Minority Groups

Japan	
International Committee to Combat the Immigration Bill in Japan (1970)	$ 2,000
Legal Defence Committee in Japan (Korean Minority) (1971, 1974)	$ 15,000
	$ 17,000

AUSTRALASIA

Movements of Aborigines

Australia	
Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Straight Islanders (FCAATSI) — 1970, 1973	$ 24,000
National Tribal Council (NTC) — 1970	$ 15,000

Support Groups

New Zealand	
National Anti-*Apartheid* Coordinating Committee (1974)	$ 4,000
	$ 43,000

EUROPE

Movements and Organizations of Migrants and Minorities

United Kingdom	
West Indian Standing Conference (1970)	$ 7,500
Europe/Third World Research Centre (1971, 1974)	$ 7,500
Free University for Black Studies (1971)	$ 2,500
Institute of Race Relations (1973)	$ 7,500
Towards Racial Justice (1974)	$ 10,000
Western Europe	
Comunità d'Agape, Italy (Migrant seminar) — 1973	$ 2,500
Migrant Workers Coordinating Committee (1974)	$ 5,000

Support Groups

United Kingdom	
Africa Bureau (1970)	$ 2,500
Anti-*Apartheid* Movement (1970, 1973, 1974)	$ 11,000
International Defence and Aid Fund (1970)	$ 3,000
Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea — 1974	$ 4,000
Netherlands	
Foundation for Information about Racism and Colonialism (1970, 1973, 1974)	$ 11,000
Anti-*Apartheid* Movement (1974)	$ 4,000
Belgium	
Anti-*Apartheid* Committee (1971, 1973)	$ 4,500
France	
Anti-*Apartheid* Committee (1971)	$ 2,500
Switzerland	
Anti-*Apartheid* Movement (1973, 1974)	$ 6,000
	$ 91,000

Southern Africa	$ 688,000
North America	$ 126,000
Latin America and Caribbean	$ 85,000
Asia	$ 17,000
Australia	$ 43,000
Europe	$ 91,000
Total :	$ 1,050,000

A.I.D.'s Historical Partnership With PVOs

The Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) has long recognized the important contribution made by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to development efforts in the Third World. PVOs as defined by A.I.D. are tax-exempt non-profit organizations which receive some portion of their annual revenue from the private sector (demonstrating their private nature) and receive voluntary contributions of money, staff time or in-kind support from the general public (a demonstration of their voluntary nature). Not all non-profit organizations are necessarily PVOs.

PVOs are a diverse universe — varying in their expertise, size, base of support and mode of operation. They bring unique skills to the job of Third World development, and provide direct channels for private, people-to-people efforts. In addition, they help increase our nation's understanding of the Third World and have the flexibility to operate in areas and ways not always open to other channels of development assistance.

U.S. PVOs have been active in humanitarian work overseas for more than a century. In the years since World War II, their activities — on all continents and in a range of areas — have shown a marked upswing. During the past twenty years, PVOs have directed their energies more intensively toward long-term development. However, this does not mean they are no longer involved in disaster assistance. When disaster strikes, the PVOs are there, providing food, clothing and medicine to victims. It does, nevertheless, indicate a trend of broadening their focus from an emphasis on relief, disaster assistance and food distribution toward alleviating the causes of poverty and improving the quality of human life in the Third World.

U.S. private and voluntary organizations have a rich history of cooperation with A.I.D. dating back to World War II, when PVOs were active primarily in relief and disaster assistance efforts. Since that time, the U.S. Government has facilitated various aspects of PVO work through grants and other support for PVO programs. Growing cooperation between A.I.D. and the international private and voluntary community mirrors the U.S. Government's belief that the programs of those agencies embody the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and support a principal objective of U.S. foreign policy:

". . . the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives."
(Section 101, Foreign Assistance Act).

Legislation governing U.S. development assistance policy reflects the expanding role and level of PVO involvement in development processes. Since 1973, Congress has spoken with increased regularity to PVO issues. In 1981, in a significant first-time action, Congress specified a range of funding for PVO activities by directing A.I.D. to make available to PVOs at least 12 and up to 16 percent of its development and disaster assistance funding. Presently the PVO funding floor is 13.5 percent and the target remains 16 percent.

The complementarity between A.I.D. and PVOs was emphasized in A.I.D.'s October 1982 PVO Policy Paper. It acknowledged that PVOs, because of their heterogeneity and ability to work effectively at the grassroots level with small-scale projects, contribute to an extension of A.I.D.'s own effectiveness and scope of activity. The acknowledgement stems from the belief that A.I.D. and PVOs share these fundamental objectives:

- helping the people of the Third World to develop their skills and abilities to solve their own problems, and
- developing (broadly) democratic institutions which help people to achieve con-

trol over their own lives and to take responsibility for their own development.

Currently, A.I.D.-administered funding for PVOs comes from a wide range of accounts: agriculture, rural development, nutrition, population planning, health, child survival, education and human resources, selected development activities, international disaster assistance, the Sahel Development Program, Economic Support Fund, American Schools and Hospitals Abroad, excess property, African Refugee Assistance, and P.L. 480 Title II commodities and freight.

Historically, A.I.D.'s support to PVOs has built upon and substantially strengthened their capacity to undertake overseas development programs. The Agency's strategy is to maximize the effectiveness of scarce development resources in Less Developed Countries (LDC) by ensuring that all A.I.D.-funded programs, including those of the PVOs, address a country's development priorities and needs. Increasingly, PVO programs have become quite responsive to major agency priorities in addressing development problems and meeting basic human needs in the LDCs. For example, the work of PVOs in the field of small-scale, private enterprise development is recognized as fulfilling an important role in the developing of the private sector. In the area of institution building, PVOs assist local institutions to develop the skills necessary to address their own development problems. PVOs also contribute to the process of technology transfer as they work at the grassroots level teaching appropriate technologies to the people in LDCs, including management techniques and training based on local needs, rather than "high tech" innovations.

A.I.D.'s support for PVOs has two major dimensions. A.I.D. deals with PVOs both as intermediaries in conducting A.I.D.'s programs and as independent entities in their own right. How this support is provided and on what basis it is available is the subject of this brochure.

Categories of Private and Voluntary Organizations

Acknowledging the diversity of the private non-profit development community, A.I.D. has disaggregated organizations within the PVO rubric into a number of more homogeneous sub-groups within the following broad categories: cooperatives and credit unions, labor institutes, family planning groups and traditional private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

Cooperatives and Credit Unions. U.S. cooperatives were formed to provide business services and outreach in cooperative development for their U.S. membership. Their international programs were initiated largely as a result of A.I.D. urging, A.I.D. financing and congressional mandate. These organizations support the goal of sections 102, 111, 123, and 601 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended ("FAA"), to increase "the participation of rural and urban poor people in their countries' development" (FAA, Sec. 111). These organizations are not charitable or fund-raising groups and rely almost exclusively on A.I.D. funding for their international programs. Policy Determination-73 (PD-73) governs the Agency's relationship with the U.S. cooperative development organizations.

AFL-CIO Labor Institutes. The Labor Institutes support FAA Section 102 and 601 goals of strengthening free labor unions and increasing participation of workers in the economic and social development processes of their respective countries. Like cooperatives, the Institutes established their international programs largely as a result of A.I.D. initiatives and Congressional mandate. They are trade associations, not charitable or fund-raising groups, relying almost exclusively on A.I.D. funding to operate their international programs. Policy Determination-52 (PD-52) governs the Agency's relationship with the Labor Institutes.

Family Planning Organizations. U.S. family planning organizations have expanded family planning services accessibility around the world, a major objective of U.S. foreign aid policy for more than a decade and a half (FAA Section 104). Like the cooperatives and labor institutes, U.S. family planning organizations have entered international assistance activities largely as a result of A.I.D. initiatives and funding and Congressional mandate. They do not attract large amounts of private funding, relying heavily on A.I.D. support to operate their international programs. The A.I.D. Policy Paper on Population Assistance (September 1982) governs the Agency's relationship with family planning organizations.

Traditional Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). Traditional PVOs constitute a majority in the diverse development community of private, non-profit, voluntary organizations. These groups, also referred to as volags, have historically been involved in international programs with many having been established at the close of World War II to undertake European relief and rehabilitation. They rely significantly on U.S. private grants and contributions for their revenue and draw on volunteers to implement their programs. These organizations are most likely to qualify for the PVO grant programs and most closely represent the kind of organization that Congress in Section 123 of the FAA, has urged AID to support in development work.

Initial Steps For Organizations Seeking A.I.D. Support

Before making contact with A.I.D.'s Washington Offices or Missions for support, an organization should be clear about its own purpose and need for A.I.D. support. Specifically, an organization should have identified:

- the kind of project or program under consideration,
- where it is to be conducted,
- what human and technical resources may now, or might be, available,
- approximate project cost, and
- where/how matching funds might be obtained.

In addition, to help answer questions A.I.D. staff may ask, the PVO should have information on:

- the need for the project,
- similar efforts already underway, and
- how the one proposed is complementary or different.

Organizations seeking A.I.D. assistance for the first time, which are uncertain about the resources and funding instruments most appropriate for a proposed project or program, are encouraged to first contact the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation to explore the proposed idea, how it fits with A.I.D. priorities, suitable funding mechanisms, etc. PVC serves as A.I.D.'s focal point for the Agency's relationship with PVOs and increasingly assists PVOs and A.I.D. Missions in developing PVO programs and suggesting new and innovative approaches.

All potentially eligible recipients who approach A.I.D. will benefit from having a short (one to two page) concept paper in hand as a basis for discussion. Having some idea of the proposed program or project facilitates A.I.D.'s ability to respond and identify avenues of support.

Organizations interested in a particular type of resource or program for which reg-

istration is a requirement are encouraged to begin the registration application process by discussing with the appropriate A.I.D. Office, Mission or Bureau the relevance of their proposed project to A.I.D.'s overall program and legislative mandate. If and when there is clear interest, and if necessary, the organization might then decide to apply for registration. A detailed discussion of that process follows.

Additional Requirements

- Registration is one of several steps toward eligibility for certain A.I.D. resources. Additional requirements may vary for different grants and subventions (see section on A.I.D. Resources), but usually include a proposal, a budget, a program and budget review conducted by A.I.D. program staff, and a pre-grant award audit — if appropriate (including compliance with OMB circulars A-110 and A-122).
- Eligibility for support under certain A.I.D. programs designated for PVOs requires that the PVO demonstrate its private nature, i.e., that 20 percent of its total annual financial support (cash) for its international activities is obtained from sources other than the U.S. government (required by legislation) effective January 1, 1985. This test of privateness is an eligibility criterion for certain PVO programs; it is not a condition of registration.
- Grant approval by A.I.D. in general depends on the PVO's ability to demonstrate that its proposed program or project matches current A.I.D. programmatic priorities. This does not necessarily mean that an A.I.D. supported PVO must always work in the same sectors as A.I.D.; PVO programs outside of, but complementary to or natural extensions of, A.I.D.'s priority sectors may be given consideration.
- Most grant programs require PVOs to share in the costs of the program. Typically this is 50 percent of the total costs. Preference is given in many cases to those programs where the PVO makes a cash contribution.

A.I.D. Resources Available To PVOs

Support for the programs of private and voluntary organizations may come from several sources within the Agency for International Development. Principal avenues of support for PVO programs include:

- The Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FVA) in Washington, and its Offices of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC), Food for Peace (FFP), and the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) Program. Among other mandates, FVA encourages the participation of non-governmental organizations in support of A.I.D.'s development and humanitarian objectives.
- The geographic Bureaus for Africa, Asia and Near East and Latin America and the Caribbean, A.I.D.'s Washington-based Bureaus which implement and backstop the Agency's foreign assistance efforts in their respective regions.
- A.I.D. Missions and Offices located in countries in which the U.S. Government has bilateral assistance programs. These entities represent A.I.D. overseas and, in cooperation with host governments and other organizations, develop and carry out agreed-upon programs consistent with A.I.D.'s legislative and country priorities.

An A.I.D. organization chart and a list of its Missions and Offices overseas can be found at the end of this brochure.

Responsibility for administering the resources available to PVOs and other organizations varies within A.I.D. These resources (primarily comprising grants, cooperative agreements and subventions), and the A.I.D. office which administers each, are described in the following sections. Some require that potential recipients be registered with A.I.D., an eligibility process outlined in a later section of this brochure.

In addition to the grants, cooperative agreements and subventions mentioned herein, funding may be available to PVOs and other organizations from other A.I.D. offices for projects relevant to the programs of those offices (for example, A.I.D.'s Bureau for Science and Technology, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance). Further, any organization, including registered PVOs, may compete for the award of a contract in support of an A.I.D.-sponsored program.

Grants Reserved For Registered PVOs

Operational Program Grants (OPGs) enable registered PVOs to carry out specific field projects in individual countries and occasionally in regions. OPGs are primarily funded by A.I.D. Missions and sometimes by A.I.D. Regional Bureaus. Co-financing or Umbrella grants are a variation of the OPG program. Typically funded for two or three years, projects for which OPG support is sought must be fully compatible with A.I.D.'s legislative mandate. Costs of all projects supported by OPGs, Co-financing or Umbrella grants are shared by PVOs. A.I.D. funding is limited to a maximum of 75 percent of total program costs. The remaining 25 percent must come from non-A.I.D. sources and may be a combination of cash or in-kind contributions obtained by the PVO. Missions have the authority to negotiate cash levels in individual cases.

Since OPGs are PVO-initiated field programs, with A.I.D.'s management of the grant relationship performed at the Mission level, PVOs usually begin by having early consultation with the appropriate A.I.D. Mission to discuss:

- activity to be undertaken; purpose and description,
- preliminary indication of host country interest and intent,
- background information relevant to the proposed project,
- rough cost estimate and proposed source of the non-A.I.D. share.

Inquire:

Inquiries should be directed to the A.I.D. Mission for the country in which the operation is proposed. Initial disccussions may also be undertaken with the PVO Liaison Officer in the relevant A.I.D./Washington Regional Bureau. Depending on the Region, contact the PVO Liaison Officers through the appropriate Bureaus (Africa, Asia and Near East and the Latin America and the Caribbean). Agency for International Development, Washington D.C. 20523.

Matching Grants support PVO field-oriented programs designed to be executed in a number of countries. Matching grants provide A.I.D. funds for up to 50 percent of program costs and are awarded to registered PVOs which adequately meet these criteria:

- the PVO has proven experience in the sector and activities for support ("track record"); and
- can raise the necessary private resources.

The Matching Grant is designed to consolidate multiple grant relationships with a PVO; provide for better program integration; reduce overlapping administrative procedures; and allow maximum program flexibility.

Proposed programs should be consistent with A.I.D.'s legislative mandate as well as with country development priorities. Since the A.I.D. Mission plays a key role in assessing country development priorities, proposals for this program should be prepared in consultation with the A.I.D. Mission. Parallel funding of Matching Grants and OPGs to the same PVO in the same country is not permitted, unless agreed to by the A.I.D. Mission. These grants provide dollar-for-dollar assistance to significantly increase PVO participation in international development, while giving greater programming flexibility to PVOs in recognition of their share of program costs. Funding is limited to private and voluntary organizations with demonstrated development track records and is usually awarded for a multi-year period. Proposals are reviewed annually within a specified, common time frame and compete equally for funds available. While the PVOs "match" can be made with cash or in-kind contributions from non-governmental sources, preference is given to programs where the PVO is providing a cash match.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Matching Grant Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington D.C. 20523

Partnership Grants are awarded to PVOs to promote program integration within a jointly agreed, longer-term A.I.D./PVO planning framework. Similar to Matching Grants, these grants provide A.I.D. funds for up to 50 percent of program costs to PVOs demonstrating a strong, well-established record of successful performance in A.I.D.-supported development activity, including the Matching Grant Program and/or OPGs in the last few years.

In addition to an emphasis on the development of a mutually agreed upon long term planning framework between A.I.D. and the PVO, other principal features of Partnership grants include:

- Five year (rather than three year) project authorization
- Optional "buy in" provision whereby Mission-financed activities can be incorporated within this centrally-funded framework.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Partnership Grant Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington D.C. 20523

Child Survival Grants awarded to PVOs are intended to address the special health needs of children and mothers by fostering the use of simple, available technologies that enhance child survival prospects in poor countries, with particular emphasis on oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and immunizations. Recognizing the special contribution PVOs can make in extending child survival outreach, A.I.D. has set aside a portion of child survival funding specifically for their activities. Proposals are reviewed annually and grants are awarded by PVC.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Child Survival Grant Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington D.C. 20523

Ocean Freight Reimbursement Program funds are available from A.I.D. to pay ocean freight transportation costs for shipments of donated supplies for use in humanitarian and development programs overseas. To be eligible to receive reimbursement for shipment to a country, the PVO's program in that country must have received prior approval from A.I.D. The agencies participating in the program pay all warehousing, packaging, processing and transportation costs, as well as the administrative costs of field representatives. Eligibility is limited to U.S. PVOs registered with A.I.D. Before seeking registration, organizations should first obtain additional information on other approval criteria and annual reporting requirements.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Ocean Freight Reimbursement Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

P.L. 480 Title II Outreach Program provides grants to PVOs to improve the development impact of Title II food-aid programs by covering the logistic and material support costs of U.S. voluntary agencies engaged in improving and expanding people-to- people programs in the poorest areas of Africa and Latin America. To help determine the impact of Title II food resources, the project also provides support for the acquisition of scales, health services equipment, short-term training, small tools and equipment.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Food for Peace
Title II Outreach Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

P.L. 480 Title II Enhancement Program project assists Title II voluntary agency sponsors to improve the development impact of the Title II resources they administer by strengthening their capability to design and implement essential components of supplementary feeding programs. The project's objective is to demonstrate that food aid, when combined with other developmental activities, can have an important development impact.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Food for Peace
Title II Enhancement Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Developmeent
Washington, D.C. 20523

A.I.D. Administered Support To PVOs (Specialized Subventions)

Specialized subventions, assistance available primarily for relief and humanitarian work, are the oldest form of A.I.D. assistance. Some subventions require PVO registration as a pre-condition for eligibility; others do not.

P.L. 480 Title II — Food For Peace The United States, under this authority, donates food to developing countries for humanitarian and development purposes. Administered jointly by the Department of Agriculture and A.I.D., food distribution activities and related development programs of private and voluntary organizations may be supported by P.L. 480 resources. Registration confers a preference under P.L 480. PVOs should obtain additional information prior to application for P.L. 480, since other eligibility criteria apply.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Food for Peace
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dairy Product Program (Section 416, Dairy Commodities, of the Agriculture Act of 1949) Previously administered by U.S.D.A. and now the responsibility of A.I.D., this program makes available excess U.S. dairy commodities for use in relief efforts overseas. All private and voluntary organizations registered with A.I.D. are eligible sponsors, provided the host government in the proposed country has agreed to be a cooperating sponsor and provide support, including free entry of donated goods. Foreign governments may also be sponsors. Unregistered PVOs which do not meet the A.I.D. Conditions of Registration may apply to the Office of Food for Peace for participation in the program and to receive consideration. Decisions are based on a review of the qualifications of unregistered PVOs by the Office of Food for Peace. In emergency situations, local PVOs may be sponsors when no U.S. PVO is available to assist. Since A.I.D. Missions play a key oversight role in-country for all donated dairy commodities, proposals for this program should be prepared in consultation with the A.I.D. Mission. Proposal criteria may be obtained directly from the Mission; A.I.D./Washington can also provide general information.

Certain categories of organizations, i.e., churches or organizations engaged exclusively in religious activities, and private foundations, which do not meet Condition 1 of the registration requirements (see Section on Conditions) will not be registered for this program. However, in exceptional circumstances, and pending a review by the Office of Food for Peace, these organizations may become participants in the Dairy Commodities Program.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Food for Peace
Attn: Section 416 Overseas Dairy Donation Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

The Farmer-to-Farmer Program is a recently authorized initiative that offers short-term technical and managerial assistance by U.S. farmer-volunteers to farmers in the world's developing countries. Patterned after the experience of two successful volunteer assistance organizations — Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (VOCA) and the International Executive Service Corps (IESC), each with a solid record of achievement in sending experienced American business executives to enterprises in developing countries — the Farmer-to-Farmer program seeks to improve farm operations of all kinds, including animal care and health, field crop cultivation, fruit and vegetable growing, poultry and fish operations, agricultural education, farm credit, marketing, farm inputs, agricultural extension activities.

The overriding goal of the Farmer-to-Farmer program is to improve farm income and quality of life in rural areas. Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (VOCA) has been selected by the Agency for International Development to conduct this program.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Food for Peace
Farmer-to-Farmer Program
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Denton Amendment (authorized in 1985) provides for the shipment of humanitarian goods and supplies to Central American countries on a space available basis by the Department of Defense. Denton Amendment transport authority was extended to the rest of the world in 1986. Donor organizations (consignees) are responsible for making all necessary arrangements and expenses related to shipment; duty free entry of the donated materials; securing recipient government approval; and distribution of the donated materials in the country of destination. All shipments must be certified by the Department of State as consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives, and by the Agency for International Development as meeting an identified humanitarian need.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Grants Not Limited To Registered PVOs

Institutional Support Grants provide broad and continuing support to recipient organizations. This limited category of grant supports PVOs and other organizations delivering a unique development service overseas or having a service function in support of overseas efforts.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance Agency for International Development Washington, D.C. 20523

Development Education Grants (Biden-Pell) as directed by the Biden-Pell Amendment to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, support PVO efforts to facilitate public discussion within the U.S. on hunger and related

issues and to increase U.S. public awareness of political, economic, technical and social factors relating to hunger and poverty in less developed countries. Grants are awarded through an annual competitive review of proposals. Funds are limited, and awards are made to U.S. PVOs and other organizations with demonstrated ability or clear potential to carry out development education programs. Grants are not intended to fund existing programs or research studies, nor to encourage dependency on federal support or detract from local initiatives. All grant awards require at least a 50 percent match by the applicant which may include cash, in-kind contributions, or a combination. Federal government funds may not be used for the match.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Development Education Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program provides assistance to selected schools, libraries, and hospitals overseas founded or sponsored by U.S. citizens and serving as study and demonstration centers for both ideas and practices of the U.S. as well as centers for medical education and research. Applicants must be non-profit U.S. organizations (preferably tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS code) which either founded or sponsor the institution for which assistance is sought and which can demonstrate a continuing supportive relationship with the institution. Interested organizations should first obtain information on other criteria used by A.I.D. in evaluating requests for assistance.

Inquire:

Director, Office of American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

The Cooperative Development Program within A.I.D. is a centrally funded program in existence for more than 20 years and is further expanded by individual country projects directly funded by overseas A.I.D. missions. The program is designed to implement Section 123 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. Generally, the objectives of the A.I.D. cooperative program are to foster and expand cooperative development in developing countries and to expand and strengthen the private nongovernmental sector of developing countries. The major component of the central cooperative development program is a portfolio of core grants designed to enable U.S. cooperative development organizations to maintain active international departments. These departments develop, supervise and evaluate overseas projects as well as provide assistance to A.I.D. on issues related to cooperatives.

Inquire:

Director, Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation
Cooperative Development Program
Bureau of Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Foreign Disaster Assistance Grants support the extensive humanitarian activities of U.S. PVOs throughout the world in providing emergency relief and rehabilitation for disaster victims. As part of its foreign disaster assistance program, A.I.D. draws upon the unique ability of PVOs to respond flexibly and rapidly in meeting critical human needs when disaster strikes overseas. Decisions to award grants to PVOs are made on a case-by-case basis with Mission participation. The structure and capabilities of the organizations to launch and carry-out anticipated activities are critical considerations in this relationship with host governments. Organizations interested in participating in the foreign disaster assistance grant program may inquire at the following address:

Inquire:

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Origin Of Registration

The registration of U.S. private and voluntary agencies originated on the eve of World War II as a means for the U.S. government to monitor the overseas relief activities of American agencies in warring countries. The Neutrality Act of 1939 required U.S. Voluntary agencies to register with and report to the Department of State. During the war this function was formalized by an executive order creating the President's War Relief Control Board (1942-1946), licensing war relief activities and regulating solicitation and disposition of relief contributions.

In 1946, the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) was formed within the State Department to continue the registry, comprised of those agencies which appealed to the public for funds, conducted voluntary foreign assistance activities and agreed to provide financial information for public inspection. Reimbursement of the ocean shipment costs of supplies of voluntary agencies began in 1947; registration with ACVFA was a prerequisite for that support. Subsequent legislation made registered groups also eligible for the Food for Peace (P.L. 480) and Excess Property Programs known as subventions.

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 established the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) to administer U.S. bilateral aid. In 1977, A.I.D. expanded the registry, citing registration as prerequisite for U.S. PVOs wishing to apply for A.I.D.-administered assistance reserved for PVOs. Subsequently, the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC) was established in what is now A.I.D.'s Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FVA) as the focal point for PVO relations with the Agency, its Bureaus and Missions. In 1980 authority to register was re-delegated from the Advisory Committee to the A.I.D. Administrator, and further re-delegated as follows:

U.S. PVOs	Director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, A.I.D./ Washington
Indigenous or local PVOs	USAID Mission Director or the U.S. Embassy in the absence of an A.I.D. Mission
Regional PVOs	Assistant Administrators of Regional Bureaus A.I.D./Washington
International PVOs	Assistant Administrator FVA Bureau, A.I.D./ Washington

Definitions of these categories of PVOs, and where to apply for registration, may be found in a later section of this brochure.

Purpose Of Registration

For A.I.D., registration is primarily a mechanism to:

- identify PVOs engaging in or intending to engage in voluntary foreign aid operations (A.I.D. maintains two registries, one of U.S. PVOs, and another of foreign PVOs);
- determine whether PVOs meet certain general operating guidelines and accountability standards;
- certify the eligibility of PVOs to apply for A.I.D. resources intended for PVOs, including grants, cooperative agreements and subventions.

Registration is a prerequisite process whereby private and voluntary organizations may become eligible to apply for certain A.I.D. resources intended for PVOs; eligibility for other resources does not require registration.

Registration does not refer to programmatic capability, nor does it confer any official status or approval. It is not the purpose of registration to make, or enable to be made, any representation to the public concerning the meaning of being registered.

The Process Of Registration

There are two major components of the Registration Process: the application for registration and the maintenance of registered status. They are related but distinct processes.

An application for registration requires a letter of application from the private and voluntary organization accompanied by those documents described in A.I.D.'s Conditions of Registration (see separate section on Conditions). By letter, A.I.D. acknowledges receipt of registration applications and reviews the materials for completeness. Incomplete submissions or those requiring clarification will occasionally require letter or phone communications between A.I.D. and the PVO. PVOs asked to supply additional information are urged to do so quickly, so as not to delay the remainder of the review process. Applicants receive written notification of A.I.D.'s determination. Successful applicants are then issued a Certificate of Registration by A.I.D..

Should A.I.D. deny an applicant registration, the applicant will be informed in writing of the denial with a specific statement of those conditions and documentation requirements of registration that the applicant has failed to satisfy. An applicant may, within 30 days after receipt of notification of denial of registration, request that A.I.D. reconsider its application for registration and may submit additional information to A.I.D. bearing on its suitability for registration. An applicant requesting reconsideration will be informed in writing of A.I.D.'s decision upon reconsideration. In addition, A.I.D. may, at its own discretion, reconsider a denial of registration at any time.

Annual Submissions are required of registered PVOs to maintain their registered status. Documentation (see separate section on Conditions) demonstrating that the PVO continues to meet the Conditions of Registration is required within 180 days after the close of the PVO's fiscal year. These documents are submitted to a contractor who, beforehand, notifies PVOs when and what documentation is required. As with initial registration, incomplete annual submissions or those requiring clarification will require additional communications between the contractor and the PVO. So that a determination can be made regarding continued compliance, PVOs must ensure that their annual submissions are complete and timely. Organizations which do not annually comply with the registration requirements will be removed by A.I.D. from the registry. Prior to such removal, PVOs will be notified in writing when removal from the registry is imminent. Once removed, PVOs may not reapply for registration for a period of three months.

Use of Registration Information. Documentation submitted as part of either the initial or annual process serves the immediate purpose of assessing compliance (or continued compliance) with the Conditions of Registration. In addition, the fiscal and program information is maintained within PVC's Information System and will be used by A.I.D. in evaluating applications for A.I.D. grants or other resources. The documentation further provides A.I.D. with the means to determine whether a PVO obtains at least 20 percent of its total annual financial support (cash) for its international activities from sources other than U.S. Government, a requirement for funding under those A.I.D. programs limited to registered PVOs.

Audited Financial Statements. A principal requirement for both initial and annual submissions is an audited financial statement prepared by a certified public accountant. In terms of a PVO's responsibility for public and private funds and as a good management practice providing an accurate assessment of an organization's financial condition, an audited statement prepared annually is extremely important. Further, Condition No. 8 requires that a PVO provide public disclosure of its financial circumstances upon request. This is possible only if audited financial statements prepared annually are available.

Annual Reports. The documentation requirement of an annual report, or similar document, is aimed at eliciting basic information from PVOs regarding program activities conducted during the preceding year (i.e., sectors, countries, sources of revenue and collaborating organizations, such as other U.S. PVOs, local PVOs, Peace Corps, etc.). Organizations having printed annual reports prepared for their contributors may find these to be adequate in complying with the requirement. Organizations not having printed annual reports may substitute a typewritten narrative report containing the same information. The information, rather than how it is presented, is what is of importance. In general, fund raising materials, while supplementing basic program information, often do not contain the specificity needed. Organizations which feel that their fund raising materials will serve as the annual report should review them carefully before submission to A.I.D.

Inquire:

Registration Officer
Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Registration For Non-U.S. PVOs Where To Apply

Registration requirements for non-U.S. PVOs are similar to those for U.S. PVOs, although they vary to reflect differing legal, business or cultural practices from those in the U.S. Conditions of Registration for non-U.S. PVOs may be obtained from the Registration Officer, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance.

There are three categories of non-U.S. PVOs as follows:

(1) **Indigenous or Local PVOs** are those non-U.S. PVOs which conduct operations in the country under whose laws they are organized. The USAID Mission Director has the authority to register indigenous or local PVOs. Application may be made to the Mission Director, or in the event there is no USAID Mission, to the U.S. Embassy.

(2) **Regional PVOs** are those non-U.S. PVOs which are organized under the laws of a country in an A.I.D. geographic region, and which conduct operations in more than one country in that region but not in more than one A.I.D. geographic region. The Assistant Administrators of the A.I.D./Washington Regional Bureaus have the authority to register Regional PVOs. Application may be made to the PVO Liaison Officer in the appropriate geographic Bureau (Africa, Asia Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean), Washington D.C. 20523.

(3) **International PVOs** are those non-U.S. PVOs which are not organized under the laws of any country in the A.I.D. geographic region or regions in which they conduct operations (they are often European, but not necessarily). They may receive funds from two or more countries, have an international governing body, and conduct operations in one or more A.I.D. geographic regions. The Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, has the authority to register international PVOs. Application may be made to the Registration Officer, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, Washington, D.C. 20523.

Conditions Of Registration For U.S. PVOs

The following Conditions of Registration and Documentation Requirements are taken from Part 203, Chapter II, Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. In some cases, notes for clarification have been added to highlight important points.

Conditions of Registration and Documentation Requirements for U.S. Private and Voluntary Organizations

An applicant shall be registered with A.I.D. as a U.S. PVO if A.I.D. finds that the applicant has satisfied all the conditions and documentation requirements of registration listed below. An applicant seeking registration shall submit to A.I.D., Washington, D.C. 20523, the documentation listed below accompanied by a letter stating the reasons for seeking registration signed by its chief executive officer and supported by a resolution of its governing body. In addition, the applicant shall submit such other information as A.I.D. may reasonably require to determine if the applicant should be registered.

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 1

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant is a private nongovernmental organization which is organized under U.S. law and maintains its principal place of business in the United States and is not a university, college, accredited degree granting institution of education, private foundation, organization engaged exclusively in research or scientific activities, church, or organization engaged exclusively in religious activities.

(2) **Documentation Requirement** Articles of incorporation, bylaws, relevant documents establishing its legal status, and a statement as to the location of the organization's principal offices.

Note: Documentation submitted should include the official document of the state in which the organization is established, including the state seal and signature of the authorizing state official.

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 2

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant receives funds from private U.S. sources.

"Funds from private U.S. sources" means cash contributions received from private non-governmental U.S. sources, e.g., private individuals groups, foundations and corporations. Cash contributions received directly or indirectly from the U.S. Government, state or local governments, the United Nations and other public international organizations, and foreign governments, institutions and individuals are not included. All in-kind contributions are excluded.

(2) **Documentation Requirement** The latest audited financial statement (see Condition No. 6 below).

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 3

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant is a nonprofit organization and has a tax exemption under any one of the following provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: Section 501(c)(3), except private foundations under Section 509(a)(2); as a social welfare organization under Section 501(c)(4); Section 501(c)(5), or Section 501(c)(6).

(2) **Documentation Requirement** IRS Statement of Tax Exemption and a copy of IRS Form 990 or 990-PF, "Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax," or one comparable to the Internal Revenue Service document.

Note: IRS Form 990 or 990-PF should be for the latest year available.

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 4

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant is a voluntary organization (i.e. receives voluntary contributions of money, staff time or in-kind support from the general public).

(2) **Documentation Requirement** Latest annual report (or similar document) and audited financial statement (see Condition No. 6 below).

Organizations which do not produce annual reports may substitute a brief narrative report which covers the following points:

- description of program activities carried out during the year, including country or countries of operation.
- budget information by program areas and sources
- collaborating organizations (e.g., local organizations, private or public, Peace Corps, another U.S. PVO).

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 5

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant is, or anticipates becoming, engaged in voluntary charitable or development assistance operations abroad (other than religious), including but not limited to services of relief, rehabilitation, disaster assistance, development assistance, welfare, training, or program support and coordination for such services, in the fields of health, child survival, education, population planning, nutrition, agriculture, industry, environment, ecology, refugee services, emigration, resettlement, and development of capacities in indigenous PVOs and institutions to meet basic human needs; and that such operations are consistent with its articles of incorporation and related documentation included in the application, and with the broad purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and P.L.480.

(2) **Documentation Requirement** Latest annual report (or similar document) describing the development assistance operations. For organizations who anticipate initiating overseas activities, a statement should be included in the letter accompanying the registration document describing steps taken to date to undertake a program of development assistance overseas.

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 6

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant accounts for its funds in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"); has a sound financial position as evidenced by its audited financial statements; and exercises financial planning through the preparation of an annual budget for the year subsequent to that covered in the annual audit.

(i) Further tests of the financial management systems of a PVO are part of the A.I.D. pre-grant award process. In judging the financial management systems of grant applicants the requirements set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-110 "Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals and other Nonprofit Organizations," Attachment F, "Standards for Financial Management Systems" will apply, and by reference, OMB Circular A-122 "Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations" will also apply. The determination as to whether an applicant can conform to these requirements is made through a pre-grant award review which is the responsibility of the grant officer with information provided by the A.I.D. Inspector General.

(2) **Documentation Requirement** The most recent audited financial statement including Balance Sheet, Statement of Support, Revenue and Expenditure and Statement of Change in Financial Positions prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") disclosing administrative, program, and fund-raising costs; and separately disclosing overseas programs costs and sources and amounts of funds received for overseas programs. The Audit shall be conducted by an independent Certified Public Accountant. A budget for the year subsequent to that covered in the year reported in a format consistent with the audit, including the detailing of anticipated amounts and sources of support and revenue.

New organizations which have been incorporated less than a year must provide an independent CPA's statement that financial statements can be prepared in accordance with GAAP, along with an unaudited financial statement covering the period between incorporation and application for registration. The CPA's statement for new organizations will also indicate whether the organization has installed internal controls to enable the execution of an audit in accordance with the applicable auditing standards at the end of the first year of operation.

Note: The annual budget for the year subsequent to the one covered in the annual audit should be specific with regard to sources of revenue, and the programs and program costs to which the revenue is expected to be applied.

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 7

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant has a Board of Directors which meets at least annually, whose members serve without compensation for such services, and that paid officers or staff members do not constitute a majority in any decision.

(2) **Documentation Requirement** A statement indicating that paid officers or staff members who serve on the Board do not constitute a majority in any decision and members of the governing body receive no compensation for their services on that body; the names and addresses of members; and minutes of meetings or excerpts from minutes which demonstrate that the Board holds meetings at least annually.

Condition and Documentation Requirement No. 8

(1) **Condition.** That the applicant expends and distributes its funds and resources in accordance with the stated purposes of the organization, without unreasonable cost for promotion, publicity, fund raising and administration, A.I.D. shall consider fund raising costs as presumptively unreasonable if they exceed 20 percent of the total cash and in-kind contributions to the organization (as reflected in the audited financial statement).

(a) In determining whether an applicant obtains, expends, and distributes its funds without unreasonable cost for promotion, publicity, fund raising, and administration, A.I.D. shall consider fund raising costs as presumptively unreasonable if they exceed 20 percent of the total cash and in-kind contributions to the organization (as reflected in the audited financial statement).

(b) An applicant for registration or a registered agency whose fund raising costs exceed the 20 percent limitation must demonstrate that such costs are not unreasonable in light of the nature of the organization's operations. Upon such a showing, A.I.D. may permit exceptions to the 20 percent limitation on a case-by-case basis.

(c) "Contributions" as used in this section, include U.S. Government financial support, both cash and in- kind, as well as private support; similarly, it is expected that fund raising costs will include costs incurred in securing government contributions.

(2) **Documentation Requirement** A certification that audited financial statements are available to the public upon request and a statement indicating salaries and allowances of the top five principal headquarters positions (determined by salary level) and country director positions. When provided

directly by the applicant, salaries and/or allowances may be valued at actual cost; when provided by the recipient country or local institutions, they may be valued at fair market value. Any other documentation or evidence which the applicant wishes to submit addressing the degree to which annual program spending has been consistent with the stated purposes of the organization and annual expenses are reasonable in amount.

Note: By "country director" is meant a PVO staff person who is resident in a given country and is responsible for the PVO's operations there.

Registration Checklist For New Applicants

____ 1. Letter stating reasons for seeking registration, signed by Chief Executive Officer.

____ 2. Signed resolution of the governing board supporting the application for registration with A.I.D.

____ 3. Articles of incorporation, by-laws and a statement as to the location of the organization's principal offices.

____ 4. Most recent audited financial statement prepared in accordance with GAAP.

____ 5. Current annual budget, reflecting expenses and revenues.

____ 6. IRS statement of tax exemption and a copy of IRS Form 990 (or 990-PF).

____ 7. Most recent annual report or similar document.

____ 8. A report describing steps taken to date to undertake a program of development assistance overseas.

____ 9. A signed statement indicating that paid officers or staff members who serve on the Board do not constitute a majority in any decisions made.

____ 10. A signed statement that members of the governing body do not receive compensation for their services on that body.

____ 11. Names and addresses of board members.

____ 12. Minutes of board meetings for previous three years.

____ 13. A signed statement that audited financial statements are available to the public upon request.

____ 14. A signed statement indicating the salaries and allowances of the top 5 principal headquarters positions and country director positions.

Annual Requirements To Maintain Registered Status

In order to maintain its registered status, within 180 days after the close of each PVOs fiscal year, the following documents must be submitted by a registered PVO:

a. Independently audited financial statement for PVOs fiscal year just ended.

b. Report of Income and Expenditures (A.I.D. Form 1550-2) which is relatable to the audited financial statement.

c. Annual report or similar document.

d. Budget for the PVO's current fiscal year (projected).

e. Copy of latest IRS Form 990 or 990-PF.

f. Statement that all other circumstances listed in original application are unchanged except as noted — e.g., Board addresses and citizenship (new complete list, not just names); principal positions, pay and allowances; country directors, pay perquisites and allowances).

g. A.I.D. Schedule 1550-11 — PVO Project Reporting Information on A.I.D. — Supported PVO Projects (one per activity, per country).

A.I.D. may revise the above list of documents from time to time. In addition, each registrant shall submit such other information as A.I.D. may reasonably require to determine that the organization continues to meet the conditions of registration.



REGISTRATION CHECKLIST TO MAINTAIN REGISTERED STATUS

1. Independently audited financial statements for fiscal year just ended prepared in accordance with AICPA Guidelines and GAAP.
2. Annual report of program activities or similar document.
3. Current annual budget (projected) reflecting amounts and sources of revenue, administrative costs, and overseas program costs.
4. List of principal positions (not Board of Directors or Trustees) including title, pay and allowances.
5. List of the top salary levels, prequisites and allowances of country directors for all countries in which the organization has representation.
6. List of changes in Board memberships including addresses.
7. A.I.D. Schedule 1550-2 — Statement of Income and Expenditures.
8. Copy of IRS Form 990 or 990-PF or a statement explaining why the organization is not required to file such a form.
5. A.I.D. Schedule 1550-11 — A description (one per activity, per country) for each A.I.D. supported activity.

A.I.D. Missions And Offices As Of December 31, 1986

A.I.D. offices are usually located within A.I.D. Missions (USAIDs) in countries in which the U.S. has major foreign assistance programs. In some countries where A.I.D.'s programs are smaller by comparison, A.I.D. presence may be referred to as A.I.D. Section, Office of the A.I.D. Representative (OAR) or A.I.D. Affairs Office. These latter offices are typically located in the American Embassy (although any A.I.D. presence in a country technically falls under the supervision of the American Ambassador). The Mission or Office locations listed below may be contacted through the Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. 20523.

Africa Region

Benin	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Lome
Botswana	USAID/Gaborone
Burkino Faso	USAID/Ouagadougou
Burundi	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Bujumbura
Cameroon	USAID/Yaounde
Cape Verde	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Praia
Chad	Office of A.I.D. Representative/N'Djamena
Djibouti	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Djibouti
Ethiopia	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Addis Ababa
Gambia	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Banjul
Ghana	USAID/Accra
Guinea	A.I.D. Section, American Embassy, Conakry
Guinea-Bissau	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Bissau
Kenya	USAID/Nairobi
Lesotho	USAID/Maseru
Liberia	USAID/Monrovia
Malawi	USAID/Lilongwe
Mali	USAID/Bamako
Mozambique	A.I.D. Section, American Embassy/Maputo
Mauritania	USAID/Nouakchott
Niger	USAID/Niamey
Nigeria	A.I.D. Section, American Embassy/Lagos
Rwanda	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Kigali
Senegal	USAID/Dakar
Sierra Leone	A.I.D. Section, American Embassy/Freetown
Somalia	USAID/Mogadishu
South Africa	USAID/Pretoria
Sudan	USAID/Khartoum
Swaziland	USAID/Mbabane
Tanzania	USAID/Dar es Salaam
Togo	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Lome/Cotonou
Uganda	USAID/Kampala
Zaire	USAID/Kinshasa
Zambia	USAID/Lusaka
Zimbabwe	USAID/Harare
REDSO/East & Southern Africa	Nairobi, Kenya
REDSO/West & Central Africa	Abidjan, Ivory Coast

Asia and the Near East Region

Bangladesh	USAID/Dhaka
Burma	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Rangoon
Egypt	USAID/Cairo
India	USAID/New Delhi
Indonesia	USAID/Jakarta
Jordan	USAID/Amman
Lebanon	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Beirut
Morocco	USAID/Rabat Nepal
USAID/Kathmandu	
Oman	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Muscat
Pakistan	USAID/Islamabad
Philippines	USAID/Manila
Portugal	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Lisbon
South Pacific	Regional Development Office/Fiji
Sri Lanka	USAID/Colombo
Thailand	USAID/Bangkok
Tunisia	USAID/Tunis
Yemen	USAID/Sanaa

Latin America and Caribbean Region

Belize	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Belize City
Bolivia	USAID/La Paz
Brazil	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Brasilia
Colombia	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Bogotá
Costa Rica	USAID/San Jose
Dominican Republic	USAID/Santo Domingo
Ecuador	USAID/Quito
El Salvador	USAID/San Salvador
Guatemala	USAID/Guatemala City
Haiti	USAID/Port-au-Prince
Honduras	USAID/Tequcigalpa
Jamaica	USAID/Kingston
Mexico	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Mexico City
Panama	USAID/Panama City
Peru	USAID/Lima
Uruguay	Office of A.I.D. Representative/Montevideo
RDOC/Central America	Bridgetown, Barbados
ROCAP/Caribbean	Guatemala City, Guatemala

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VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Newberry College - Newberry, SC; January 1990 to present.
Chaplain to the college and instructor in the department of Religion and Philosophy. I teach courses in Christian Theology, Christian Ethics, East Asian Religions, and Religion and Public Policy. I fulfill all pastoral duties of the college, oversee five campus ministry organizations, work with the Center for Ethical Development, provide counseling services to students and staff, develop lecture programs, help facilitate major synodical events on campus, and serve on various administrative committees. I have organized a pre-seminary student organization and an annual thematic commemoration of the week for Peace with Justice.

St. Matthew Lutheran Church - Richmond, VA; March 1985 to December 1989.
Full pastoral and administrative position at a redeveloping congregation in a neighborhood in transition. Accomplishments over four years included beginning the integration process, increasing the membership and financial solvency of the congregation, expanding the church's ministry by centering local community groups, and providing a goal-oriented administrative process beneficial to a small congregation.

Loop Area Churches Association of Chicago - Chicago, IL; September 1980 to June 1981.
Developed evangelism and public relations mass-mailing materials for various Protestant congregations and their apartment ministry projects.

Emmanuel Parish Middle School - Philadelphia, PA; September 1978 to June 1980.
Principal and science teacher. Accomplishments as principal included achieving financial solvency, placing motivated students into select private schools, and expanding the school one grade level. As a teacher, designed and taught a science curriculum which was enthusiastically received by students.

EDUCATION

University of Richmond - Richmond, VA; from January 1986 to December 1991.
Master of Arts in Political Science. Thesis area: Church international development agencies and case studies of American Foreign Policy.

Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago - Chicago, IL; September 1980 to March 1984.
Lutheran House of Studies Program - Washington, DC: September 1981 to June 1982.
Master of Divinity - Cumulative average, 3.800.

Wittenberg University - Springfield, OH; September 1974 to March 1978.
St. Katherine's College, Liverpool, GB - junior year abroad.
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Religion, Cum Laude.

RELATED EXPERIENCE

South Carolina Christian Action Council - Board member on committee for Public Policy Advocacy. Help director and staff identify advocacy direction for upcoming Legislative Sessions; develop Public Policy education days for denominational judicatories, and provide workshops on public advocacy to South Carolina congregations.

South Carolina Lutheran Synod Global Mission Task Committee - Help initiate, direct, and provide Global Mission Policies Program (Japan).

Richmond Area Lutheran Council - Former chairperson and initial member. Participated in coalition to develop area wide, Pan-Lutheran ministry study and was involved in its implementation for two years. I coordinated the representatives from seventeen congregations (ELCA and LCMS) for projects, workshops, conferences, and other events in the areas of evangelism, worship, social ministry, resource sharing, and pastoral education.

Virginia Hunger Congress - Liaison representative for the Virginia Synod (ELCA, LCA). Inform Bishop of Congress activities; achieved Virginia Synod budgetary commitment and assisted in coordinating "Unequal Harvest", a conference on hunger in Virginia.

Task Force on Virginia Missions (ELCA)
Review and advise on congregational mission development (including financial requests), statewide campus ministry programs, and synodical social ministry organizations.

Richmond Lutheran Campus Ministry Council - Bishop's representative to a Pan-Lutheran agency. Bishop's resource for campus ministry activities and programs, chaired committee, and developed campus ministry self-study statement during time of pastoral vacnacy.

INTERNSHIPS

Community Family Life Services - Washington, DC; September 1982 to August 1983. Weekly counseling and service provision for homeless and downtown neighborhood poor.

Commission for Church and Society - DMNA/LCA - New York, NY; June 1982 to August 1982. Reported to staff on United Nations Special Session on Disarmament and assisted director on Corporate Social Responsibility in development of philanthropy porgrams.

Office of Government Affairs/LCUSA - Washington, DC; September 1981 to May 1982. Research Assistant.

References are available upon request.